SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J. The defendant, Dhosi J. Ndina, seeks review of a published decision of the court of appeals reversing an order of the Circuit Court for Milwaukee County, Dennis P. Moroney, Judge. At the hearing on the defendant's postconviction motion for a new trial, the circuit court reversed a judgment of conviction against the defendant and granted the defendant's postconviction motion for a new trial. The circuit court (Judge Moroney) concluded that the circuit court (Mary M. Kuhnmuench, Circuit Court Judge for Milwaukee County), had violated the defendant's right to a public trial under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution by excluding the defendant's family from three days of the trial proceedings.

KESSLER, J. Shermell G. Tabor appeals from a judgment and an order finding him to be a sexually violent person under WIS. STAT. ch. 980 (2001-02), and committing him to the custody of the Department of Health and Family Services (DHFS) for treatment. He also seeks reversal of a post-commitment order denying his post-commitment motion for dismissal or a new trial. Tabor argues that the commitment order should be dismissed because the trial court lost jurisdiction when the DHFS transferred custody of Tabor to the Juneau County Jail and the Department of Corrections (DOC) so that he could serve a criminal sentence while the ch. 980 case was pending. In the alternative, he argues that he is entitled to a new trial because he never personally waived his previously demanded jury trial before proceeding with a court trial.

BRIDGE, J. U.S. Oil Company, Inc. appeals a judgment of the circuit court finding that U.S. Oil materially breached a contract for the sale of property owned by U.S. Oil and ordering U.S. Oil to convey title to the property to AMBR Enterprises upon tender of the purchase price. It contends that the circuit court erred in concluding that there was a breach because AMBR's complaint did not allege that a breach occurred on the date identified by the circuit court, nor did AMBR present evidence at trial which indicated that AMBR considered the contract to be in breach on that date. It also argues that, pursuant to a provision in the contract addressing the acceptability of title at closing, it was excused from conveying title to the property to AMBR. Finally, it argues that even if it did breach its agreement to convey title, a subsequent addendum to the contract cured that breach under the doctrines of waiver or novation. We reject each argument and affirm.

BRUNNER, J. Lorenzo Thompson, pro se, appeals a judgment rendered against him for violating Price County's Shoreline Zoning Ordinance. Thompson contends the court erroneously denied his motion to dismiss the case on double jeopardy grounds. We disagree and affirm the judgment.

PER CURIAM. Aaron Lee Simmons appeals from a judgment of conviction for possessing a firearm as a felon to challenge an order denying his suppression motion. Simmons did not yield to a show of authority and discarded a gun and ammunition prior to being seized; we therefore conclude that the trial court properly denied his suppression motion. Therefore, we affirm.

BRENNAN, J. Jose S. Soto appeals from orders denying his WIS. STAT. § 974.06 (2005-06) postconviction motion. Soto argues that: (1) his postconviction counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to allege his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance regarding the refusal to allow him phone privileges to contact counsel during interrogation; (2) the trial court erred in summarily denying (without holding an evidentiary hearing) his ineffective assistance claim that postconviction counsel should have alleged that David Claudio's confession constituted newly discovered evidence; and (3) the trial court should have conducted a hearing on his claim that he was actually innocent. Because we resolve each claim in favor of upholding the postconviction orders, we affirm.

PER CURIAM. Derrick Pablo appeals pro se from a judgment of conviction of party to the crime of child abuse and two counts of intimidation of a victim by use or attempted use of force. He also appeals from the order denying his postconviction motion to withdraw his guilty plea. He argues that there is no factual basis to support the convictions, that the complaint failed to state probable cause, and that his trial counsel was ineffective for not moving to dismiss and sever certain charges. We reject his claims and affirm the judgment and order.

PER CURIAM. Janice M. Welton pled guilty to one count of conspiracy to commit theft by fraud, less than $10,000, and one count of misappropriation of personal identifying information. See WIS. STAT. §§ 943.20(1)(d), 939.61, & 943.201(2)(a) (2005-06). The trial court sentenced Welton to fifteen months of initial confinement and sixty months of extended supervision for the theft by fraud charge, and to a concurrent sentence of twelve months of initial confinement and twelve months of extended supervision for the identity theft charge. The only issue on appeal is whether the trial court properly exercised its sentencing discretion. We conclude that it did and, therefore, affirm.

