PER CURIAM. Attorney Tim Osicka has appealed from the report and recommendation of the referee that Attorney Osicka's license to practice law in Wisconsin be suspended for a period of 60 days, that Attorney Osicka be ordered to pay restitution to a former client in the amount of $150, and that he be required to pay the full costs of this disciplinary proceeding.

PER CURIAM. We review the report and recommendation of the referee, Attorney Judith Sperling-Newton. Based on a comprehensive stipulation between the Office of Lawyer Regulation (OLR) and Attorney Dennis J. Ryan, the referee found that Attorney Ryan had committed six violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct for Attorneys. As jointly requested in the stipulation, the referee recommended that Attorney Ryan be publicly reprimanded for his professional misconduct and that he be ordered to pay $8,000 in restitution to a former client's parent, who had paid Attorney Ryan's requested fee. The referee went beyond the stipulation in recommending that Attorney Ryan be required to provide a detailed billing to another former client, G.S., and that the OLR supervise Attorney Ryan's practice for a period of two years. Neither party has appealed from the referee's report and recommendation. Thus, our review proceeds under SCR 22.17(2).

PER CURIAM. We review the recommendation of the referee, Jonathan V. Goodman, that Attorney Michael D. Mandelman's license to practice law in Wisconsin be suspended for one year. The Office of Lawyer Regulation (OLR) filed a disciplinary complaint alleging six counts of misconduct arising from three separate matters. The OLR and Attorney Mandelman stipulated to Attorney Mandelman's no contest plea to the allegations of the disciplinary complaint.

ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J. Michael Scott Long seeks review of an unpublished decision of the court of appeals affirming his conviction and sentence for second-degree sexual assault and false imprisonment. He asserts that there was insufficient evidence to convict him of either offense. In addition, he contends that the circuit court erroneously concluded that he was a persistent repeater under Wis. Stat. § 939.62(2m) (2007-08).

SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J. The defendant, Christopher S. Hoppe, seeks review of a published decision of the court of appeals affirming a judgment convicting the defendant of 12 counts of possessing child pornography contrary to Wis. Stat. § 948.12(1m) and an order denying the defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Judge Robert J. Kennedy of the Circuit Court for Walworth County entered the judgment of conviction; Judge John R. Race of the Circuit Court for Walworth County entered the order denying the defendant's motion to withdraw the plea of guilty.

ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, J. This is a review of an unpublished court of appeals' decision that reversed the Waupaca County Circuit Court, Raymond S. Huber, Judge. The circuit court denied the defendant's motion to suppress evidence of operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated and operating with a prohibited alcohol concentration. The defendant asserted that any evidence should be suppressed because the police officer had neither probable cause nor reasonable suspicion to conduct the traffic stop. The defendant appealed the circuit court's decision, and the court of appeals reversed. The State petitioned for review. We accepted review and now reverse the court of appeals' decision.

BRENNAN, J. Austin Curry Ross appeals pro se from an order denying his WIS. STAT. § 974.06 (2007-08) motion. Ross raises seven claims: (1) he was entitled to a competency hearing; (2) he should have been resentenced based on his competency claim; (3) he should be allowed to withdraw his guilty plea; (4) he was denied due process because of the overlooked competency factor; (5) trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to request a competency hearing and to raise the issues he raises in this appeal; and (6) the trial court erred in summarily denying his claim of ineffective assistance without conducting a Machner hearing. Because we resolve each claim in favor of upholding the trial court's order, we affirm.

PER CURIAM. Juan Nieto appeals an order denying his postconviction motion after being convicted as party to the crimes of kidnapping, attempted first-degree intentional homicide, and three counts of second-degree sexual assault with the use of force. Nieto alleges multiple circuit court errors. We reject his arguments and affirm.

