PER CURIAM. The Office of Lawyer Regulation (OLR) has appealed a referee's report concluding that Attorney Warren Lee Brandt's multiple convictions for operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated did not represent a violation of former SCR 20:8.4(b). The referee found that Attorney Brandt did violate former SCR 20:5.3(b) by failing to adequately supervise an employee. Attorney Brandt has not appealed that conclusion. The referee recommended that Attorney Brandt be publicly reprimanded for violating former SCR 20:5.3(b). The OLR sought a 60-day suspension.

MICHAEL J. GABLEMAN, J. This is a review of an unpublished decision of the court of appeals summarily affirming the entry of a judgment of conviction by the Circuit Court for Milwaukee County, Charles F. Kahn, Judge, against Marchand Grady ("Grady"). Grady was convicted of first-degree intentional homicide while armed with a dangerous weapon as a party to a crime, possession of a short-barreled shotgun as a party to a crime, and possession of a firearm by a felon. Grady contends that the circuit court erred by denying his motion to suppress inculpatory statements that he made to police officers while in custody. The court of appeals disagreed and upheld the denial of Grady's motion.

PER CURIAM. Plaintiffs petitioned for review of an unpublished decision of the court of appeals, which affirmed the circuit court's decision dismissing the plaintiffs' claims on mootness and standing grounds. After examining the record and the briefs of the parties, and after hearing oral argument, we conclude that the petition for review was improvidently granted.

ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, J. This is a review of a published court of appeals' decision that reversed and remanded the decision of the Milwaukee County Circuit Court, Jeffrey A. Kremers and Jean W. DiMotto, Judges. The circuit court granted the defendants'----Virchow Krause & Company, LLP, and Donald Vilione (collectively hereinafter "the accountants")----summary judgment motion thereby dismissing the claims of the plaintiffs, Henry J. Krier and Badger Investment Realty, LLC (f/k/a Vil-Kri Investments, LLC), but as to the plaintiff, Badger Disposal of WI, Inc. (f/k/a EOG Disposal, Inc.), the accountants were granted partial summary judgment in that only EOG Disposal's claim against the accountants for $7,000 in damages survived because it arose out of Michael Vilione's alleged misappropriation from plaintiff, EOG Disposal. The court of appeals reversed the circuit court's dismissal of the plaintiffs' claims, and as result, the accountants petitioned this court for review. We accepted review and now reverse the court of appeals' decision.

MICHAEL J. GABLEMAN, J. This is a review of an unpublished opinion and order of the court of appeals denying a petition for a supervisory writ of mandamus. Ira Robins ("Robins") sought the writ to compel the Circuit Court for Taylor County, Patrick J. Madden, Judge, to examine all the witnesses produced by Robins at a John Doe hearing under Wis. Stat. § 968.26 (2007-08). The court of appeals concluded that § 968.26 does not require the circuit judge to examine all the witnesses produced by a John Doe complainant. It therefore denied the petition for a writ of mandamus because Judge Madden had no plain legal duty to examine all the witnesses Robins produced. Robins then sought review before this court.

BROWN, C.J. In State v. Hansen, 2001 WI 53, 243 Wis. 2d 328, 627 N.W.2d 195, our supreme court addressed WIS. STAT. § 961.45 (2007-08), providing for double jeopardy protection against successive prosecutions by dual sovereignties in the context of controlled substance offenses. The supreme court rejected the State's contention that, so long as the elements are different (the so-called Blockburger test), dual prosecutions may proceed. Hansen, 243 Wis. 2d 328, ¶¶12, 44. Rather, the court announced that successive prosecutions may not exist when the "conduct" is the same. Id., ¶44. In this case, Julio C. Bautista, relying on two cases from Pennsylvania, argues that conduct is defined as a "common scheme or plan" such that his conspiracy to sell drugs encompasses all acts under that planned endeavor. We are unwilling to accept that definition. Borrowing from a phrase in Harrell v. State, 88 Wis. 2d 546, 558, 277 N.W.2d 462 (Ct. App. 1979), we hold that when a defendant comes to a "fork in the road" and commits to a separate volitional act, it is different conduct and its prosecution is not subject to § 961.45. We affirm.

PER CURIAM. Thomas L. McCants appeals from the amended judgment of conviction and the order denying his motion for postconviction relief. McCants argues that the circuit court violated his Sixth Amendment right to counsel of choice when it disqualified his defense counsel, Attorney Joseph Sommers, and when it denied his motion to reinstate Sommers. He also argues that the circuit court erred when it denied his motion for postconviction relief because the circuit court improperly excluded evidence, did not allow him to explain the relevance of certain evidence, and did not conclude that he received ineffective assistance of counsel for the reinstatement motion. We conclude that the circuit court's decisions to disqualify Attorney Sommers and to deny the motion to reinstate him did not violate McCants' Sixth Amendment rights, and that the circuit court did not err when it denied his motion for postconviction relief. We further conclude that McCants did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel for the reinstatement motion. Consequently, we affirm the judgment and order of the circuit court.

