PER CURIAM. The Office of Lawyer Regulation (OLR) has filed a complaint and motion pursuant to SCR 22.22 requesting that this court impose reciprocal discipline against Attorney Scott E. Selmer identical to the public reprimand imposed by the Minnesota Supreme Court. The OLR's complaint further alleges that Attorney Selmer failed to notify the OLR of the public reprimand in Minnesota within 20 days of the effective date of the order, contrary to SCR 22.22(1).

PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, J. We review a decision of the court of appeals affirming the circuit court's decision granting summary judgment in favor of Medtronic, Inc. Both the circuit court and the court of appeals agreed that the express preemption provision of the 1976 Medical Device Amendments to the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, specifically 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a) (2000), preempted the negligence, strict liability and loss of consortium claims asserted by the plaintiffs, Joseph and Margaret Blunt (the Blunts).

SNYDER, J. Jeffrey H. Kopsi appeals from a judgment of conviction and from an order denying his postconviction motion for plea withdrawal and a new trial. Kopsi was convicted on two felony counts of failure to pay child support, contrary to WIS. STAT. § 948.22(2) (2005-06). He contends that the circuit court denied him his constitutionally protected right to counsel, conducted an insufficient plea colloquy, and improperly participated in the plea negotiation by changing the plea to two felonies rather than one felony and one misdemeanor. We agree that the court did not engage in the proper inquiry before concluding that Kopsi had waived his right to counsel; therefore, we reverse and remand the matter for further proceedings.

PER CURIAM. Ivan Johnson appeals pro se from a circuit court order denying his motion for a new trial without an evidentiary hearing. We conclude that the circuit court did not misuse its discretion in denying the motion without a hearing, and we affirm.

HOOVER, P.J. Aaron Lear appeals a judgment of conviction for fourth-degree sexual assault. Lear contends the circuit court erroneously denied his motion to suppress statements made to the police. We disagree and affirm.

PER CURIAM. Gregory Storks appeals from a judgment of conviction for one count of first-degree sexual assault of a child, and from an order denying his motion for postconviction relief. Storks asserts trial counsel was ineffective by failing to object to certain hearsay testimony and the trial court erred by admitting the challenged statements. We reject Storks' arguments and affirm.

KESSLER, J. Juan A. Sanchez-Torres appeals from a judgment of conviction for two counts of first-degree sexual assault of a child, two counts of causing a child to view sexual activity, and one count of battery, contrary to WIS. STAT. §§ 948.02(1), 948.055(1) and 940.19(1) (2005-06). He also appeals from an order denying his postconviction motion for a new trial based on ineffective assistance of counsel. We reject his arguments and affirm the judgment and order.

PER CURIAM. Noel Davila, pro se, appeals from an order denying his WIS. STAT. § 974.06 (2005-06) motion seeking a new trial because of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Davila contends a change in law, which arose after his direct appeal, constitutes a sufficient reason for not raising certain ineffective-assistance arguments in that appeal. We reject this argument and affirm the order.

PER CURIAM. Thomas Ivery Reese appeals from an order denying his motion for postconviction relief. The issue is whether Reese is entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his ineffective assistance of counsel and sentence modification claims. We conclude that Reese's belated claims are procedurally barred by State v. Escalona-Naranjo, 185 Wis. 2d 168, 185-86, 517 N.W.2d 157 (1994). Therefore, we affirm.

PER CURIAM. In this plea withdrawal case, the issue is whether the circuit court complied with the factual basis requirement. Many factual basis cases hinge on whether a particular set of facts satisfies the elements of a crime. Here, however, the dispute centers on which facts a court may look to when satisfying the factual basis requirement. Weatherall contends that a court may look only to facts that a defendant, either personally or through counsel, admits are true or stipulates may be considered. The State contends that courts may consider any allegation in the record, regardless of any admission or stipulation. We conclude that the supreme court's decision in State v. Thomas, 2000 WI 13, 232 Wis. 2d 714, 605 N.W.2d 836, compels rejection of the State's view. Applied here, a factual basis is lacking for the plea because Weatherall neither admitted nor stipulated to the use of a necessary factual allegation. Accordingly, we reverse the circuit court and remand with directions that Weatherall be permitted to withdraw his plea.

PER CURIAM. Chino Antonio Moore, Jr., appeals from the judgment of conviction entered against him and the order denying his motion for postconviction relief. He argues that he did not enter his guilty plea knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily, and should be allowed to withdraw it, and that the trial court erred when it denied his repeated requests for substitution of counsel because his counsel had a conflict of interest. Because we conclude that the record demonstrates that Moore entered his plea knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily, and that he waived the right to challenge the court's decision to deny his counsel's motions to withdraw, we affirm.

PER CURIAM. James A. Andersen appeals from a judgment of conviction, entered upon his guilty plea, for two counts of delivery of cocaine, and from an order denying his motion for postconviction relief. Andersen asserts the court's plea colloquy was inadequate and, therefore, he was entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his motion to withdraw his plea. He also argues his sentence was excessive. We conclude the colloquy was adequate, Andersen has failed to show he is entitled to a hearing on his motion for withdrawal, and the trial court appropriately exercised its sentencing discretion. We therefore affirm the judgment and order.

PETERSON, J. Mark Jaramillo appeals a judgment of conviction for armed robbery and an order denying his postconviction motion. During the trial, Jaramillo testified in his own defense. He subsequently filed a postconviction motion arguing he did not knowingly and voluntarily waive his right not to testify. He contends the circuit court should have conducted an on-the-record colloquy to ensure he understood he had the right not to testify. The court denied the motion, holding that the issue had to be raised within the context of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.

