No decisions were released.

• Attorney Fees/ Child Support/ Arrearages
  
  Alexander v. Kopp
  Docket: 2008AP001359 06-04-09
  

  PER CURIAM. Marjorie Alexander appeals an order modifying child support and denying her motion for contribution of attorney fees, and a separate judgment awarding attorney fees to her former counsel. She challenges the court's calculation of child support arrearages and the date from which interest should have accrued; a modification to the parties' stipulation to share their child's medical expenses during four years of college; the denial of her request for a contribution to attorney fees; and the award of attorney fees owed to her former counsel. For the reasons discussed below, we affirm the award of attorney fees, but reverse and remand regarding Alexander's request for a contribution to those fees, as well as each of the support issues raised on appeal.
• Attorney Fees/ Judicial Authority-Discretion/ Wisconsin Consumer Act/ Small Claims/ Debtor/ Creditor
  
  Arrow Financial Services v. Lunemann
  Docket: 2008AP002945 06-02-09
  

  BRUNNER, J. Thomas Lunemann appeals an order denying his request for attorney fees after a voluntary dismissal of Arrow Financial Services, LLC's case against him. Lunemann claims he was entitled to attorney fees under the Wisconsin Consumer Act or, alternatively, that the court erroneously exercised its discretion by failing to adequately explain its basis for denying fees under WIS. STAT. § 805.04(2). We reverse the order and remand for the court to reconsider whether Lunemann should receive attorney fees and costs under § 805.04(2).
• Criminal Law/ Evidence Ruling/ Warrantless Entry/ Plain View/ Constitutional Law/ Search & Seizure
  
  State v. Lee
  Docket: 2007AP002976 06-04-09
  Recommended for Publication
  State v. Lee
  Docket: 2007AP002977 06-04-09
  Recommended for Publication
  

  BRIDGE, J. Kevin Lee appeals judgments of conviction entered against him. He argues that the circuit court erred when it denied his motion to suppress evidence seized when police officers entered his apartment after viewing suspected drugs and drug paraphernalia through the apartment's open door, and after announcing their presence and receiving no response. Lee contends that the officers' warrantless entry into his apartment violated his Fourth Amendment right to be free of unreasonable searches and seizures, and that no exigent circumstances justified the entry. We disagree and affirm.
• Criminal Law/ Evidence/ Judicial Authority-Discretion/ Severance/ Joinder/ Ineffective Assistance of Counsel/ Sentencing
  
  State v. Lelinski
  Docket: 2008AP002379 06-02-09
  

  BRENNAN, J. Steven J. Lelinski appeals from judgments entered after a jury found him guilty of second-degree sexual assault with use or threat of force, attempted second-degree sexual assault with use or threat of force, lewd and lascivious behavior and fourth-degree sexual assault, contrary to WIS. STAT. §§ 940.225(2)(a), 939.32, 944.20(1)(b) and 940.225(3m) (2005-06). He also appeals from an order denying his postconviction motion. He raises five arguments on appeal: (1) there was insufficient evidence to support the conviction on second-degree sexual assault; (2) the trial court erroneously exercised its discretion in allowing in "other acts" evidence; (3) the trial court erroneously exercised its discretion in denying his motion for severance and granting the State's motion for joinder; (4) the trial court erred in summarily denying his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel without conducting a Machner hearing; and (5) the sentence imposed was unduly harsh. Because we resolve each assertion in favor of upholding the verdict, we affirm.
• Criminal Law/ New Trial/ New Evidence/ DNA Evidence
  
  State v. Bintz
  Docket: 2008AP001907 06-02-09
  

  PETERSON, J. In 2000, David Bintz was convicted of first-degree intentional homicide, as party to the crime. Six years later he moved for a new trial on the grounds of newly discovered DNA evidence. The circuit court denied the motion, concluding the DNA evidence does not present a reasonable probability that a different result would be reached in a new trial. We affirm.
• Criminal Law/ Procedure/ Pro Se/ Colloquy/ New Trial/ Right to Counsel
  
  State v. Imani
  Docket: 2008AP001521 06-03-09
  Recommended for Publication
  

  ANDERSON, P.J. Rashaad A. Imani appeals from a judgment convicting him of one count each of armed robbery, as party to a crime, and possession of a firearm by a felon, both as a repeater. His challenge arises from the denial of a pretrial motion to represent himself at trial. We conclude the evidence was more than sufficient for the jury to convict him. But because we also conclude that the trial court failed to conduct the waiver-of-counsel colloquy required by State v. Klessig, 211 Wis. 2d 194, 564 N.W.2d 716 (1997), we must reverse and remand for a new trial.
• Criminal Law/ Statutes/ Procedure/ Charges
  