PER CURIAM. Tyrone Davis Smith, pro se, challenges a circuit court order upholding the revocation of his parole. We affirm.

PER CURIAM. Mickey Escamea appeals from his convictions for battery to an emergency medical care provider and disorderly conduct. The sole issue involves Escamea's claim that the circuit court improperly denied his requested self-defense jury instruction. We conclude that any perceived error in refusing to give a self-defense instruction was harmless. Therefore, we affirm the judgments of conviction.

PER CURIAM. David A. Sell appeals from judgments convicting him upon his no-contest pleas to two drug-related charges and one count of bail jumping and from orders denying his postconviction motions seeking to withdraw his pleas. Sell has not demonstrated that plea withdrawal is necessary to correct a manifest injustice. We affirm.

PER CURIAM. James A. Colwell appeals from a judgment of conviction imposing sentence after the revocation of his probation ("revocation sentence"), and from a postconviction order denying his resentencing motion. The issue is whether Colwell is entitled to resentencing because the trial judge who imposed the revocation sentence ("revocation judge") failed to read the transcript of the original sentencing. We conclude that resentencing is not warranted because the revocation judge demonstrated familiarity with the original sentencing court's intent, and properly exercised its discretion in imposing the revocation sentence accordingly. Therefore, we affirm.

PER CURIAM. Vincent Edward Wollert appeals from three amended judgments and three postconviction orders denying his petitions for eligibility for the Earned Release Program ("Program"). We conclude that the trial court properly exercised its discretion in determining that Wollert was ineligible for the Program because early release was inconsistent with the trial court's intent when it imposed sentence. Therefore, we affirm.

PER CURIAM. Ronald J. Leicher appeals from a judgment of conviction and a postconviction order. The only issue on appeal is whether the circuit court properly exercised its sentencing discretion. We affirm.

NEUBAUER, J. Dennis S. Pryes appeals from a judgment of conviction for having sex with a child age sixteen or older in violation of WIS. STAT. § 948.09. Pryes argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss on the ground that § 948.09 is unconstitutional because it applies to unmarried persons age sixteen and seventeen, but not to married persons of the same age, thus creating a classification that is irrational and serves no legitimate state purpose. We reject Pryes's argument and affirm the judgment.

FINE, J. Amey R. Delugeau appeals the judgment convicting her of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of an intoxicant as a first offense, see WIS. STAT. § 346.63(1)(a), and the trial court's order denying her motion to suppress the evidence of her intoxication. The only issue is whether the trial court erred in denying Delugeau's motion to suppress because of what she contends was an illegal stop. We affirm.

NEUBAUER, J. The State appeals from a judgment dismissing with prejudice its misdemeanor charge against Daniel W. Kohel for operating while intoxicated (OWI), third offense. The trial court entered judgment based on its determination that the State's failure to produce a reliable copy of the video taken during the stop of Kohel's vehicle violated Kohel's right to discovery. While we agree with the State that this discovery violation does not support dismissal with prejudice pursuant to WIS. STAT. § 971.21(7m) (2007-08), we nevertheless conclude that grounds for dismissal may exist if there was a violation of Kohel's due process rights. We therefore reverse the judgment and remand for additional findings consistent with the analysis set forth in State v. Greenwold (Greenwold II), 189 Wis. 2d 59, 525 N.W.2d 294 (1994), as to the nature of the evidence and the nature of the police conduct in losing the evidence.

PER CURIAM. The dispute in this foreclosure action involves the priority of mortgages on property Patrick Johnson owned. Shorecrest Apartments Limited Partnership appeals from an order granting summary judgment in favor of Bank of New York (BoNY) in its capacity as trustee for certain entities. The parties focus on whether principles of equitable subrogation apply and, if so, whether the "clean hands doctrine" precluded its use. After much deliberation, we affirm, despite BoNY's marginally adequate pleading and near disregard for proper summary judgment procedure.

SNYDER, J. Barbara C. Grygiel and Janet M. Nahorn (together, Grygiel) appeal from an order for a summary judgment dismissing their claims against Karl J. Scheife and Monches Fish & Game Club, Inc. (the Club). Grygiel asserts that the circuit court's interpretation of the law of easements impermissibly expanded the scope and purpose of the easement that provides access over Grygiel's property to the Club's land. We disagree and affirm the order of the circuit court.