PER CURIAM. We review the stipulation filed pursuant to SCR 22.12 by the Office of Lawyer Regulation (OLR) and Attorney Gene B. Radcliffe. Attorney Radcliffe admits the misconduct alleged by the OLR and agrees to a 90-day suspension of his license to practice law in Wisconsin.

VERGERONT, J. The issue on this appeal is whether WIS. ADMIN. CODE § COMM 62.0903(6) (Feb. 2008), addressing automatic fire sprinkler systems in multifamily dwellings, conflicts with WIS. STAT. § 101.14(4m)(b), which addresses the same topic. The circuit court concluded there was no conflict because the rule required automatic fire sprinkler systems in multifamily dwellings with the number of dwelling units and floor area required by the statute and nothing in the statute prohibited the Department of Commerce from requiring the sprinkler systems in multifamily dwellings with fewer dwelling units or a smaller floor area. The Wisconsin Builders Association appeals, contending that the statute plainly restricts the Department's authority to requiring sprinkler systems in multifamily dwellings that have no fewer dwelling units and no smaller floor area than that provided in the statute.

PER CURIAM. Kenneth McCoy appeals a judgment dismissing his claims for breach of contract, promissory estoppel, and unjust enrichment against Maureen Occhino. McCoy argues the circuit court erred by concluding there was insufficient evidence to support his claims. We disagree and affirm.

KESSLER, J. Bruce J. Morgan appeals from a judgment of conviction for forgery (uttering), contrary to WIS. STAT. § 943.38(2) (2005-06), and from an order denying his motion for postconviction relief. Morgan argues that the trial court erred when it: (1) denied his motion to suppress identification evidence based on a photo array; (2) concluded there was sufficient evidence to support his conviction; and (3) denied his ineffective assistance of counsel claim. We reject his arguments and affirm the judgment and order.

PER CURIAM. Dennis McCoy, pro se, appeals judgments of conviction for exposing a child to harmful material, disorderly conduct, and intimidating a victim, and orders denying his postconviction motion and motion for reconsideration. McCoy argues the circuit court lacked personal jurisdiction, his statutory speedy trial right was violated, there was insufficient evidence on the harmful material charge, and the prosecutor made improper remarks during closing argument. McCoy also argues his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the claimed errors. We disagree and affirm the judgments and orders.

PER CURIAM. Demetrey Lambouths appeals from a judgment of conviction of two counts of party to the crime of false imprisonment, two counts of intimidation of a victim by threat of force, and party to the crime second-degree sexual assault by use of force. He also appeals from an order denying his postconviction motion for a new trial on the grounds of prosecutorial misconduct, newly discovered evidence, and ineffective assistance of trial counsel. He argues those same claims on appeal and requests a new trial in the interests of justice under WIS. STAT. § 752.35 (2005-06). We reject his claims and affirm the judgment and order.

BRENNAN, J. Tramell E. Starks appeals from a judgment entered after a jury convicted him of first-degree reckless homicide as a party to a crime, contrary to WIS. STAT. §§ 940.02(1) and 939.05, and being a felon in possession of a firearm, contrary to WIS. STAT. § 941.29(2)(a) (2005-06). Starks asserts the following claims of error: (1) the trial court erred when it denied his request for the lesser-included offense instruction on second-degree reckless homicide; (2) the trial court should have granted his motion for a mistrial based on an alleged violation of the witness sequestration order; (3) the trial court erred in failing to dismiss the case based on the prosecutor's failure to turn over information relating to Junebug; and (4) the evidence was inconsistent and therefore insufficient to support the verdict. We reject each of Starks's claims and affirm.

HIGGINBOTHAM, P.J. Chaunte Dean Ott appeals a circuit court order denying his motion for a new trial following his conviction for first-degree intentional homicide. Ott argues that he is entitled to a new trial based on newly discovered evidence or in the interest of justice because the real controversy was not fully tried. See WIS. STAT. §§ 974.06, 805.15 and 752.35 (2005-06). Ott contends that newly discovered DNA evidence linking someone other than Ott to the murder scene establishes a reasonable probability that a different verdict would be reached at a new trial, and that the real controversy was not fully tried because the jury did not have the opportunity to consider that evidence. We conclude that the newly discovered DNA evidence creates a reasonable probability that a different verdict would be reached at a new trial. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for a new trial.

PER CURIAM. Juan Nava appeals a judgment sentencing him to life in prison with no eligibility for extended supervision plus thirty-two and one-half years' initial confinement and twenty years' extended supervision for first-degree intentional homicide, arson and three counts of first-degree reckless endangerment. He also appeals an order denying his motion to reduce the sentences. He argues: (1) the trial court failed to identify the sentencing objectives and how the sentences imposed further those objectives; (2) the court failed to give reasons for imposing consecutive sentences; and (3) the court's remarks at sentencing evince a preconceived sentencing policy. We reject these arguments and affirm the judgment and order.