KESSLER, J. Robert L. Flynn, proceeding pro se, appeals from a judgment of conviction for being a felon in possession of a weapon as a habitual criminal, contrary to WIS. STAT. §§ 941.29(2)(a) and 939.62 (2007-08). He also appeals from the order denying his pro se postconviction motion for relief. In his postconviction motion, Flynn claimed that his trial counsel was ineffective for a variety of reasons. Because Flynn did not present facts at the Machner hearing that established ineffective assistance of counsel, we reject his arguments. Further, we reject his challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. Therefore, we affirm the judgment and the order.

PER CURIAM. Julious Wallace II appeals from a judgment convicting him of two counts of solicitation of first-degree intentional homicide contrary to WIS. STAT. §§ 940.01(1)(a) and 939.30(2) (2005-06) and from an order denying his postconviction motion. Wallace was convicted of soliciting two inmates to murder his former companion and her current boyfriend. We reject Wallace's claims that the circuit court erroneously admitted other acts evidence and that his trial counsel was ineffective. We affirm.

CURLEY, P.J. Todd W. Berggren appeals from a judgment of conviction, entered upon his guilty pleas, for two counts of first-degree sexual assault of a child, two counts of second-degree sexual assault of an unconscious victim, two counts of sexual exploitation of a child, and one count of possession of child pornography, contrary to WIS. STAT. §§ 948.02(1), 940.225(2)(d), 948.05(1)(b), and 948.12 (2005-06). Berggren also appeals the orders denying his motions for postconviction relief. He argues that he should be able to withdraw his pleas, contending that his trial counsel was ineffective because he failed to file suppression motions relating to: (1) the seizure of a memory stick containing incriminating photographs; and (2) Berggren's custodial statements. He further asserts that the trial court erroneously exercised its discretion when it sentenced him and that the sentence imposed is excessive and constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. We conclude that Berggren's trial counsel was not ineffective and that the trial court properly exercised its discretion and imposed a sentence that was not unduly harsh. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment and orders.

KESSLER, J. Myron E. Edwards, pro se, appeals from an order denying his WIS. STAT. § 974.06 (2007-08) motion for postconviction relief. Edwards asserts that the postconviction counsel who represented him on his direct appeal was ineffective for failing to raise claims that trial counsel was ineffective and for not properly impeaching trial counsel at a Machner hearing. We conclude trial counsel was not ineffective, which means postconviction counsel was not ineffective for failing to so allege. Further, we conclude that postconviction counsel did not provide ineffective assistance during cross-examination of trial counsel at the Machner hearing. Therefore, we affirm the order.

BRIDGE, J. Cheri Ludwig appeals from a judgment of conviction for theft of moveable property in violation of WIS. STAT. § 943.20(1)(a) and (3)(a). She contends the circuit court erred when it modified the standard jury instruction on mistake by substituting the word "may" for "must," and that she is therefore entitled to a new trial. We reverse Ludwig's conviction and remand for a new trial.

PER CURIAM. Jaron David Thornton appeals from a judgment of conviction for attempted armed robbery as a party to the crime, and from a postconviction order summarily denying his motion for resentencing. We conclude that Thornton's breach of the plea bargain was material and substantial, thereby relieving the State of its obligation to honor its previously negotiated sentencing recommendation. Therefore, we affirm.

PER CURIAM. Richard T. Sharrard pled guilty to one count of first-degree sexual assault of a child under thirteen in violation of WIS. STAT. § 948.02(1) (2007-08). He appeals, pro se, the judgment of conviction and the order denying his postconviction motion for resentencing. Seeing no breach of the plea agreement or sentencing on inaccurate information, we affirm.

PER CURIAM. Richard Turner, III, appeals a judgment sentencing him to fifteen years' initial confinement and ten years' extended supervision after he pled guilty to second-degree sexual assault of a child, contrary to WIS. STAT. § 948.02(2). He also appeals an order denying his motion for resentencing. Turner claims the circuit court relied upon inaccurate information when determining his sentence. We affirm the judgment and order.

