DAVID T. PROSSER, J. This case is before the court on certification from the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 821.01 (2007-08) and Circuit Rule 52 (Circuit Rules of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit). The four certified questions relate to damages permitted in a suit under Wis. Stat. § 218.0171, Wisconsin's Lemon Law, in a specific factual situation. The questions restated by the Seventh Circuit are as follows:

MICHAEL J. GABLEMAN, J. This is a review of an unpublished decision of the court of appeals, which affirmed in part a judgment and order of the Circuit Court for Rock County, Daniel T. Dillon, Judge. Star Direct, Inc. d/b/a Star Distributing ("Star Direct") sued a former employee, Eugene Dal Pra ("Dal Pra"), for breach of two non-compete clauses. The "business clause" non-compete provision prohibited Dal Pra's engagement in a "substantially similar or competitive" business within his prior assigned sales territory. The "customer clause" non-compete provision barred Dal Pra from interfering with or endeavoring to entice away current and recent past customers for whom he had performed services, with whom he had dealt, or about whom he had obtained special knowledge over the course of his employment. The contract also contained a "confidentiality clause" that barred Dal Pra from disclosing or using certain information such as confidential marketing techniques, customer lists, and trade secrets.

DAVID T. PROSSER, J. This case is before the court on certification by the court of appeals, pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 809.61 (2007-08). The issues presented examine whether there is a right to jury trial in a civil action to recover damages under Wisconsin's Family or Medical Leave statute, Wis. Stat. § 103.10.

ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J. This case is before this court on certification from the court of appeals pursuant to Wis. Stat. (Rule) § 809.61 (2007-08). It involves a dispute between the children of the deceased, Robert Tensfeldt, and the two attorneys who provided his estate planning services, Attorneys LaBudde and Haberman. Both the children and Attorney LaBudde appealed a circuit court order on their cross motions for summary judgment.

MICHAEL J. GABLEMAN, J. This is an appeal pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 809.61 (2007-08) in which American Family Insurance Co. ("American Family") seeks review of the judgment of dismissal entered by the Circuit Court for Waupaca County, Raymond S. Huber, Judge.

N. PATRICK CROOKS, J. This case is before the court on certification from the court of appeals pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 809.61 (2005-06).

MICHAEL J. GABLEMAN, J. This is a review of a published decision of the court of appeals affirming the judgment of the Washington County Circuit Court, Annette K. Ziegler, Judge. After a jury trial, the circuit court rejected Plaintiffs' negligence and strict products liability personal injury claims. Plaintiffs moved for a new trial, challenging the accuracy of the jury instructions on the strict products liability claim. The circuit court concluded that the jury was properly instructed and denied the motion for a new trial. The court of appeals affirmed.

ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J. The petitioner, Ruben Baez Godoy, seeks review of a published court of appeals decision affirming the circuit court's order dismissing his defective design claims in strict liability and negligence against manufacturers of white lead carbonate pigment. The issue presented here is whether the circuit court correctly concluded that Godoy's complaint failed to state a claim of defective design where (1) the product is white lead carbonate pigment; (2) the alleged design defect is the presence of lead; and (3) the defendant manufacturers were manufacturers of white lead carbonate pigment.

PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, J. This case comes to us on certification from the court of appeals.

SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J. The Redevelopment Authority of the City of Milwaukee seeks review of a published decision of the court of appeals reversing a judgment of the Circuit Court for Milwaukee County, Elsa C. Lamelas, Judge.[1] The judgment of the circuit court was that the Redevelopment Authority is not obligated under Article I, Section 13 of the Wisconsin Constitution to pay any sum to the City of Milwaukee Post No. 2874 Veterans of Foreign Wars of the United States as just compensation for the taking of a parcel of real property in which the VFW held a leasehold interest. The judgment also required the VFW to return a $300,000 award that it had previously received from the Redevelopment Authority and to pay $87,348 in interest and statutory costs.