PER CURIAM. Titus Graham, pro se, appeals from orders denying his motion for sentence modification. Because Graham's claims are barred by State v. Escalona-Naranjo, 185 Wis. 2d 168, 517 N.W.2d 157 (1994), we affirm.

PER CURIAM. Lawson Carter appeals from a judgment of conviction and a postconviction order denying sentence modification. The sole issue on appeal is whether the circuit court properly exercised its sentencing discretion. We affirm.

PER CURIAM. Adam Smith appeals from the judgment of conviction entered against him and the order denying his motion for postconviction relief. He argues that the sentence the court imposed was unduly harsh. Because we conclude that the circuit court properly exercised its discretion when it sentenced Smith, we affirm.

SNYDER, J. Lord L. Sturdivant appeals from an amended judgment of conviction reflecting the circuit court's decision to correct an invalid sentence by increasing Sturdivant's sentence from thirty years to thirty-three years. Sturdivant contends that the circuit court engaged in judicial vindictiveness when it increased his sentence after he successfully challenged the court's initial sentence. We disagree. Sturdivant also argues that the circuit court improperly deprived him of a second resentencing when it treated his second motion for resentencing as a motion for sentence modification and reduced the extended supervision term from eight years to six and one-half years. He asserts that he is entitled to resentencing before a new judge. We disagree. Finally, it is undisputed that the current modified sentence does not implement the intent of the circuit court, which was to impose the minimum period of extended supervision required to comply with Truth In Sentencing-I (TIS-I). See WIS. STAT. § 973.01(2)(d) (1999-2000). We therefore modify the sentence to reflect the original dispositional scheme within the confines of TIS-I. As modified, we affirm.

PER CURIAM. Larry Meddaugh appeals an order that denied his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. We affirm, although on partially different grounds than those cited by the circuit court.

HOOVER, P.J. Sandeen Agency, Inc., appeals an order granting summary judgment to Tri-State Insurance Company of Minnesota. Sandeen argues the circuit court erroneously concluded Tri-State was not obligated to pay a Minnesota worker's compensation claim under a policy issued to Wayne and Dianna Brown, d/b/a Sky High Crane Rental, Inc. (collectively, "Sky High"). Sandeen further alleges the court erroneously determined Sandeen was not Tri-State's agent. Sky High cross-appeals, also arguing the worker's compensation claim is covered under the policy, and challenging the part of the order denying its motion for summary judgment. The court concluded genuine issues of material fact existed with regard to Sandeen's negligence in procuring insurance for Sky High, and Sky High argues that Sandeen was negligent as a matter of law. We affirm the order.

PER CURIAM. Joseph Wilson appeals a circuit court order affirming the Labor and Industry Review Commission's denial of his claim for worker's compensation benefits. We affirm.

BROWN, C.J. Bruce A. Findley did not make a timely property division payment of $162,500, in accordance with the divorce judgment. His former wife, Ellen V. Gibbons, brought an order to show cause why he should not be held in contempt, but the family court found that his once lucrative business had gone belly-up through no fault of his own, that he did not have the ability to pay and that the circumstances did not show a willful intent to avoid payment. Gibbons appeals, arguing that, instead of pouring funds into the business in an attempt to keep the business afloat, Findley should have thought about his former wife first, should have closed the business down while he still had the assets, and his failure to do so was "unreasonable" and amounted to "shirking." But Gibbons is wrong on the law. This is not a case governed by the shirking analysis that takes place in support and maintenance cases. This is a property division case and the touchstone questions are whether there was ability to pay and whether nonpayment was willful with intent to avoid payment. We uphold the family court's determinations.

BROWN, C.J. Durand Shell, Inc. rented a gas station for five years from Gurwant and Parminder Kaleka. A written lease agreement detailed the repairs that the Kaleka's agreed to perform. They did not do these repairs. As a self-help remedy, Durand Shell stopped paying rent. The Kaleka's then brought this eviction action, alleging that the lease agreement called for the timely payment of rent and Durand Shell breached this provision. After a bench trial, the trial court found that both parties had breached the lease agreement, but ordered a judgment for eviction on the grounds that the self-help remedy of abatement was foreclosed by a specific lease provision prohibiting it. Durand Shell appeals, claiming that its self-help abatement remedy is authorized by WIS. STAT. § 704.07(4) and that the court's decision leaves it without a remedy contrary to Article I, Section 9 of the Wisconsin constitution. But we hold that the lease agreement does indeed foreclose self-help abatement as a remedy, the statute does not help Durand Shell and it had other remedies available. We affirm.

