N. PATRICK CROOKS, J. This review of a published court of appeals decision involves three questions that arise in the context of a minority shareholder's lawsuit against the majority shareholder: (1) whether the allegations in the complaint state a direct claim by the minority shareholder for breach of fiduciary duty; (2) whether an allegation that the majority shareholder benefited from due diligence----paid for by the corporation for the shareholder's own purposes without reimbursement to the corporation----supports a direct claim by the minority shareholder for breach of fiduciary duty; and (3) whether a pending direct claim by the minority shareholder for judicial dissolution (based on oppressive conduct) survives a cash-out merger that eliminates the petitioner's status as a shareholder.

SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J. The defendant, Mark H. Tody, Jr., seeks review of an unpublished decision of the court of appeals affirming a judgment and an order of the Circuit Court for Ashland County, Robert E. Eaton, Judge. Judge Eaton presided over the defendant's jury trial and denied the defendant's motion to strike Judge Eaton's mother as a prospective juror. Judge Eaton's mother sat on the jury. The defendant was convicted of taking and driving a vehicle without the owner's consent, as a party to a crime, contrary to Wis. Stat. § 943.23(2) and § 939.05 (2005-06).

N. PATRICK CROOKS, J. This case is before the court on certification from the court of appeals pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 809.61 (2005-06). The court of appeals asks us whether State v. Loutsch, 2003 WI App 16, ¶25, 259 Wis. 2d 901, 656 N.W.2d 781 (Ct. App. 2002), correctly interprets the criminal restitution statute when it states that a court may order only as much restitution as a defendant has the ability to pay within the term of the sentence.

SNYDER, J. Donessa T. Davis, Sr. appeals from a nonfinal order granting a mistrial on a finding of manifest necessity and denying Davis' motion to dismiss with prejudice. He argues that the circuit court erroneously granted the mistrial. Davis contends that, because the jury was selected and sworn, a new trial would expose him to double jeopardy. We agree with Davis and reverse the order of the circuit court. We direct that, because a new trial would subject Davis to jeopardy a second time for the same offense, the complaint must be dismissed with prejudice.

HOOVER, P.J. Jason Borelli appeals a judgment of conviction for first-degree intentional homicide and an order denying his motion for a new trial. Borelli asserts numerous claims of trial court error and ineffective assistance of counsel. We reject Borelli's arguments and affirm the judgment and order.

PER CURIAM. Ronald W. Taleronik, pro se, appeals an order denying his motion for postconviction relief by which he sought to withdraw his guilty plea, set aside the judgment of conviction and vacate his sentence. None of his arguments persuade us. We affirm.

PER CURIAM. Raymond Pinch appeals from a judgment of conviction of two counts of forgery and from an order denying his postconviction motion for sentence modification. Pinch argues that he was sentenced on the basis of inaccurate information, that the sentence is the result of an erroneous exercise of discretion, and that his amenability to treatment is a new factor supporting sentence modification to make him eligible for the Earned Release Program (ERP). We affirm the judgment and order.

NEUBAUER, J. Melvin Bridges appeals from a judgment of conviction for possession of cocaine with intent to deliver (between five and fifteen grams) in violation of WIS. STAT. § 961.41(1m)(cm)2. (2007-08). Bridges contends that the circuit court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence obtained during a protective search for weapons following a routine traffic stop. Because we conclude that the search was justified by specific, articulable facts supporting a reasonable suspicion that Bridges posed a threat to the officers' safety, we uphold the decision denying the motion to suppress and affirm the judgment of conviction.

PER CURIAM. The State appeals an order granting Ernest Gardner's motion for a new trial. The State argues that because information about the victim's past sexual assault by another perpetrator was not exculpatory under the facts of this case, the circuit court erred by granting Gardner a new trial. We agree and reverse the order.

VERGERONT, J. Michele Morris appeals the order of the circuit court granting scheduled visitation with her child to Keith and Bernadine Cook, the child's paternal grandparents. Michele argues that the court failed to apply the presumption required by Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000), that a parent's decision regarding visitation is in her child's best interest. The Cooks respond that the court did apply the presumption and properly determined that they had presented evidence rebutting the presumption. We conclude the circuit court did not apply the presumption. We therefore reverse and remand, as explained in more detail in paragraph 15, to allow the circuit court to apply the Troxel presumption in determining whether to grant visitation under WIS. STAT. § 767.43(3).

SNYDER, J. Todd Schoenwalder appeals from a remedial contempt order entered as a remedy for Todd's failure to provide income information in a timely manner as required by his divorce judgment, by a family court order, and by WIS. STAT. § 767.58. The contempt order required Todd to reconcile his child support obligation to his actual annual income for the 2007 calendar year. Todd argues that § 767.58(1) does not require constant income fluctuation reporting and that, if it did, the trial court erroneously exercised its discretion in holding Todd in contempt on that basis. We affirm the contempt finding and order.