N. PATRICK CROOKS, J. This is a review of a published court of appeals decision that reversed a grant of summary judgment for the petitioner and remanded the case to the circuit court. This wrongful death case concerns a claim by cross-respondents (the Umanskys) that Barry Fox (Fox), the director of facilities for Camp Randall Stadium, negligently caused the death of Richard Umansky (Umansky) by failing to enforce a specific safety regulation at Camp Randall. Umansky was a television cameraman for ABC, Inc. He fell approximately eight feet to his death from a four-foot by eight-foot platform supplied by the University. There was no railing on Umansky's platform at the time. The Wisconsin legislature has adopted federal safety regulations and made them applicable for all public buildings, and such regulations require that railings be installed on platforms like the one from which Umansky fell.

PER CURIAM. Sherry Olson appeals a judgment dismissing her complaint against Jeffrey Bauer. The trial court dismissed the action as a sanction for Olson's spoliation of evidence. We conclude that the trial court properly exercised its discretion in the matter, and therefore affirm.

FINE, J. Robert J. Dietrich appeals a judgment entered after he pled guilty to first-degree sexual assault of a child. See WIS. STAT. § 948.02(1)(b) (2005­06). He also appeals an order denying his postconviction motion. Dietrich claims that the circuit court: (1) erred when it denied his motion to suppress his confession; (2) violated his due-process rights when it allowed the victim's treating therapist to address the circuit court at sentencing; and (3) erroneously exercised its sentencing discretion. We affirm.

PER CURIAM. Chris Hoffman appeals an order denying his postconviction motion to vacate his conviction for possession of methamphetamine as a repeater. He argues that physical evidence and his statements should have been suppressed because he was unreasonably detained, he involuntarily turned over the methamphetamine to a police investigator, and the trial court improperly applied the doctrine of inevitable discovery. He also argues ineffective assistance of trial counsel based on his attorney's failure to call a witness at the suppression hearing, and misleading the court by suggesting Hoffman was involved in an earlier counterfeit drug transaction. Finally, he contends he is entitled to the return of $136 seized as contraband. We reject these arguments and affirm the order.

PER CURIAM. Mark Mey appeals from a judgment of conviction. The main issue is sufficiency of the evidence. We affirm.

PER CURIAM. Jeremy Adeyanju appeals from a judgment of conviction and from an order denying his motion for postconviction relief. The main issue is ineffective assistance of counsel. We affirm.

PER CURIAM. Paul Mey appeals from a judgment of conviction and from an order denying his postconviction motion. The main issue is ineffective assistance of counsel. We affirm.

SNYDER, J. Herbert M. Haldemann, Jr. appeals from a judgment of conviction for second-degree sexual assault with use of force, a class C felony, contrary to WIS. STAT. § 940.225(2)(a) (2007-08), and from an order denying postconviction relief. He contends that he is entitled to a new trial because his defense counsel was ineffective and because the court improperly allowed the State to introduce evidence it had failed to produce during discovery. As a result, Haldemann argues his trial was unfair. We conclude that Haldemann received effective assistance of trial counsel. However, we agree with Haldemann that the State failed to meet its discovery obligations under WIS. STAT. § 971.23. Nonetheless, we conclude that any error caused by those violations was harmless. We affirm the judgment of conviction and the order denying postconviction relief.

ANDERSON, P.J. Benjamin D. Tarrant appeals from the circuit court's denial of his motion to dismiss criminal charges against him, premised on the State of Wisconsin's failure to comply with the time limits of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (IAD). We reverse, because the modification of a national arrest warrant, after Tarrant invoked the speedy trial provisions of the IAD, frustrated the principal purpose of the IAD, to protect prisoners by encouraging the prompt and final disposition of untried criminal charges.

