DAVID T. PROSSER, J. This is a review of a published decision of the court of appeals, Froedtert Memorial Lutheran Hospital v. National States Insurance Co., 2008 WI App 58, 310 Wis. 2d 476, 750 N.W.2d 926. The decision affirmed an order of the Milwaukee County Circuit Court, Patricia D. McMahon, Judge, granting Froedtert Memorial Lutheran Hospital's (Froedtert) motion for summary judgment against National States Insurance Company (National States). The order awarded Froedtert a cash judgment for $130,725.63, plus costs, and an additional $63,223.58 for statutory interest under Wis. Stat. § 628.46 (2007-08).

PER CURIAM. John Ahlf appeals an order which denied his motion for reconsideration of a prior order granting summary judgment in favor of Richard Clapper, Harry Andruss, and Kay Leicht on a series of claims relating to business franchise agreements entered into by the parties. We conclude that our jurisdiction over the order is limited to the sole new issue which was raised in the reconsideration motion--namely, whether Ahlf was entitled to any offsets against the judgment. We further conclude that the circuit court properly denied that requested relief. Accordingly, we affirm.

PER CURIAM. Dennis L. Randle appeals from an order summarily denying his postconviction motion. We conclude that Randle's reason for belatedly challenging the children's paternity is insufficient to overcome the procedural bar of State v. Escalona-Naranjo, 185 Wis. 2d 168, 185-86, 517 N.W.2d 157 (1994). Therefore, we affirm.

PER CURIAM. Larry Myartt appeals from an order denying his latest motion for postconviction relief from a 2000 conviction for robbery. Myartt's current motion claims that the trial court violated his right to a unanimous jury by individually questioning a juror who dissented during a poll of the jury before sending the jury back for further deliberations. We affirm on the grounds that Myartt is procedurally barred from raising the unanimity issue at this stage.

NEUBAUER, J. Jeremy C. Denton and Aubrey W. Dahl (the defendants) appeal from judgments of conviction for attempted kidnapping, attempted false imprisonment, and party to the crime of attempted armed robbery. The defendants appeal from the trial court orders denying their motions for postconviction relief. They challenge (1) the trial court's admission of a computer generated animation, (2) the propriety of a kidnapping charge in addition to a robbery charge, and (3) the sufficiency of the evidence to support their convictions. We conclude that the trial court erroneously exercised its discretion when it admitted a computer-generated exhibit created and presented by a police officer who was not an expert, and who possessed no firsthand knowledge of the facts depicted in the animation which purportedly illustrated the State's key witnesses' combined testimony of "what people did" during the alleged crime. We further conclude that the State has failed to carry its burden of proving that the trial court's error was harmless. We therefore reverse the judgments of conviction and the orders denying postconviction relief. We remand for further proceedings.

PER CURIAM. Robert Cardoza appeals from a judgment of conviction for three counts of first-degree sexual assault of a child, three counts of incest, and ten counts of possession of child pornography. He argues that the trial court erroneously exercised its discretion when it required him to admit to ten prior convictions if he elected to testify and that the introduction of his journal entries was error. We conclude the record supports the trial court's exercise of discretion on both evidentiary rulings and we affirm the judgment.

CURLEY, P.J. Mekious D. Bullock appeals the judgments, entered following a jury trial, convicting him of first-degree intentional homicide and mutilating a corpse, both as a party to a crime, contrary to WIS. STAT. §§ 940.01(1)(a), 940.11(1), and 939.05 (2005-06). Bullock also appeals from the order denying his postconviction motion. On appeal, Bullock raises three issues. First, he maintains that the trial court erred in denying his Miranda-Goodchild motion because his incriminating statements given to police were not knowingly and voluntarily made. Second, he argues that the trial court erred when it permitted a subjectively biased juror to remain on the jury. Finally, he submits that a State expert witness's opinion explaining the cause of death should not have been admitted because the witness could not say that the opinion was to a reasonable degree of certainty. Because Bullock's incriminating statements were properly admitted; no subjectively biased juror heard Bullock's case; and the expert witness's opinion was properly admitted, we affirm.

SNYDER, J. Colin G. Schloegel appeals from a judgment of conviction on one count of possession with intent to deliver narcotics and one count of possession of marijuana. He contends that the circuit court erred when it denied his motions to suppress statements he made during the investigation and evidence discovered during the search of his vehicle. He asserts that law enforcement officers failed to provide Miranda warnings prior to interrogating him and that the search of his car violated his constitutional right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure. We disagree and affirm the judgment.

PER CURIAM. Tommy L. Brown has appealed from an order denying his motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence. We conclude that the trial court properly denied Brown's motion. We also deny Brown's request that this court order a new trial in the interest of justice. We therefore affirm the trial court's order denying relief.

PER CURIAM. Cedric Stevenson appeals from a judgment convicting him of kidnapping, burglary while armed, and armed robbery, all as party to the crime, and from the order denying his postconviction motion to withdraw his no contest plea to kidnapping. Stevenson did not establish the existence of a manifest injustice warranting plea withdrawal, and the circuit court properly exercised its discretion when it denied his motion. We affirm.