  State v. Bartow
  Docket: 2008AP002245 06-03-09
  

  PER CURIAM. Burton S. Bartow appeals from the judgment of conviction entered against him and the order denying his motion for postconviction relief. He argues that the circuit court erred when it allowed the State to amend the charges against him in the middle of his trial. Because we conclude that the amendment was reasonable, we affirm the judgment and order.
• Employment Law/ Contracts/ Summary Judgment
  
  Rustemeyer v. CNH Capitol
  Docket: 2008AP001564 06-04-09
  

  DYKMAN, J. Ralph Rustemeyer appeals from an order granting summary judgment to his former employer, CNH Capital Corporation, in Rustemeyer's action for breach of contract based on CNH's calculation of Rustemeyer's annual incentive compensation for 2006. Rustemeyer contends that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to CNH rather than to him because the undisputed facts establish that CNH breached its employment contract with Rustemeyer by arbitrarily adjusting the figures it used under its stated formula in calculating his 2006 compensation. CNH argues that it validly reserved discretion to calculate Rustemeyer's incentive compensation under a contract provision stating that CNH is "the sole and final arbitrator" in interpreting and applying its compensation plan, and that it properly exercised that discretion in determining the figures to use in the formula to determine Rustemeyer's 2006 incentive compensation. We conclude that (1) the "sole and final arbitrator" provision did not reserve discretion to CNH in determining Rustemeyer's incentive compensation, but rather allowed CNH to select between competing reasonable interpretations of the formula it set forth; and (2) CNH's interpretation and application of its incentive compensation formula was not reasonable, because it was contrary to the plain language of the formula. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for the court to deny CNH's motion for summary judgment, and to grant Rustemeyer's motion for summary judgment.
• Family Law/ Divorce/ Maintenance/ Marital Estate/ Property Division
  
  Heppner v. Heppner
  Docket: 2008AP002020E 06-04-09
  
• Family Law/ Divorce/ Marital Property Division/ Judicial Authority-Discretion
  
  Kracht v. Kracht
  Docket: 2008AP002147 06-04-09
  

  PER CURIAM. Mary Ellen Kracht (now known as Mary Ellen Liesse, hereinafter "Liesse") appeals from the portion of the judgment of divorce that divided marital property. She argues that the circuit court did not consider all the relevant statutory factors and erroneously exercised its discretion when it divided the marital property. We conclude that the circuit court properly exercised its discretion, and we affirm the judgment.
• Family Law/ TPR/ Best Interest of Child
  
  Langlade County v. Bobby M.
  Docket: 2009AP000788 06-02-09
  

  PETERSON, J. Bobby M. appeals an order terminating his parental rights to his daughter, MyKarla M. Bobby argues the circuit court did not adequately consider MyKarla's best interests before terminating his parental rights. We affirm.
• OWI/ Evidence/ Probable Cause/ Arrest/ Testing/ Statutes
  
  State v. Morgan
  Docket: 2008AP002142 06-04-09
  

  BRIDGE, J. Robert Morgan appeals from a judgment of conviction for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of an intoxicant, fourth offense, contrary to WIS. STAT. § 346.63(1)(a). He contends the arresting officer did not have probable cause to request that he provide a preliminary breath test (PBT) and that the fruits of the officer's subsequent investigation should have been suppressed. Absent the fruits of the investigation, he argues, probable cause to arrest was lacking. He also contends that the results of his blood test should have been suppressed because the test was not performed by an individual authorized to do so under WIS. STAT. § 343.305(5)(b), and because it was not performed in a reasonable manner. We disagree with each of Morgan's contentions and affirm.
• OWI/ Reasonable Suspicion/ Evidence/ Evidence Ruling/ Search & Seizure/ Community Caretaker Function
  
  State v. VanDinter
  Docket: 2008AP002820 06-02-09
  

  HOOVER, P.J. Rod VanDinter appeals a judgment of conviction for operating while intoxicated, third offense. VanDinter argues the circuit court erroneously denied his motion to suppress. We conclude VanDinter was seized without reasonable suspicion, and we therefore reverse the judgment and remand for the circuit court to grant the suppression motion.
• OWI/ Traffic Stops/ Probable Cause/ Reasonable Suspicion/ Constitutional Law
  