BRIDGE, J. Howard D. Walton appeals an order of the circuit court affirming a decision of the Labor and Industry Review Commission (LIRC), which in turn affirmed a ruling by an administrative law judge (ALJ) pursuant to WIS. STAT. § 102.30(7) (2007-08). The ALJ ruled that temporary total disability worker's compensation benefits awarded to Walton be paid directly to Hartford Life Benefit Management to reimburse Hartford for disability benefits it had previously paid to Walton under a nonindustrial insurance policy. Walton contends that the reimbursement is not appropriate because he discharged his obligation to Hartford in bankruptcy. LIRC argues that Hartford had a preexisting subrogation right that survived the bankruptcy and thus the order directing that reimbursement be made directly to Hartford was proper. The policy between Walton and Hartford was not made a part of the record, however, and we are unable to determine whether the policy creates a subrogation interest. Absent a showing of a valid subrogation interest, LIRC has no authority to direct a payment otherwise owed to Walton to be made to Hartford under § 102.30(7)(a). We therefore reverse.

PER CURIAM. Dean Tautges appeals a judgment of divorce, arguing the circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion with regard to maintenance and property division. We affirm.

BRENNAN, J. Bobby G. appeals from an order terminating his parental rights to Marquette S. on the grounds that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to raise an objection to WIS. STAT. § 48.415(6) as unconstitutional as applied to him. Bobby first argues that the statute deprived him of his constitutional rights under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment because, as he characterized it, he was given no opportunity to know or parent his child before his rights were terminated. Next he argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the termination of his parental rights on these constitutional grounds.

PETERSON, J. Merlin W. and Rae Ann W. appeal orders terminating their parental rights to Delylla W., Shawndel W., Merlin W. III, and Marlie W. They argue there was insufficient evidence to support the orders. We disagree and affirm. We further sanction Rae Ann's attorney, Jesse Johansen, for falsely certifying to this court his brief conformed to the requirements of WIS. STAT. RULE 809.19(8)(b) and (c).

SNYDER, J. David C. Myers appeals from an order granting the State's motion to dismiss Myers' petition for writ of certiorari. Myers, an inmate at Oshkosh Correctional Institution (OCI), sought access to a book that he claims is relevant to his Wiccan beliefs. He now contends that the circuit court improperly dismissed his petition for lack of jurisdiction, improperly made factual findings after it had determined it lacked jurisdiction, and denied him his due process right to discovery. He further contends that WIS. ADMIN. CODE § DOC 309.04(4c)(8a) (Dec. 2006) is unconstitutional as applied to him. We affirm the order of the circuit court.

BROWN, C.J. What does run mean when an insurance policy covers "hit-and-run" as part of an uninsured motorist provision and the policy does not define the term? Does run mean to flee without stopping, or does it mean leaving the scene without providing identifying information even if the driver stopped to see if there was any injury? We hold that the latter definition controls and affirm the circuit court.

BROWN, C.J. This is a "chicken or the egg" case. More precisely, when a person who must appear in court at a substantive proceeding, seeks an accommodation because of physical disability, and self-identifies in as reasonable a time as possible before the hearing, should circuit courts who believe they need more information before deciding whether and what accommodation to give, make a factual determination before the date of the substantive court hearing, either by informal means or by a formal hearing with notice to the person alleging a disability? Or, may the circuit courts maintain silence about the accommodation request and decide the accommodation request at the substantive hearing? We hold that, as a matter of common sense, fairness and due process, the answer is the former. We reverse because the circuit court in this case used the latter and that latter process prejudicially affected the disabled person's right to a fair hearing. We also reverse for other, correlative reasons.

NEUBAUER, J. Ted Dohm appeals from a small claims judgment denying his damages claim against his former tenant, Kenneth Weber, based on the trial court's finding that Dohm wrongfully evicted Weber and his co-tenant Rebecca Romeis. As a result, the trial court awarded damages to Romeis in the amount of $4,272.50, which included two times her portion of the security deposit ($1,050), reimbursement for damage to personal property, and actual costs and attorney's fees. Weber did not appear at trial and a default judgment was entered against him for past due rent (twenty days) in the amount of $338. Weber did not receive any damages related to the wrongful eviction, nor was he ordered to pay any damages to Dohm arising from damages to the premises.

VERGERONT, J. Juan Madrid appeals the circuit court's order revoking his operating privilege because, the court determined, he improperly refused to submit to a chemical test of his blood upon arrest for operating while under the influence of an intoxicant (OWI) in violation of WIS. STAT. § 346.63(1)(a). Madrid's primary contention is that the circuit court erred in concluding there was probable cause for his arrest for OWI. For the reasons we explain below, we affirm.

PER CURIAM. This is an appeal and cross-appeal by Madison Teachers, Inc., and the Madison Metropolitan School District from a circuit court order remanding to the Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission. We conclude that, by not first seeking commission review of a hearing examiner's decision, the District failed to exhaust its administrative remedies before seeking judicial review under WIS. STAT. ch. 227 (2007-08). Accordingly, we reverse the circuit court's order and remand to the circuit court with directions to dismiss the judicial review petition without further proceedings.

FINE, J. W. Jean McCoy-Garner appeals, pro se, a small-claims judgment entered against her in favor of Bruce J. Kellett for $4,360 plus costs and fees for a total of $5,011.49. Kellett sued McCoy-Garner for damages he allegedly sustained as a result of an automobile accident involving him and McCoy-Garner.