PETERSON, J. The Estate of Thomas Hageny, and his widow, Phyllis, (collectively, Mrs. Hageny) appeal a judgment dismissing their medical malpractice claims against Dr. Joseph Bodensteiner and related insurers. Mrs. Hageny argues the circuit court erred by deciding as a matter of law not to submit the issue of informed consent to the jury. We disagree and affirm.

BRUNNER, J. Kurt Keuken appeals a conviction for driving while under the influence of an intoxicant, first offense. Keuken contends the trial court erroneously admitted evidence of his blood test results because the blood was not drawn by a person authorized under WIS. STAT. § 343.305(5)(b). Because Keuken fails to fully develop his argument and present a complete record, we affirm.

VERGERONT, J. Keith Engel appeals the judgment finding him guilty of operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated contrary to WIS. STAT. § 346.63(1)(a) (OWI) and driving with a prohibited alcohol concentration in violation of § 346.63(1)(b) (PAC). He contends his detention by the arresting officer was not supported by reasonable suspicion or by the community caretaker exception and that his arrest was not supported by probable cause. He also contends he is entitled to suppression of evidence or dismissal because of the police department's failure to preserve the video recording relating to his arrest. For the reasons we explain below, we affirm.

ANDERSON, P.J. Stanley N. Jezeski did not want a twenty-acre parcel of land to be part of the marital estate during his divorce from Rosalie A. Jezeski; so, he concocted a plan to transfer the parcel to his brother, Thomas P. Jezeski. The plan was spelled out in a contract signed by both brothers in which Thomas promised to transfer the parcel back to Stanley after the divorce was finalized. When Stanley and Rosalie were divorced, Thomas refused to transfer the parcel back to Stanley, and Stanley brought a breach of contract action. After a bench trial, the trial court held that the contract was an attempt to defraud Rosalie and the family court that presided over the Jezeski divorce, and dismissed Stanley's breach of contract action. Stanley appeals. We agree with the trial court that Stanley's hiding of a significant asset from the family court constitutes a fraud upon the court and affirm.

BRUNNER, J. Steven and Marcy Boyer appeal an order denying their motions for relief from judgments rendered against them in a foreclosure action. The Boyers were guarantors of debts owed by S.J. Boyer Construction, Inc., to Bank Mutual. The guaranteed debts were secured by mortgages on the foreclosed-upon properties. The Boyers contend Bank Mutual was prohibited from obtaining judgments against the Boyers for the full amounts of the debts because Bank Mutual elected a shortened redemption under WIS. STAT. § 846.103(2). We agree and reverse the order. We remand for the court to reconsider the Boyers' motions in light of our decision.

FINE, J. The Milwaukee Metropolitan Sewerage District appeals a judgment entered on a jury verdict in favor of E-L Enterprises, Inc., that found the Sewerage District liable to E-L Enterprises under an inverse-condemnation theory for damage to E-L Enterprises's property as the result of the Sewerage District having drained groundwater from around the pilings supporting the building. The Sewerage District contends that the requisites to inverse condemnation under both article I, section 13 of the Wisconsin Constitution and WIS. STAT. § 32.10 were not met. The Sewerage District also argues that the calculation of damages was erroneous and that the statute of limitations barred the action. We affirm.

BROWN, C.J. The novel issue in this case is whether the Wisconsin Condominium Ownership Act, WIS. STAT. ch. 703 (2005-06), limits the duration of a developer's control over a master-planned community. In Wisconsin, a condominium developer may maintain control only for three years or until seventy-five percent of the units are sold, whichever comes first, or ten years for an expandable condominium. WIS. STAT. § 703.15(2)(c). Here, the developer still has control eighteen years later, and only fifty-two percent of the maximum allowable units have sold. And, a restrictive covenant grants the developer control until eighty-five percent have sold. Nonetheless, Geneva National is a private quasi-town, not a condominium. It is a master-planned community comprising 1600 acres with single- and multi-family homes, commercial and recreational property that caters to people who value its prized golf courses and other recreational options. Because such a complex community requires an extended time to develop and market, we hold that master-planned communities are not subject to ch. 703. Further, we refuse to disturb the restrictive covenant when it clearly and specifically states the duration of the developer's control, a condition that the complainants full-well knew existed before they signed on the dotted line. Therefore, we affirm the grant of summary judgment for the defendants.

PER CURIAM. The Estate of Joseph E. Sabol and Joseph E. Sabol, Jr., (collectively, Sabol) appeal from an order granting summary judgment and dismissing the complaint on the basis of issue preclusion. On appeal, Sabol challenges that dismissal. The Village of Mount Pleasant asks the court to find the appeal to be frivolous. We affirm the judgment, find the appeal to be frivolous, and remand the matter to the circuit court for a determination of the appropriate amount of attorney's fees and costs.