PER CURIAM. Jeffrey Keil appeals from a judgment of conviction on one count of second-degree sexual assault with the use of force and from an order denying without a hearing his motion for postconviction relief. Keil asserts he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his attorney permitted him to be sentenced almost immediately after entering a plea and because the attorney was unprepared for sentencing. We conclude that Keil has not shown he is entitled to relief and, accordingly, we affirm the judgment and order.

DYKMAN, J. Kevin Luu appeals from a judgment of conviction imposing sentence following revocation of his probation. Luu also appeals from an order denying his postconviction motion for relief from the revocation and sentencing. Luu argues that his probation terminated as a matter of law prior to revocation because the probation was extended beyond the maximum possible term of imprisonment for the crime he committed. He contends that this is contrary to WIS. STAT. § 973.09(2) (2007-08). We conclude that § 973.09(2) does not prohibit a court from extending a defendant's probation beyond the maximum term of imprisonment the defendant faced for the crime he or she committed. Accordingly, we affirm.

PER CURIAM. Leon Tart appeals a judgment, entered upon a jury's verdicts, convicting him of three offenses: false imprisonment, first-degree sexual assault with use of a dangerous weapon, and first-degree recklessly endangering safety. Tart also appeals an order denying his motion for postconviction relief. He argues the trial court erred by denying his requests to allow him to enter a plea of not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect, and to adjourn the trial. We reject these arguments and affirm the judgment and order.

PER CURIAM. Steven W. appeals an order for guardianship that appointed a third-party corporate guardian of the person and estate for Steven's autistic then eighteen-year-old son, Benjamin M. W. Steven argues the circuit court erred when it appointed the third-party guardian based solely on Benjamin's parents' history of disagreement over how to raise and care for Benjamin. Steven further argues the court erred by refusing to hear evidence of the parents' history of parenting decisions. We agree with Steven and reverse and remand for the circuit court to hear further evidence and employ the WIS. STAT. ch. 54 standards, including the presumption that a parent be appointed the guardian.

CURLEY, P.J. Thomas DeMarco appeals from a judgment in favor of Scott R. Peters, West Bend Mutual Insurance Company, and Marriott Construction, Inc. (collectively referred to as Peters) following a jury trial. DeMarco claims that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a directed verdict and contends that because Peters was negligent as a matter of law, the jury's finding to the contrary was not supported by credible evidence at trial. In addition, DeMarco asserts that the trial court erred when it gave the emergency instruction to the jury. We conclude: (1) the trial court properly denied DeMarco's motion for a directed verdict because there was credible evidence to sustain a finding in favor of Peters; (2) credible evidence likewise supports the jury's verdict; and (3) because DeMarco failed to object to the emergency instruction, pursuant to WIS. STAT. § 805.13(3) (2007-08), he cannot now argue that the trial court erred when it gave that instruction to the jury. Accordingly, we affirm.

SNYDER, J. Charlie N. Burton appeals from a judgment finding him guilty of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of an intoxicant (OWI), fourth violation, contrary to WIS. STAT. §§ 346.63(1)(a) and 346.65(2)(am)4. He also appeals from an order denying his motion for sentence modification. Burton contends that he should have been subjected to the enhanced penalties for a second offense for this conviction because only one of three prior Colorado traffic violations qualified as a prior offense under Wisconsin law.

ANDERSON, P.J. Theodore E. Coerper appeals from a judgment of conviction for operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated, third offense. Coerper argues the circuit court erred when it denied his motion to suppress because the arresting officer lacked reasonable suspicion to make a traffic stop. We disagree and affirm the judgment.

BRENNAN, J. Vicki Tatera, individually and as Special Administrator of the Estate of her deceased husband, Walter M. Tatera, appeals from a judgment entered after the trial court granted summary judgment to FMC Corporation in this product liability case. The trial court dismissed the case on the basis that Tatera had not presented a prima facie case for either a strict liability or a negligence claim. Tatera contends that the trial court erred in dismissing the case at the summary judgment stage. We agree with the trial court that Tatera has not presented a prima facie case for strict liability and affirm on that claim. But we conclude that Tatera has presented a prima facie case for negligence and genuine issues of material fact exist; thus, summary judgment should not have been granted on that claim. We affirm the judgment as to strict liability but reverse and remand for further proceedings on the negligence claim.

HOOVER, P.J. Rebecca Harvey and Jessica Gretzlock appeal orders granting them attorney fees pursuant to the Wisconsin Consumer Act, WIS. STAT. ch. 425. Harvey and Gretzlock contend the circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion by failing to explain how it determined the amount of the awards. We agree and reverse and remand for the circuit court to determine and award reasonable costs and attorney fees, including an amount to compensate Harvey's and Gretzlock's attorney for this appeal.

BRIDGE, J. This case involves a business dispute between Marilyn Holt-Smith and Kristin Yates, each of whom was an employee, officer, director, and shareholder in Holt-Smith & Yates Advisors, Inc. ("HSYA"). Holt-Smith appeals a money judgment by the circuit court based on the court's ruling that, as a director of HSYA, she breached a fiduciary duty owed to Yates as a shareholder by withholding a year-end "bonus" from Yates for 2005, and that her actions in this regard were not protected by the business judgment rule. Yates cross-appeals the circuit court's determination that Yates is not entitled to prejudgment interest or postverdict interest on the damage award.