SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J. The State seeks review of an unpublished decision of the court of appeals reversing a judgment of the Circuit Court for Milwaukee County, Dennis P. Moroney, Judge. The circuit court denied defendant Jaime Romero's motion to suppress evidence that law enforcement officers seized during the execution of a search warrant at the defendant's residence. The defendant was convicted of the manufacture, distribution, or delivery of more than 40 grams of cocaine as a party to a crime contrary to Wis. Stat. §§ 961.41(1m)(cm)4. and 939.05 (2005-06).

KESSLER, J. Stewart Title Guaranty Company appeals from a summary judgment dismissing its breach of contract complaint against R.E. Title Services LLC. We agree with the trial court's conclusions that the Title Insurance Underwriting Agreement ("Agreement") was ambiguous, that the facts are undisputed and that the parties intended that the Agreement be construed reasonably, consistent with standard practice in the title insurance industry. Based on the undisputed proof that R.E. Title followed this standard practice, R.E. Title was entitled to summary judgment and, therefore, we affirm.

LUNDSTEN, J. Michael Sveum challenges his aggravated stalking conviction. At Sveum's jury trial, the prosecution presented detailed tracking information about the movements of Sveum's car obtained from a Global Positioning System tracking device (GPS device) that police secretly attached to his car. Sveum argues that the police obtained this tracking information in violation of his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. The State responds that no Fourth Amendment search or seizure occurs when police attach a GPS device to the outside of a vehicle while it is in a place accessible to the public and then use that device to track the vehicle while it is in public view. We agree with the State. At the same time, we urge the legislature to consider regulating both police and private use of GPS tracking technology.

FINE, J. A jury found Christopher J. Anderson guilty of possessing more than fifteen but fewer than forty grams of cocaine with the intent to deliver that cocaine. See WIS. STAT. § 961.41(1)(cm)3. He appeals, pro se, and claims, inter alia, that the trial court erred when it denied his motion for an in camera review of the arresting officers' personnel files. We agree, reverse the trial court's order denying Anderson's motion seeking to have the trial court review in camera the personnel files, and remand with directions for the trial court to conduct an in camera review of the files to determine whether they contain any exculpatory or impeachment evidence relevant to this case. Inasmuch as Anderson would be entitled to a new trial if the State withheld exculpatory evidence that affected the reliability of his conviction, see State v. Harris, 2004 WI 64, ¶14, 272 Wis. 2d 80, 97, 680 N.W.2d at 737, 746 (The withholding of exculpatory material warrants a new trial "'if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A 'reasonable probability' is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.'") (quoted source omitted), we do not address the myriad other issues he argues in his appellate submissions.

KESSLER, J. James Dontae Williams, pro se, appeals from an order denying his WIS. STAT. § 974.06 (2007-08) motion for postconviction relief. Williams asserts that the postconviction counsel who represented him on his direct appeal was ineffective for failing to raise claims of trial counsel's ineffectiveness. We conclude trial counsel was not ineffective, which means postconviction counsel was not ineffective for failing to so allege. Therefore, we affirm the order.

PER CURIAM. Dionny L. Reynolds appeals his conviction, based on a jury verdict, for first-degree reckless homicide while armed. He also appeals an order which denied, without a hearing, his postconviction motion alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel. We affirm for the reasons discussed below.

PER CURIAM. Tamikia Beamon appeals from a judgment convicting her of two counts of first-degree reckless homicide by use of a dangerous weapon, and from an order denying her postconviction motion to withdraw her plea. We affirm for the reasons discussed below.

VERGERONT, J. Stephen Freer appeals the judgment convicting him of disorderly conduct as a repeat offender in violation of WIS. STAT. §§ 939.62(1)(a) and 947.01, and the portion of the circuit court's order denying his motion for postconviction relief. He contends that he is entitled to reversal of the conviction and a new trial on the ground that he suffered compelling prejudice from evidence presented to support a charge that was dismissed at the close of evidence. We conclude that there was no prejudicial spillover from the evidence supporting the vacated charge and therefore Freer did not suffer compelling prejudice. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of conviction and the order of the circuit court.

