PER CURIAM. After examining the record and the briefs of the parties, and after hearing oral argument, we conclude that the petition for review was improvidently granted.

ANDERSON, P.J. Emerging Energies (EE) appeals from decisions of the circuit court that EE's challenge to Manitowoc County's ordinance governing large wind energy systems lacked the requisite ripeness and dismissing its declaratory judgment action. We affirm because EE has not pointed to any adjudicative facts that permit a court to issue an opinion that declares the parties' respective rights.

BRENNAN, J. Adam Procell appeals pro se from an order denying his WIS. STAT. § 974.06 (2005-06) postconviction motion. This is Procell's second appeal following his convictions for first-degree intentional homicide and attempted first-degree intentional homicide, both as a party to a crime. We affirmed the judgment following his direct appeal. See State v. Procell, No. 97-0182, unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. Mar. 10, 1998).

PER CURIAM. Edward J. Mendez appeals from a judgment of conviction entered after a jury found him guilty of first-degree sexual assault of a child. He contends that the circuit court improperly barred him from offering evidence tending to show that the victim was of untruthful character and had a motive to make a false accusation. We reject his contentions and affirm.

PER CURIAM. Mong Lor appeals from the judgment of conviction entered against him and the order denying his motion for postconviction relief. He argues that his trial counsel was ineffective because she did not pursue a cultural marriage defense to the charge of sexual assault of a child. Because we conclude that Wisconsin does not recognize such a defense in these circumstances, trial counsel is not ineffective for failing to raise it. We affirm the judgment and order.

KESSLER, J. Jeffrey Edward Olson, pro se, appeals from a judgment of conviction for two counts of fourth-degree sexual assault, contrary to WIS. STAT. § 940.225(3m) (2005-06), and from an order denying his motion for postconviction relief. Olson, who entered Alford pleas to the crimes, argues that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel and that the State illegally suppressed evidence that was favorable to the defense. We affirm the judgment and order.

PER CURIAM. Robert Martinez appeals from a judgment of conviction for seven counts of possession of child pornography and an order denying postconviction relief. Martinez argues we should vacate the convictions and grant a new trial because the real controversy was not fully tried. We reject his arguments and affirm.

PER CURIAM. Timothy Shattuck appeals from the judgment of conviction entered against him and the order denying his motion for postconviction relief. Shattuck argues that the State violated the terms of the plea agreement when the prosecutor mentioned during sentencing a charge that had been dismissed, and that as a result, he should be allowed to withdraw his guilty plea. Because we conclude that the sentencing court stated that it would not consider the dismissed charge, we conclude that Shattuck has not established that there was a manifest injustice, and is not entitled to withdraw his plea.

BRUNNER, J. Omer Ninham appeals an order denying his postconviction motion seeking modification of his life sentence to allow for the possibility of parole. He argues: (1) a sentence of life without the possibility of parole for a crime committed by a fourteen-year-old violates the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment; (2) regardless of the constitutionality of the sentence, it was unduly harsh and excessive; (3) new scientific evidence regarding adolescent brain development constitutes a new factor justifying a sentence reduction; and (4) he was sentenced based on consideration of an improper factor, specifically, the victim's family's belief system. We reject these arguments and affirm the order.

PER CURIAM. Aurora Medical Center and Sentry Insurance, a Mutual Company (collectively Aurora), appeal from the order of the circuit court affirming the order of the Labor and Industry Review Commission (LIRC) awarding compensation to Curtis G. Thoms for a work-related injury. Aurora argues that there was no credible evidence to support LIRC's finding that this was a work-related injury and not a preexisting condition, and that LIRC improperly placed the burden of proof on it. Because we conclude that there was sufficient evidence to sustain LIRC's findings and conclusions, and that LIRC did not place the burden of proof on the employer, we affirm.

PER CURIAM. This is another in a series of William S. Roush, Jr.'s appeals of post-divorce judgment proceedings. He appeals an order finding him in contempt for willful nonpayment of maintenance to his former wife, Nancy Hanna Roush. We affirm the order and deny frivolous appeal costs to Nancy.

PER CURIAM. Elisa M. Rose appeals from the order dismissing her motion and supplemental motion to modify placement. Rose argues that her motion was sufficient to establish that there had been a change in circumstances warranting modification of placement, that she was entitled to a hearing on the motion, and that the circuit court erred when it dismissed her motion. Rose argues that a change in circumstances occurred when her son's primary placement was changed from with his father in Wisconsin to with her in California. She further argues that because of that change, her daughter's primary placement should also be with her. We conclude that Rose has not established a substantial change in circumstances, which is a necessary predicate to modification of placement.

ANDERSON, P.J. Susie Y. Chon appeals from a circuit court order denying her motion to reverse an order entered by the Kenosha county family court commissioner. Chon argues that the circuit court incorrectly denied her motion for a de novo hearing on the issues addressed by the family court commissioner's order. We conclude that the plain language of WIS. STAT. § 757.69(8) (2005-06) entitles Chon to a new trial on both questions of fact and issues of law. Therefore, we reverse and remand with directions that the circuit court conduct a new trial on the issues presented by Chon.

PER CURIAM. Belva Zocher-Burke appeals from the order of the circuit court that dismissed Acuity, a Mutual Insurance Company, from the underlying action. Zocher-Burke argues that Acuity is required to defend her in this action under the terms of Acuity's insurance policy with her employer. Because we agree with the circuit court that the insurance policy does not provide coverage to Zocher-Burke for this action, we affirm.