PER CURIAM. Clarence Givens appeals from the order denying his motion for postconviction relief. He argues that he is entitled to a new trial because a witness against him has recanted her testimony. Because we conclude that Givens has not corroborated the recantation testimony, we affirm the order of the circuit court.

PER CURIAM. Joseph N. Knaus appeals a judgment convicting him upon his no-contest plea to one count of second-degree sexual assault. We affirm because Knaus has not demonstrated that the trial court erroneously exercised its discretion in fashioning his sentence.

PER CURIAM. In these consolidated appeals, Daniel Kuchar appeals from judgments convicting him of forgery-uttering, felony bail jumping, disorderly conduct and unlawful use of the telephone. Kuchar also appeals from orders denying his motion to modify his sentence. On appeal, Kuchar argues that the circuit court should have permitted him to withdraw his no contest pleas prior to sentencing. We conclude that the court did not misuse its discretion in denying this request. The court also did not err when it declined to modify Kuchar's sentence. We affirm.

PER CURIAM. Joshua McKindra pled guilty to one count of second-degree sexual assault of a child. See WIS. STAT. § 948.02(2) (2007-08). The court imposed a bifurcated sentence of ten years, comprised of three years of initial confinement and seven years of extended supervision. The only issue on appeal is whether the trial court properly exercised its sentencing discretion. We conclude that it did and, therefore, affirm.

PER CURIAM. Donna Kay Trombley appeals an order denying her motion to reduce the restitution she must pay to the victim of her theft. She argues: (1) the sentencing court failed to apply proper procedures under WIS. STAT. § 973.20(13) when it set restitution at $196,415.16; (2) Trombley did not stipulate to the amount of restitution and the State failed to prove the amount due; and (3) she is entitled to modification of the amount due as a condition of probation under WIS. STAT. § 973.09(3)(a). We reject these arguments and affirm the order.

PER CURIAM. Alfonso Elizalde Santos appeals a judgment convicting him of repeated sexual assault of a child. He also appeals an order denying his motion for a sentence modification. Santos contends that the circuit court erroneously exercised its sentencing discretion. We disagree, and affirm.

HIGGINBOTHAM, P.J. Ross B. Brandt appeals a judgment convicting him of three charges of hit and run causing personal injury contrary to WIS. STAT. §§ 346.67(1) and 346.74(5)(b) (2007-2008). He contends that the charges are misdemeanors under the Wisconsin Statutes and not felonies, and therefore the criminal complaint should be dismissed since it classifies the violations as felonies. We disagree and conclude that the charges are felonies. We therefore affirm.

HOOVER, P.J. Michael Martinez appeals an order denying his petition for determination of heirship of the Estate of Angellika Arndt, his granddaughter. The circuit court concluded Martinez was not an heir because Angellika's parents' parental rights had been terminated. Martinez argues his right to intestate inheritance survived unless and until Angellika was adopted. We agree with Martinez and reverse and remand for the circuit court to grant Martinez's petition and to enter findings consistent with this decision.

PER CURIAM. Lisa and Robert Stellmacher appeal from a judgment dismissing their medical malpractice claims against Dr. Paul Boeder. After a trial on just liability, the jury returned a no negligence verdict. The Stellmachers argue that it was error to bifurcate liability and damages for separate jury trials. We agree and reverse the judgment and remand for further proceedings.

PER CURIAM. Heidi Heldt appeals a summary judgment dismissing her negligence claims against Hauck Power Sports, Inc., and its insurer. Heldt argues summary judgment was improper because there are disputed issues of material fact concerning her negligence allegations. We agree. We therefore reverse and remand for further proceedings.