DYKMAN, J. Harry Chileski appeals from a judgment convicting him of battery and an order denying his postconviction motion. Chileski argues that he did not voluntarily waive his right to counsel when he appeared without legal representation on the date of his trial and said he wanted an attorney but that he understood it was too late for him to obtain one. We agree that the record does not reflect that Chileski voluntarily waived his right to counsel. We also conclude that Chileski did not forfeit his right to counsel through his conduct. We reverse.

PER CURIAM. Peter Josephson appeals from judgments of conviction of possession of child pornography and three counts of repeated sexual assault of the same child. He argues that he was denied his constitutional right to present a defense when his motion to present evidence that the victim had a sexual relationship with another man was denied under the rape shield law, WIS. STAT. § 972.11 (2007-08). We conclude that the evidence Josephson sought to introduce did not satisfy all five of the criteria outlined in State v. Pulizzano, 155 Wis. 2d 633, 656, 456 N.W.2d 325 (1990), to establish a constitutional exception to exclusion of the evidence. We affirm the judgments.

PETERSON, J. Mark Campbell appeals a judgment of conviction for first-degree sexual assault of a child and an order denying his motion for resentencing. Campbell argues the circuit court erred by not considering the applicable sentencing guidelines. At a postconviction hearing, the court stated it had considered the same factors as set forth in the guidelines, although it did not consider the guidelines themselves. It further stated consideration of the guidelines would not have changed the sentence. Based on this, the State argues the court's failure to consider the guidelines was harmless error. We disagree and therefore reverse the order denying Campbell's postconviction motion and remand for resentencing.

PER CURIAM. Alain Richard Welsh, Jr., pro se, appeals from an order denying without a hearing his WIS. STAT. § 974.06 (2007-08) motion for postconviction relief and an order denying his motion for reconsideration. We conclude the trial court appropriately denied Welsh's motions and affirm.

PER CURIAM. Wesley McKinney appeals a judgment convicting him of repeated sexual assaults of the same child and an order denying postconviction relief. He contends that he was convicted of an offense that did not exist when he committed it. He also contends that he received ineffective assistance from trial counsel. We affirm.

PER CURIAM. The State appeals from an order vacating the jury's verdict finding Jason Edmonson guilty of false imprisonment during an incident in which he battered his fiancée. The only issue on appeal is whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain the jury's verdict on that charge despite the not-guilty verdict on two counts of second-degree sexual assault and disorderly conduct. We conclude it was and reverse the order vacating the verdict and remand for sentencing on the false imprisonment conviction.

FINE, J. Garrett L. Huff appeals the judgment convicting him after a jury trial of three counts of conspiracy to commit election bribery in violation of WIS. STAT. §§ 12.11(1m)(a)1 (election bribery) and 939.31 (conspiracy). He claims that because the persons with whom he was found to have conspired were undercover law-enforcement officers ineligible to vote in the election involved, it was impossible for him to have committed the crimes. He also seeks reversal on the ground that the trial court did not order that the audio tapes recorded by the undercover officers and played for the jury be taken down by the court reporter. Finally, he argues that there was insufficient evidence to support the jury's verdicts. We affirm.

PER CURIAM. Sterling Witt appeals the maintenance component of his divorce judgment. He argues that the circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion by basing the award on his earning capacity rather than his actual earnings. We agree, and therefore reverse and remand this matter for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

FINE, J. John N. and Susan M. Heppner were married in May of 1974, when he was just shy of his twenty-second birthday and she was almost twenty-three. They were divorced in March of 2008. Ms. Heppner appeals the judgment of divorce, contending that the trial court erred in deciding that maintenance payable by Mr. Heppner should end when he turns sixty on May 30, 2012. She also asserts that the trial court erred in ruling that: (1) Mr. Heppner's stock options exercised by him after the divorce were not to be considered in determining the amount of Mr. Heppner's maintenance obligation; and (2) those of Mr. Heppner's stock options whose grant price exceeded the value of the stock as of the divorce would be awarded to Mr. Heppner because they allegedly had "no value." We modify the judgment in part, see WIS. STAT. § 808.09, reverse in part, and remand with directions.