PER CURIAM. Kenneth Ridener appeals an order denying his motion to suppress evidence seized pursuant to three search warrants. The first two warrants, issued in Marathon County, erroneously identified the place to be searched. The third warrant, issued in Wood County, consists of the judge's signature on the application for the warrant, with no specific direction to the officer executing the warrant regarding the objects or places to be searched and seized. Ridener contends these defects invalidate the warrants and compel suppression of the evidence. Because we conclude the defects are technical irregularities that do not invalidate the warrants, we affirm the order. See WIS. STAT. § 968.22.

HOOVER, P.J. Crystal L. S. appeals an order granting her petition to terminate her parental rights to Jacob D. W. and an order denying her postdisposition motions. Crystal argues the circuit court failed to follow the statutory procedures for determining both whether her consent was informed and voluntary and whether termination was in Jacob's best interest. We reject Crystal's arguments and affirm.

PER CURIAM. Gregory Babcock appeals from a summary judgment decision that dismissed his lawsuit for reformation of an insurance policy. The lawsuit was based upon allegations that Babcock's insurance agent negligently failed to procure sufficient replacement cost coverage on a policy that adjusted annually for inflation. We affirm for the reasons discussed below.

KESSLER, J. Royal Indemnity Company, now known as Arrowood Indemnity Company ("Royal"), appeals from a trial court order denying its WIS. STAT. § 806.07(1)(h) (2007-08) motion for relief from a default judgment for its insured Kathleen A. Johnson. Royal argues the trial court erroneously exercised its discretion when it denied Royal's motion because two independent reasons justified granting relief from the judgment: (1) the complaint was insufficient; and (2) the doctrine of claim preclusion barred Johnson's claim for underinsured motorist ("UIM") benefits.

ANDERSON, P.J. Zachary J. S. claims that he was in custody when he was interrogated in the rear of a locked squad car and entitled to Miranda warnings prior to his interrogation. He asserts the circuit court erred in refusing to suppress his inculpatory responses to questions. The totality of the circumstances leads us to conclude that a reasonable person in the same situation would believe that he was in custody. Therefore, we reverse and remand with directions.

NEUBAUER, J. Waukesha Memorial Hospital, Inc., (WMH) appeals from a declaratory judgment granted in favor of Christopher Snyder, as special administrator of the estate of his deceased wife, Wendy Snyder. While an inpatient in the hospital's psychiatric unit, Wendy committed suicide with a gun she brought into the hospital following a five-hour unsupervised pass. At issue is whether Snyder's claim that the hospital staff failed to adequately search Wendy upon her return to the inpatient psychiatric unit alleges negligence in the performance of custodial care, or medical malpractice, which is governed by WIS. STAT. ch. 655 (2007-08). We affirm the circuit court's order for judgment in favor of Snyder declaring that the plaintiff's claim alleges negligence in the hospital's provision of custodial care, and not in the provision of health care services; therefore Snyder's claims are grounded in ordinary negligence and fall outside the purview of ch. 655.

BROWN, C.J. This appeal by the State involves an application of the facts of this case to the law announced in State v. Newer, 2007 WI App 236, 306 Wis. 2d 193, 742 N.W. 2d 923. There, we held that a police officer can make a common sense assumption that the registered owner of a vehicle is likely to also be its driver and, if the owner's license is revoked, the officer has reasonable suspicion for a traffic stop so long as there are no facts which would call into question the nexus between the owner of the vehicle and the driver. Id., ¶2. Here, there were two registered owners of the vehicle, an older man and a younger man--the younger man's license was revoked. We agree with the circuit court that this fact ruined the nexus which usually supports a reasonable suspicion that the driver is the owner. We affirm.