BROWN, C.J. Travis C. Peterson alleges that he got drunk during a concert at Alpine Valley, decided to sleep it off in his car which was parked on Alpine Valley grounds, and was awakened by a state trooper who insisted that he drive the car off the premises because the parking lots were being cleared. He claims to have protested that he was too drunk to drive, but that the trooper persisted and told him he could sleep it off at a nearby rest area, so he reluctantly acceded to the trooper's order and drove away from the grounds. Then, another state trooper arrested him for operating while intoxicated. Peterson argues that these allegations, if believed by a jury, amount to entrapment. But the trial court granted the State's motion in limine prohibiting Peterson from erecting an entrapment defense. We reject the trial court's apparent rationale that, because Peterson got himself drunk knowing he would have to drive away from the lot when the concert ended, the circumstances were wholly of his own making, thus precluding his use of the entrapment defense, which is available for the otherwise innocent only. While getting drunk is not recommended behavior, it is not illegal, standing by itself. Therefore, Peterson did nothing legally wrong until he operated his vehicle. We reverse and remand with directions.

BRIDGE, J. Douglas Wealti appeals from a judgment of conviction for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, second offense, contrary to WIS. STAT. § 346.63(1)(a). He contends the criminal complaint did not establish probable cause to believe that he operated a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol. He also contends that his arrest is not supported by probable cause. We disagree and therefore affirm.

HIGGINBOTHAM, P.J. Dell W. Horan appeals a judgment convicting him of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of an intoxicant (OWI), first offense, contrary to WIS. STAT. § 346.63, and an order denying his motion to suppress evidence. The issue on appeal is whether there was probable cause to arrest Horan for OWI because he had recently been in a one-vehicle accident; avoided eye contact with the arresting officer; had bloodshot, glassy eyes; was emitting the odor of intoxicants from his person; admitted to having been drinking; made contradictory statements regarding where he was coming from at the time of the accident and the amount of alcohol he had consumed; and had difficulty maintaining his balance.

PER CURIAM. Michael Dobrzynski appeals a judgment dismissing his personal injury claims against Wisconsin Public Service Corporation, M. J. Electric, Inc. and Northern Clearing, Inc. The issue is whether the trial court properly granted summary judgment, or whether a material factual dispute remains as to any or all of the respondents. We affirm dismissal as to WPS and Northern Clearing. However, we conclude that a material factual dispute exists concerning Dobrzynski's claim against M. J. Electric. We therefore reverse and remand for further proceedings on that claim.

LUNDSTEN, J. The defendant, Denise Zurawski, and her now-deceased husband unwittingly placed permanent improvements on adjacent property they did not own. Years later, the owner of the adjacent property filed an action for possession. Denise Zurawski eventually counterclaimed that the equities of the case justified a judgment forcing a sale of the land to her at fair market value. The circuit court ordered a forced sale, relying on WIS. STAT. ch. 843. However, on appeal, the parties agree that the provision in ch. 843 allowing forced sales, WIS. STAT. § 843.10, does not apply. Rather, the main dispute on appeal is whether circuit courts have the equitable authority, apart from § 843.10, to order a forced sale. That question was implicitly resolved in Zurawski's favor in Perpignani v. Vonasek, 139 Wis. 2d 695, 408 N.W.2d 1 (1987).

BROWN, C.J. We read the Wisconsin statutes to say that our legislature favors alternative energy systems, such as the proposed wind energy system at issue in this case. We also read the statutes to disfavor wholesale local control which circumvents this policy. Instead, localities may restrict a wind energy system only where necessary to preserve or protect the public health or safety, or where the restriction does not significantly increase the cost of the system or significantly decrease its efficiency, or where the locality allows for an alternative system of comparable cost and efficiency. This determination must be made on a case-by-case basis where the local governing arm first hears the specifics of the particular wind system and then decides whether a restriction is warranted. But here, Calumet County promulgated an ordinance in which it arbitrarily set minimum setback, height and noise requirements for any wind system that might want to exist in Calumet County. We hold that this "one size fits all" scheme violates the legislative idea that localities must look at each wind system on its own merits and decide, in each specific case, whether the wind system conflicts with public health or safety. We reverse and remand with directions that the circuit court strike the County's ordinance as ultra vires.