PETERSON, J. Paris M. P. appeals orders terminating his parental rights to his daughter, Yasmine R. B., and denying his postdisposition motion. Paris argues the evidence presented at his motion hearing was insufficient to prove his no contest plea at the grounds phase of the proceeding was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. We affirm.

SNYDER, J. Phaheem S.B. appeals from an order adjudicating him delinquent on charges of second-degree sexual assault, kidnapping and intimidation of a witness. He contends that the fact-finding hearing that resulted in his adjudication placed him in jeopardy twice for the same offense, which is a violation of his constitutional rights. Our review of the record reveals that this issue is resolved by reference to a prior court of appeals decision and that jeopardy did not attach prior to the fact-finding hearing. Under the law of the case doctrine, we resolve the appeal in favor of the State.

BROWN, C.J. Tracey L. Hansen appeals her conviction for operating a vehicle with a prohibited blood alcohol concentration on grounds that the officer lacked reasonable suspicion to stop her vehicle. She asserts that the officer did not see her violate any traffic laws, but dismisses the fact that the officer observed the vehicle she was driving improperly exit a parking lot of a bar at 1:30 a.m. and then suddenly disappear while the officer was following her in his squad, only to be spied again, parked behind a closed office building. We conclude this behavior was sufficient to establish reasonable suspicion for an investigative stop.

PER CURIAM. William Teletzke and Marta Teletzke appeal from the order of the circuit court granting summary judgment to Douglas Nickel. The Teletzkes argue that the circuit court erred when it heard and granted Nickel's motion for summary judgment, and when it barred them from taking Nickel's deposition. Because we conclude that the circuit court properly heard and decided Nickel's motion, and the court properly declined to rule on the request to depose Nickel at that time, we affirm.

DYKMAN, J. Alan Hinze appeals from a small claims judgment in Reedsburg Area Medical Center's action to recover medical fees from Hinze. Hinze argues that he does not owe the amount the trial court found he owed to Reedsburg. We conclude that we, an appellate court, have no basis to disturb the trial court's decision. An appellate court does not conduct a second trial. See Johnson v. Merta, 95 Wis. 2d 141, 151-52, 289 N.W.2d 813 (1980). Instead, we consider whether the trial court erred, and if so, whether the error requires a new trial. See WIS. STAT. § 805.18(2). Because the record in this case does not reveal any errors that require a new trial, we affirm.

VERGERONT, J. In this small claims action Karyn Missimer appeals the circuit court's judgment that she owes Medical College of Wisconsin $4,515.22, plus costs, for medical services provided to her husband, now deceased. Missimer contends the circuit court erred in granting summary judgment to Medical College because there were disputed issues of fact that entitle her to a trial. We conclude the circuit court correctly granted summary judgment and therefore affirm. We also deny Medical College's motion for attorney fees under WIS. STAT. RULE 809.25(3).

PER CURIAM. Western Wisconsin Water, Inc., appeals the judgment of the circuit court after remand from this court. On remand, the circuit court concluded that there was insufficient evidence to support the award of punitive damages. Western argues that the circuit court erred when it reduced the punitive damages award to zero, and that the issue on remand was whether the award was excessive, not whether there was sufficient evidence to support it. Crystal Canyon asserts that the only question before the circuit court was whether the punitive damages award was supported by sufficient evidence and that the court, in effect, correctly ruled that it was not. We conclude that both issues were properly before the circuit court. We conclude the circuit court erred when it determined that there was insufficient evidence to support the punitive damages award and also conclude that the award was not excessive. Consequently, we reverse the judgment of the circuit court with directions to reinstate the award of punitive damages.

ANDERSON, P.J. The City of Mequon challenges the trial court's order suppressing evidence gathered after what it concluded was an illegal investigatory stop of Glenn H. Sievers. We reverse because the arresting officer observed Sievers perform a series of ambiguous acts that coalesced into reasonable suspicion.