PUBLISHED
OPINION
COURT OF
APPEALS
DECISION
DATED AND FILED
June 21,
2000
Cornelia G. Clark
Clerk, Court of Appeals
of
Wisconsin
NOTICE
This opinion is subject to further editing. If
published, the official version will
appear in the bound volume of the Official
Reports.
A party may file
with
the Supreme Court a petition to review an adverse decision by the
Court of Appeals.
See
Wis. Stat.
§808.10
and Rule 809.62.
No. 99-0617
STATE OF
WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS
DISTRICT
II
Barbara J.
Chariton,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
Saturn Corporation,
a
foreign corporation,
Defendant-Appellant,
Saturn of Waukesha,
Inc., a Wisconsin
corporation,
Defendant.
APPEAL from a judgment and an order of the circuit court for
Waukesha County:
MARIANNE E. BECKER, Judge. Affirmed.
Before Brown, P.J., Nettesheim and Anderson, JJ.
¶1. BROWN, P.J. This appeal by a car manufacturer who
did not comply with
the Lemon Law's thirty-day time frame in which to replace the
consumer's vehicle or refund
the purchase price is controlled by Church v. Chrysler
Corp., 221 Wis.
2d 460, 585 N.W.2d 685 (Ct. App. 1998). There, we held that
thirty days means thirty
days; a dispute between the consumer and the manufacturer about
the amount of refund does
not toll the thirty-day period in which the manufacturer must
act. The same is true of a
dispute over the breadth of a release, as was the situation in
this case. Here, Saturn violated
the Lemon Law when it failed to refund the purchase price of
Barbara J. Chariton's vehicle
within thirty days after she offered to transfer title to the
vehicle to Saturn. Chariton's
refusal to sign a general release did not excuse Saturn from the
thirty-day requirement. We
affirm.
¶2. The facts are not in dispute. Chariton bought a
1996 Saturn and it turned
out to be a lemon. See Wis. Stat. §218.015(1)(h)
(1997-98).1 She submitted a customer claim form
to BBB
Auto Line, pursuant to Saturn's informal dispute settlement
procedure. About one week
later, Chariton sent a statutory offer to transfer title to
Saturn, indicating that she wanted a
refund under the Lemon Law. See §218.015(2)(c).
Saturn offered her a
total refund of $20,170.75.2
Saturn's
letter also stated: "By accepting this offer Ms. Chariton
agrees to complete all
necessary documents to transfer title of the vehicle to Saturn
Corporation including but not
limited to a power of attorney (to correct any errors in title),
an odometer statement and a
General Settlement Agreement and Release." Chariton
responded that the total refund
should be $20,347.47 and that she would "not necessarily
sign whatever materials that
you propose, if the same are not required by the Wisconsin Lemon
Law." Ultimately,
the thirty days in which Saturn was to tender its refund expired
and Chariton filed suit,
claiming a violation of the Lemon Law. Saturn moved for summary
judgment, arguing that
Chariton's lemon law claim should be dismissed. Saturn argued
that it had followed the
statute by making Chariton an offer within the thirty-day period
and that Chariton's
"failure to participate in the exchange should not work to
create liability for
Saturn." After the trial court denied Saturn's motion, the
parties stipulated to an entry
of judgment in favor of Chariton for $38,874.69-$22,374.69 in
pecuniary damages and
$16,500.00 for attorney's fees and other costs recoverable under
the Lemon Law. It is from
the trial court's denial of Saturn's motion for summary judgment
that Saturn appeals.
¶3. What controls this case is the propriety of
Saturn's release
requirement.3 Saturn argues
that the
Lemon Law's silence on the subject shows that a release is not
forbidden. Chariton claims
that the "manufacturer may not require that the consumer
sign a release in order to
obtain a refund under the Wisconsin Lemon Law."
¶4. Our standard of review is de novo. First, Saturn
appeals the trial court's
denial of a summary judgment motion. Because we employ the same
methodology as the
trial court, we owe no deference to its decision. See
Church, 221 Wis.
2d at 465-66. Second, whether the manufacturer may require a
general release is a question
of statutory interpretation, which we thus examine and answer
without deference to the trial
court. See id. at 466.
¶5. We conclude that the Lemon Law does not contemplate
that the consumer
be required to sign a general release in order to obtain a
refund. Wisconsin Stat.
§218.015(5) expressly states that the Lemon Law "does
not limit rights or
remedies available to a consumer under any other law." Our
case law has made it
clear that non-lemon law claims related to a faulty vehicle must
be pled separately. See
Gosse v. Navistar Int'l Transp. Corp., 2000 WI App 8,
¶ 14, 232 Wis.
2d 163, 605 N.W.2d 896, review denied, ___ Wis. 2d ___,
609 N.W.2d 474
(Wis. Feb. 22, 2000) (No. 98-3499) (consumer must assert personal
injury in separate claim
not based on Lemon Law). Rather than merely acknowledge that
Saturn had fulfilled its
obligations under the Lemon Law, the release Saturn wanted
Chariton to sign would have
barred any suit against anyone about anything having to do with
her car.4 Section 218.015(5) prohibits such a
release.
Furthermore, just as the dispute about the amount of refund did
not toll the thirty-day period
in Church, Chariton's reluctance to sign Saturn's
release did not suspend
time in this case. Church tells us that regardless of
the status of
negotiations, the Lemon Law requires that the manufacturer
provide a refund within thirty
days or the Lemon Law has been violated. There are no
excuses.
¶6. Finally, Saturn's proposed release included Dan
Schultz, whose name
appeared on the title as an owner. While we reject Saturn's
release requirement, we do
recognize that such a co-owner would have to sign off on the
title before transfer could
occur. See Wis. Stat. §218.015(2)(c) ("When the
manufacturer
provides the ... refund, the consumer shall return the motor
vehicle ... and provide ...
certificate of title and all endorsements necessary to transfer
title to the
manufacturer.").
By the Court.-Order affirmed.
Recommended for publication in the official reports.
1 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 1997-98
version.
2 We note that the bulk of the refund would have gone to
Chariton's secured creditor. For
ease of discussion we refer to the total amounts, not just the
amount going to
Chariton.
3 We acknowledge that in our notice of oral argument and request
for supplemental briefing
we also asked the parties to address whether the Lemon Law
requires a consumer to deal in
good faith. After reading the supplemental briefs and hearing
oral argument, we have
decided that this is not the proper case in which to determine
whether the consumer has a
duty to communicate promptly with the manufacturer regarding the
details of the refund. It
is undisputed that Saturn had all the information it needed to
calculate Chariton's refund by
the twenty-second day after Chariton made her offer to transfer
title. The only issue
remaining was Saturn's insistence on a general release and
Chariton's refusal to sign it. This
is not a case where the manufacturer was lost at sea due to the
consumer's alleged
evasiveness. Thus, we decline to address the good faith
issue.
4 Under the proposed release, Chariton would agree to:
release and discharge Releasee, its subsidiaries,
divisions,
officers, representatives, employees, stockholders, authorized
Retailers, successors and
assigns and all other persons, firms or corporations, who are or
might be claimed to be
liable, of and from any and every claim, demand, right or cause
of action for the recovery
for damages including, but not limited to, those for diminution
in value, repair costs, or any
other economic or non-economic injuries, losses, breach of
warranty and/or damages
including any claims for consequential or incidental damages
and/or punitive damages, cost
of suit and attorneys fees resulting or alleged to have resulted
from the promotion, use or
sale of, or any defect and/or nonconformities in the design or
manufacture of assembly in the
aforesaid Vehicle[.]