  State v. Ferrell
  Docket: 2008AP002464 06-04-09
  

  BRIDGE, J. Michael Ferrell appeals from a judgment of conviction for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of an intoxicant in violation of WIS. STAT. § 346.63(1)(a). He contends the arresting officer did not have probable cause to initiate the traffic stop of his vehicle because the officer did not have reason to believe he had violated a state statute or local ordinance. We disagree and affirm.
• Pre & Post Judgment Interest/ Contracts/ Property/ Sale/ Specific Performance/ Jurisdiction/ Statutes
  
  Ash Park v. Alexander & Bishop
  Docket: 2009AP000062 06-02-09
  

  PER CURIAM. Alexander & Bishop, Ltd., appeals an order requiring it to pay prejudgment interest immediately and make quarterly payments of postjudgment interest. Alexander & Bishop contends the circuit court was without jurisdiction to enter the order. We agree and reverse the order.
• Property/ Deeds/ Reformation/ Mutual Mistake/ Evidence/ Agency Law
  
  Development Associates v. East Briar
  Docket: 2007AP002519 06-04-09
  

  HIGGINBOTHAM, P.J. Development Associates and Ruth and Galen Manternach (collectively, "Development Associates") appeal a judgment entered following a bench trial ordering reformation of the deed to a 1988 real estate transaction between Development Associates and East Briar, Inc. on grounds of mutual mistake. Development Associates contends that the evidence was insufficient for the trial court to conclude that the legal description in the 1988 deed did not reflect the property boundaries agreed upon by the parties, and that the court's reliance on testimony of Development Associates' attorney for the transaction was contrary to principles of agency law. We disagree and affirm.
• Property/ Statutes of Repose/ Statute of Limitations/ Nuisance/ Warranty/ Statutes/ Statutory Construction-Interpretation/ Towns & Cities
  
  Hocking v. City of Dodgeville
  Docket: 2008AP002812 06-04-09
  Recommended for Publication
  

  VERGERONT, J. The issue on this appeal is whether the ten-year statute of repose for actions for injury resulting from improvements to real property, WIS. STAT. § 893.89 (2007-08), bars this action against the City of Dodgeville. Glen and Louann Hocking claim damages to their property resulting from excessive storm water run-off, which, they allege, constitutes a nuisance and is the result of negligence by the City in the design, plotting, approval, and development of an adjacent subdivision. The Hockings contend the circuit court erred in rejecting their argument that the circumstances here fall into two categories to which the statutory bar does not apply: first, an express warranty or guarantee of the improvement, § 893.89(4)(b), and, second, negligence in the maintenance, operation, or inspection of the improvement. Subsection (4)(c).
• Property/ Zoning/ Ordinance/ Hardship/ Variance/ Statutes
  
  Klug v. Town of Nashville
  Docket: 2008AP001493 06-02-09
  

  PER CURIAM. James and Debra Klug appeal a summary judgment upholding the decision of the Town of Nashville Board of Adjustment denying a variance application. The Klugs contend the board proceeded on an incorrect theory of law, acted arbitrarily, made its determination without any investigation or evidence, without a hearing and without conducting a vote of the board members. They also argue the circuit court improperly substituted its own discretion for the board's, applied the wrong definition of "hardship," and applied an incorrect legal standard. The board contends the Klugs' appeal is frivolous. We affirm the judgment but conclude the appeal is not frivolous.
• Statutes/ Statutory Construction-Interpretation/ Sheriffs/ Summary Judgment/ Contracts/ Employment Law/ Constitutional Law
  
  Milwaukee Deputy Sheriff's Assoc. v. Clarke
  Docket: 2008AP002290 06-02-09
  

  CURLEY, P.J. Sheriff David A. Clarke, Jr., and Milwaukee County (collectively referred to as Sheriff Clarke) appeal from the portion of the trial court's order interpreting WIS. STAT. § 59.27(4) (2007-08) "to allow David A. Clark[e] Jr., as Milwaukee County Sheriff, to perform the duties identified therein either personally, or by means of the undersheriff of the Milwaukee County Sheriff's Office, or by means of deputies of the Milwaukee County Sheriff's Office (MCSO)." (Parenthetical added.) We conclude that the service and execution of trial court processes, writs, precepts, and orders constitute immemorial, principal and important duties that characterize and distinguish the office of sheriff. As such, Sheriff Clarke has the constitutional authority to determine how to carry out those duties. Accordingly, we reverse that portion of the trial court's ruling at summary judgment to the contrary and remand for further proceedings consistent with this decision.