BROWN, C.J. A lady, who was 102 years old at the time of the court hearing on this action, was a passenger in her daughter's vehicle when she was injured due to the alleged negligence of her daughter. On top of that, her doctors were allegedly negligent in treating her injuries, resulting in paralysis. The centigenarian elected to sue only her daughter because Wisconsin law allows the doctors' alleged malpractice to be rolled into the injuries from the auto accident since, without the accident, the malpractice would not have occurred. But the daughter's insurer wanted subrogation from the allegedly negligent doctors and filed a cross-complaint against them and the hospital. The circuit court dismissed the cross-complaint because the insurer did not comply with WIS. STAT. ch. 655 (2007-08), our state's malpractice statute, requiring mediation. We uphold that, but remand on the issue of whether the statute of limitations prevents the insurer from now going the ch. 655 route.

SNYDER, J. Jennifer Mosby and Brandon Boyd (tenants) appeal from a judgment of eviction and writ of restitution (judgment) entered in favor of Cartlein Investments, LLC (landlord). The judgment was entered on May 19, 2008, after trial to the court in a proceeding governed by WIS. STAT.

VERGERONT, J. Daniel Odegard appeals the judgment of conviction, after a jury trial, for operating while under the influence of an intoxicant (OWI), third offense, contrary to WIS. STAT. § 346.63(1)(a). He contends the circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion in denying his request for a mistrial and in permitting specified questions on the preliminary breath (PBT) test he was given. We conclude the court did not erroneously exercise its discretion in either respect. We therefore affirm.

PER CURIAM. Joseph Hall appeals from a judgment dismissing his action to declare his ownership of a certain parcel of land by adverse possession. He argues he proved adverse possession based on a recorded instrument and by twenty years of actual use and possession of the land. We conclude that the trial court's finding that there was not continuous adverse possession is not clearly erroneous and affirm the judgment.

BROWN, C.J. Daniel Buckett paid the property taxes on a portion of his neighbors' property for over twenty-five years, but neither he nor his neighbors, Glenn and Elsie Jante, knew it. It was not until the Wisconsin Department of Transportation condemned the parcel and paid the Jantes $63,000 that both parties found out. Buckett wanted to be paid back, so he sued, inter alia, for a portion of the condemnation sale price on the theory of unjust enrichment. The circuit court held that unjust enrichment was unavailable because the Jantes did not have "knowledge or appreciation" that Buckett was paying their taxes contemporaneous with Buckett's tax payments. The law is, however, that when the benefit conferred can be easily returned, like money for example, the benefited party need not have knowledge or appreciation of the gain at the precise time it is conferred. Instead, the party asserting an unjust enrichment claim satisfies the knowledge or appreciation element by proving that the benefited party had knowledge of or appreciated the benefit at a time which provided the party a fair opportunity to choose whether to accept or reject that benefit. So, we disagree with the circuit court on the law. Because the parties dispute the amount of taxes each party paid, we reverse and remand with directions that the trial court determine the amount that the Jantes were unjustly enriched.

PER CURIAM. Chase Home Finance, LLC appeals an order distributing a deposit made following a sheriff's sale of foreclosed property. Chase argues it was entitled to a forfeiture of the entire deposit pursuant to WIS. STAT. § 846.17. We disagree and affirm the order.

PER CURIAM. Maple Lawn, LLC appeals from an order confirming the foreclosure sale of property owned by VWH Development, LLC, and Vern Hagstrom (collectively Hagstrom), and dismissing its counterclaims against mortgage holder Construction Mortgage Investors Co. (CMIC). Maple Lawn argues that CMIC fraudulently induced it to sign a subordination agreement giving CMIC mortgage priority and that CMIC breached special duties owed to Maple Lawn and the duty of good faith and fair dealing implied in every contract. We conclude that the circuit court properly dismissed Maple Lawn's counterclaims and we affirm the order confirming the sale.

PER CURIAM. John Paderta and Anne Petrich (hereafter Paderta) appeal from a summary judgment dismissing their claims against Glenwood Springs Club, Inc. arising from the location of a Glenwood Springs structure on Geneva Lake which Paderta contended interfered with his lake access. We agree with the circuit court that Paderta's response to Glenwood Springs' summary judgment motion was deficient and raised no issue of genuine material fact. We affirm.

NEUBAUER, J. John A. Mittnacht and Theresa Mittnacht appeal from a summary judgment granted in favor of St. Paul Fire and Casualty Insurance Company. John was injured in an automobile accident while operating his own auto during the course of his employment. He seeks uninsured motorist (UM) and medical payments coverage under his employer's commercial auto policy. It is undisputed that John's car is not a "covered auto" under the policy's UM insuring agreement, but arguably would be a "covered auto" under the separate liability insuring agreement. The trial court denied the Mittnachts' contention that WIS. STAT. § 632.32(1), (3) and (4) (2007-08), requires UM coverage for all motor vehicles eligible for liability coverage. We hold that the statute does not require St. Paul to provide John with UM coverage when operating a personal car that is not described in the UM coverage section of the policy. Additionally, § 632.32(4)(b) permits the named insured to reject medical payments coverage. Here, the policy does not provide medical payments coverage to John. We uphold the trial court's grant of summary judgment and affirm.