BROWN, C.J. On April 19, 2001, the Jefferson county circuit court, acting in part on a capitulation by the district attorney's office of that county, negated a prior operating while intoxicated conviction for Michael J. Lindholm, based on information that it was his brother who was driving while intoxicated, not him. Lindholm was more recently arrested for operating while intoxicated in Walworth county and the State charged him with OWI, fourth offense. But the Walworth county circuit court, giving full faith and credit to what occurred in the Jefferson county circuit court, ruled that the proper charge was OWI, third offense. The State appeals, alleging that Lindholm improperly collaterally attacked one of his convictions and that the OWI, fourth offense, should stand. But the State has the issue wrong. The question was already decided in the Jefferson county circuit court and the State is barred by issue preclusion from relitigating its validity. We affirm.

ANDERSON, P.J. This is an eminent domain action. It involves the State of Wisconsin Department of Transportation's (DOT) 2007 acquisition of Mark E. Spanbauer's property for a planned highway project. The issue is, despite the trial court's discretionary role in regard to the admission of evidence, does Wisconsin's project influence rule create an exclusionary rule the court must apply when the sale of a comparable property--here, sold to an entity associated with Kwik Trip--is within the footprint of a planned project, where the sale of the comparable property occurred after the project plans were known to the public or to the purchaser. The trial court answered no. The DOT requests remand for a new trial "at which all evidence of the Kwik Trip sale is excluded from the trial pursuant to a bright line 'project influence' exclusionary rule." Spanbauer counters that "the DOT is asking [this court] to ignore the statute[, WIS. STAT.

VERGERONT, J. Robert Tessen appeals the circuit court's order dismissing this small claims action with prejudice on the ground of failure to appear. For the reasons we explain below, we affirm.

LUNDSTEN, J. This case arises from a transaction in land that is subject to the statute of frauds, WIS. STAT. § 706.02. The buyer, Bank of Deerfield, argues that the circuit court erred by granting summary judgment on the question of whether the seller, David Dinkel, or his company, Liberty Commons, was bound to sell the land to the Bank despite the expiration of the parties' written contract. The Bank also argues that the circuit court erred in granting summary judgment on the Bank's interference with contract claim against another party. We agree with the Bank that the circuit court should not have granted summary judgment to Dinkel and Liberty Commons, but reject the Bank's interference with contract claim. Accordingly, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings.

BRENNAN, J. The Estate of Asia D. Jones appeals from the grant of summary judgment in favor of Capitol Indemnity Corporation, the general commercial general liability ("CGL") insurer for Come & Grow Learning Arts Center, Inc., and Wee World Day Care, Inc. (the Day Care Center involved in this case). The Estate contends the trial court erred when it ruled that Capitol's CGL insurance policy did not provide coverage based on the policy's exclusion for bodily injury arising out of the use of an automobile. The Estate argues that the "independent concurrent cause" rule applies, requiring coverage under Capitol's CGL policy. Because the facts alleged in the complaint triggered coverage under the CGL policy pursuant to the independent concurrent cause rule, the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to Capitol. We reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

GAYLORD, J. The Thomas L. Waarvik Revocable Trust appeals from an order granting summary judgment to Benedict and Laura Solis in the Solises' action to reform a deed executed by previous owners of the properties now owned by the parties. Waarvick argues that the trial court erred by reforming the deed to include an additional 116 feet, thereby giving the Solises access to a town road by crossing through Waarvik's land. The Solises argue that either reformation based on mutual mistake or a prescriptive easement entitles them to the additional length of their easement. We conclude that the deed cannot be reformed based on mutual mistake on the facts of this case, and that the record does not support the Solises' claim for a prescriptive easement. Accordingly, we reverse and remand with directions to dismiss the Solises' complaint.

CURLEY, P.J. Bruce E. Larson appeals the judgment finding him guilty of violating the traffic code prohibition against parking/standing in a parking space designated for a physically disabled person without the proper authorization, pursuant to WIS. STAT. § 346.505(2) (2007-08), and the order denying his motion to reconsider. He argues that the circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion and violated his due process rights when it refused to allow him to present evidence and legal arguments. Larson also claims that he did not violate § 346.505(2), and finally, he submits that the Village of Hales Corners (the Village) selectively prosecuted him because he challenged the legality of the citation. This court affirms.