PER CURIAM. Davith Moua appeals from a judgment of conviction for first-degree recklessly endangering safety while armed, and from a postconviction order denying his sentence modification motion. The issues are whether the trial court imposed an unduly harsh sentence, and whether imposition of a significantly lesser sentence on Moua's co-actor, one month after Moua was sentenced, constituted a new factor warranting sentence modification to alleviate the alleged disparity. We conclude that the trial court properly exercised its discretion and imposed a sentence that was not unduly harsh, and that the sentence subsequently imposed on Moua's co-actor was not a new sentencing factor, nor did it result in disparate sentences. Therefore, we affirm.

PER CURIAM. Isreal Alvarado-Reyes pled guilty to one count of first-degree reckless homicide. See WIS. STAT. § 940.02(1) (2005-06). The trial court imposed a bifurcated sentence of seventeen years of initial confinement and eight years of extended supervision. Alvarado-Reyes filed a pro se motion to modify sentence, relying on WIS. STAT. § 973.13. The trial court denied the motion. Alvarado-Reyes appeals. We affirm.

PER CURIAM. Byron Preston Reeves, Jr., appeals from a judgment of conviction for possessing cocaine to challenge an order denying his suppression motion. The issue is whether the police had reasonable suspicion to justify detaining Reeves. We conclude that they did, and that the investigative stop of Reeves was constitutionally reasonable, rendering valid his subsequent arrest and search during which police discovered he was carrying cocaine. Therefore, we affirm.

BRUNNER, J. Patricia Andrews appeals a summary judgment dismissing her counterclaims against Wisconsin Public Service Corporation (WPSC) in a declaratory judgment action. Andrews contends genuine issues of material fact exist on her counterclaims. WPSC cross-appeals a portion of the same judgment dismissing its claim for a declaratory judgment. WPSC argues the circuit court erroneously concluded that WPSC did not have the right to replace an existing transmission line with a new transmission line under existing easements.

CURLEY, P.J. Brian Stecker appeals the trial court's order reducing the amount of and continuing indefinitely the maintenance he is required to pay his ex-wife, Katie Willinger-Stecker, entered following Stecker's postdivorce motion seeking to modify or terminate maintenance. He argues that the trial court erroneously exercised its discretion when it failed to terminate maintenance. Willinger-Stecker cross-appeals, arguing that the trial court erroneously exercised its discretion in determining that a substantial change of circumstances had occurred since the date of divorce and in reducing its earlier maintenance award. Because there is a reasonable basis in the record for the trial court's finding of a substantial change of circumstances and a reasonable basis for the reduced, as opposed to terminated, maintenance award, we affirm.

PER CURIAM. John J. Joyce has appealed from a judgment of divorce from the respondent, Eleanor L. Stilke-Joyce. The sole issue on appeal is whether the trial court erroneously exercised its discretion in awarding maintenance to Eleanor. We reverse the portion of the judgment awarding maintenance and remand the matter for further proceedings.

BRENNAN, J. Latrice A.H. appeals from an order terminating her parental rights to her daughter, Zarie A.C.H. She claims that the trial court erroneously exercised its discretion when it stopped her from testifying further about her rehabilitative progress. She also states in her brief that the trial court erroneously found this testimony to be irrelevant. This court's review of the record reveals that the trial court did not find the rehabilitative testimony irrelevant, that it allowed some testimony on Latrice's rehabilitative efforts and that it considered those efforts in rendering its decision. Accordingly, the trial court did not erroneously exercise its discretion with respect to the issue Latrice raises and it did not erroneously exercise its discretion in terminating her parental rights.

PER CURIAM. Norris Pegues appeals from a judgment confirming an arbitration decision in favor of his automobile insurer, Progressive Northern Insurance Company. We affirm because we agree that Progressive's spoliation of Pegues' van was not intentional or egregious and that Pegues is judicially estopped from challenging as unconscionable the arbitration provision he earlier invoked.