PER CURIAM. Scott Johnson appeals a divorce judgment dividing his and Wendie Johnson's property equally between them. Scott argues the circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion by failing to address evidence he contends warranted deviation from the presumption of equal division. He also argues the court erred by awarding Wendie attorney fees in its initial decision, and then twice more in oral orders following Scott's postjudgment motions. We agree. We reverse and remand for the court to make factual findings on the evidence Scott presented and to address his argument that he rebutted the presumption that the parties' property should be divided equally. We also direct the court to redetermine the initial grant of attorney fees. We vacate the orders awarding Wendie attorney fees for Scott's postjudgment motions.

NEUBAUER, J. William S.L. and Tanya M.B. appeal from trial court orders terminating their parental rights to their three children, Elijah, Emily, and Irie, on grounds that the children were in continuing need of protection or services under WIS. STAT. § 48.415(2)(a). The parents contend that there was no credible evidence to support the jury's finding that the Sheboygan County Department of Health and Human Services made reasonable efforts to provide specific court-ordered services as required by WIS. STAT. §§ 48.355(2)(b)1. and 48.415(2)(a)2. Because the CHIPS dispositional orders underlying the termination of parental rights (TPR) petitions failed to set forth any court-ordered services as required by § 48.355(2)(b)1., we conclude that the trial court erred in denying the parents' motions to change the jury's special verdict answers and dismiss the TPR petitions on that basis. We reverse the trial court's orders.

BRENNAN, J. InsureMax Insurance Company appeals from an order reserving its right to appeal from the trial court's denial of its motion seeking summary judgment on coverage. InsureMax contends the trial court should have ruled that its policy did not provide coverage because the "deemed permission" rule set forth in Arps v. Seelow, 163 Wis. 2d 645, 472 N.W.2d 542 (Ct. App. 1991), does not apply to the facts of this case, and because the car, as it was being used when the accident occurred here, does not qualify as an insured car under InsureMax's insurance policy. Because InsureMax's policy did not provide coverage for the car under the specific circumstances in this case, we reverse the order and direct the trial court to grant judgment to InsureMax.

DYKMAN, J. Christopher Stahl appeals from a judgment convicting him of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of an intoxicant (OWI), second offense, contrary to WIS. STAT. § 346.63(1)(a). Stahl contends that the arresting officer lacked probable cause to request he take a preliminary breathalyzer test (PBT), and also lacked probable cause to arrest him for OWI. We conclude that the State had probable cause to arrest Stahl based on the arresting officer's observations before requesting Stahl take a PBT. We affirm.

ANDERSON, P.J. Eric A. Johnson challenges the investigatory stop that led to his arrest for operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated (OWI). Johnson argues that the citizen who contacted the police ought not qualify as a reliable informant because he both lacked a record of being a reliable informant and because his information lacked enough specificity. Johnson further argues that the arresting officer lacked sufficient articulable facts required to initiate a stop and, consequently, that the officer lacked requisite reasonable suspicion to initiate the stop. We reject Johnson's appeal and affirm because, based on the totality of the circumstances, there was reasonable suspicion to initiate the stop.

PER CURIAM. Gallagher Real Estate LLC appeals a money judgment. We affirm.

BROWN, C.J. This case concerns that part of our consumer protection law dealing with unauthorized motor vehicle repair. WISCONSIN ADMIN. CODE § ATCP 132.09(4)(e) (Oct. 2004) states, in pertinent part, that "[n]o shop may [d]emand or receive payment for unauthorized repairs, or for repairs that have not been performed." We hold that a major purpose of this provision is to prevent either unexpected repairs, unexpected expense or both. Therefore, if the work done here was unauthorized, then the harm to the consumer, Randy W. Kaskin, was that he was deprived of his prescribed right to be informed and his concomitant right to consent or refuse consent. The remedy for a violation of this right is that the repair shop must forego being paid, even if the shop did, in fact, satisfactorily repair the vehicle.

VERGERONT, J. The issue on this appeal is whether Wood County is the entity responsible for Richard S.P.'s care and treatment under an order for commitment pursuant to WIS. STAT. § 51.20 (2007-08). The resolution of this issue turns on whether Richard is a resident of Wood County within the meaning of WIS. STAT. § 49.001(6). The circuit court held that he was not, and the Wisconsin Department of Health Services appeals. Construing and applying § 49.001(6) in a manner consistent with the statutory scheme established in § 51.20 and related statutes, we conclude that Richard is a resident of Wood County. Accordingly, we reverse.

PER CURIAM. Shalonda Ezell and Omarion Ezell, by his guardian (collectively, Shalonda), appeal a judgment dismissing their personal injury claims against the Boomland Learning Center, LLC, and its insurer. The issue is whether the trial court properly granted summary judgment to Boomland. We affirm.

PER CURIAM. June Shannon, Joni Sharpe, Joshua Bindl, Kerry Shannon, Robert Shannon, Sarah Munz and Timothy Munz appeal from an order admitting the will of Mae Smart into probate over their objections. The Appellants challenge both the trial court's findings of fact and its conclusion that Smart did not execute the will as the result of undue influence. Respondents UW-Richland Campus Foundation and Bonnie Moerer move to strike an argument they claim was raised for the first time in the Appellant's reply brief and ask this court to declare the appeal frivolous. As we will explain below, we decline to strike an argument from the reply brief, but do conclude that the appeal is frivolous. Accordingly, the probate order is affirmed and the Respondents shall be awarded their costs, fees and attorney fees.