LUNDSTEN, J. Lois Ann Johnson and the Estate of Jacob Johnson ("Johnson") appeal the circuit court's order dismissing Wisconsin County Mutual Insurance Corporation ("WC Mutual") from Johnson's suit against Wood County, WC Mutual, and others. The dispute between Johnson and WC Mutual arises out of an incident at a County group home that led to Jacob Johnson's death. Johnson argues that WC Mutual breached its duty to defend its insured (the County), that the County's insurance policy through WC Mutual provides coverage for the incident, and that WC Mutual's costs should be reduced. We reject Johnson's arguments and affirm the circuit court's order.

ANDERSON, P.J. This case arises out of an automobile accident in which Diane Sass was a passenger in a vehicle owned and operated by Todd Johnson. Sass was allegedly injured during the accident when Johnson's boat came loose from the trailer of his automobile and struck the cab of the vehicle. Sass made bodily injury claims against Johnson's insurance carrier Acuity, a Mutual Insurance Company, including a declaratory judgment action claiming coverage under a watercraft endorsement attached to Johnson's homeowner's policy. Acuity acknowledged coverage under Johnson's automobile liability policy and paid the policy limit to Sass. It denied coverage under the homeowner's policy and moved for summary judgment. The trial court held that Sass was barred from receiving coverage under the language of the homeowner's policy and its watercraft rider and granted Acuity's motion. We agree with the trial court's thorough and well-reasoned decision and affirm.

VERGERONT, J. This appeal arises out of a dispute between Winterfield Properties LLC and its former tenant, Dale Woods. Woods appeals the circuit court's judgment of eviction and award of $2,488.86 in unpaid rent and related charges against Woods and the dismissal of her action for damages against Winterfield Properties. For the following reasons, we affirm.

CURLEY, P.J. Judith Koier appeals from an order denying her motions to vacate a default judgment of eviction and a default money judgment and return all garnished funds arising out of the two 2005 small claims judgments. One judgment evicted her from an apartment owned by Legacy Property Management Services, LLC (Legacy), doing business as Timber Ridge Apartments (Timber Ridge), and the other ordered her to pay a money judgment for unpaid rent. Later, her wages were garnished until the $2820.68 money judgment and costs were paid. Koier claims that the trial court erred in denying her motion because the underlying judgments were void due to improper service. Although the trial court incorrectly ruled that Koier's motion was subject to the reasonable time requirement found in WIS. STAT. § 806.07(2) (2007-08), the right result was reached because here, the doctrine of equitable estoppel prohibited Koier from raising the void judgment issue. Therefore, this court affirms, albeit on other grounds. See State v. Holt, 128 Wis. 2d 110, 124-25, 382 N.W.2d 679 (Ct. App. 1985) (We may affirm a trial court's decision on other grounds even if we do not agree with its reasoning.).

BROWN, C.J. Jeffrey Keesee was involved in a fatal motor vehicle accident. Officers at the scene could not find any of the factors that would support intoxication but obtained Keesee's consent to a blood draw nonetheless. However, prior to the blood draw at the hospital, even though Keesee was not under arrest and had been told he was not under arrest, an officer read him the implied consent form which advised Keesee that he was under arrest and stood to be penalized if he did not consent to the test. The trial court found that the reading of the form negated the earlier consent because it "placed in the defendant's mind the idea that this is something that he had to do under the circumstances." But Keesee never testified, never told the court what effect, if any, the reading of the form had on him. So, there is no foundation for the trial court's finding of fact--if indeed it was meant as a finding of fact. And we hold that the circumstance did not present a situation of coercion per se. Because the trial court found that there was a valid consent at the scene and because we disagree that such consent was rendered nugatory by the reading of the implied consent form, we reverse and remand with directions.

PETERSON, J. Glenn Schiffmann appeals a judgment of conviction for operating while intoxicated, and an order denying his motion to suppress evidence. Schiffmann argues there was insufficient evidence to support the circuit court's factual findings on the motion. We disagree and affirm.