PUBLISHED
OPINION
Case No.: 95-2956
Complete Title
of Case:
State ex rel. Journal/Sentinel, Inc. and
Anne Bothwell,
Petitioners-Respondents,
v.
Philip Arreola, Chief of Police,
City of Milwaukee,
Respondent-Appellant.
Submitted on Briefs: ----
Oral Argument: August 27, 1996
COURT COURT OF APPEALS OF WISCONSIN
Opinion Released: December 17, 1996
Opinion Filed: December 17, 1996
Source of APPEAL Appeal from an order
Full Name JUDGE COURT: Circuit
Lower Court. COUNTY: Milwaukee
(If "Special", JUDGE: MICHAEL P. SULLIVAN
so indicate)
JUDGES: WEDEMEYER, P.J., SCHUDSON and CURLEY, JJ.
Concurred:
Dissented:
Appellant
ATTORNEYS For the respondent-appellant the cause was
submitted on the briefs of Grant F. Langley, city
attorney and Susan E. Lappen, assistant city
attorney. There was oral argument by Susan E.
Lappen.
Respondent
ATTORNEYS For the petitioners-respondents the cause was
submitted on the briefs of David M. Lucey and Paul
Bargren of Foley & Lardner of Milwaukee. There was
oral argument by David M. Lucey.
COURT OF APPEALS
DECISION
DATED AND
RELEASED
December 17, 1996
NOTICE
A party may file with the Supreme Court a
petition to review an adverse decision by the
Court of Appeals. See § 808.10 and Rule
809.62, Stats.
This opinion is subject to further editing. If
published, the official version will appear in
the bound volume of the Official Reports.
No. 95-2956
STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS
State ex rel. Journal/Sentinel, Inc. and
Anne Bothwell,
Petitioners-Respondents,
v.
Philip Arreola, Chief of Police,
City of Milwaukee,
Respondent-Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the circuit court for Milwaukee County:
MICHAEL P. SULLIVAN, Judge. Affirmed in part and modified in part.
Before Wedemeyer, P.J., Schudson and Curley, JJ.
WEDEMEYER, P.J. Police Chief Philip Arreola and the City of
Milwaukee (hereinafter referred to collectively as "the City") appeal from an order
issuing a writ of mandamus requiring the City to release certain police documents
pursuant to an open records request made by a Journal/Sentinel, Inc. reporter. The
City claims the trial court erred in issuing the writ because the requested records involve
officer personnel records and, therefore, should not be released on public policy
grounds. Because the right of the public to have access to the majority of these records
outweighs any public policy concerns raised by the City, we affirm in part; and because
some of the concerns raised by the City outweigh the public's right to access certain
portions of the requested records, we modify the order in part.
I. BACKGROUND
Anne Bothwell, reporter for Journal/Sentinel, Inc., in letters dated
September 27, 1994, and September 29, 1994, made an open records request for
certain
information from the Milwaukee Police Department. Specifically, Bothwell requested:
Copies of the reports filled out every time a police
officer discharges his or her weapon, from 1990 to date,
and from 1980 to 1985.
I understand the department has recently created a
"use of deadly force" report. I would like copies of each
report that has been filed since the document was created.
I also realize that, prior to the creation of the "use
of deadly force" report, officers who discharged their
weapons were required to file a report on the incident. I'd
like a copy of each report filed to document those
incidents.
And in the alternative, Bothwell requested:
Also, if my request for the reports detailing
discharges of weapons and use of deadly force are [sic]
denied, please provide me with the following information
for each year from 1980 to 1985, and from 1990 to the
present:
-The number of times police officers discharged
their weapons
-The number of times those discharges resulted in
a person being struck by gunfire
-The number of times those shootings were fatal
-The number of times those discharges resulted in
an animal being struck
-The number of times those discharges were
determined to be accidental
-The date, time and location of each occurrence
-The name, age, address, race and sex of each
person who was shot
-The name, age, sex, race, and length of service
with the department of the officer whose weapon was
discharged.
-A brief description of the circumstances under
which each weapons discharge occurred.
The police records custodian denied both of Bothwell's requests by letters
dated October 14, 1994, and January 4, 1995. The denial letters indicated that this
information would not be released, stating in pertinent part:
Please be advised that your request for copies of
the aforementioned reports is denied. These are pending
ongoing administrative internal personnel matters.
Open or closed personnel reports and investigations
are not subject to disclosure pursuant to the Open Records
Act.
The Milwaukee Police Department's ability to
conduct thorough confidential internal investigations,
including the gathering of statements from members of the
Department as a condition of their employment would be
seriously hampered by disclosure of such investigations....
In addition, we are denying disclosure as in the
case of the Village of Butler v. Cohen, 163 Wis. 2d 819,
472 N.W. 2d 579 (Ct. App. 1991). The following are
specific policy reasons for nondisclosure of personnel-related material, in that disclosure
would: (1) Run counter
to the legislature's recognition in sec. 19.85(1) Stats., of
the need to keep personnel records confidential, to
maintain the reputational and privacy interests of the
employee; (2) Give the requester greater access to the
records than the employee; (3) Subvert the municipalities'
policy of ensuring employees opportunities for satisfying
careers and fair treatment based on value of service;
(4) Impinge upon the officers' ability to have and retain
competent personnel; (5) Prevent a reviewer from making
candid assessments of an officer; and (6) Run counter to
the municipalities' interests in maintaining the
confidentiality of its personnel records which are closed
under sec. 230.13(5) Stats.
We are further denying disclosure because sec.
103.13(2) Stats., indicates that this information should
only be turned over upon the request of the employee or
pursuant to a waiver by the employee. Release of this
information without a waiver would thwart the public
policy of nondisclosure contained in sec. 103.13(2). In
addition, the State has closed similar records of state
employee discipline pursuant to sec. 230.13(5) Stats. We
believe that, by analogy, this is also indicative of public
policy justifying their confidentiality. Federal common
law has further established that these records are
confidential. See Ballard v. Terrek, 56 F.R.D. 45 (E.D.
Wis. 1972).
The City denied Bothwell's alternate records request as well, stating:
With regards to your request for statistical
information, please be advised that your request for a copy
of this information as afore described is denied. Pursuant
to ss 19.35(1)(L), "... this subsection does not require an
authority to create a new record by extracting information
from existing records and compiling the information in a
new format."
On January 17, 1995, Journal/Sentinel, Inc. and Bothwell filed a petition
for a writ of mandamus with the Circuit Court. The City moved to quash the petition,
but this motion was denied. The trial court held several hearings regarding the petition,
conducted an in camera review of a sampling of the requested records, and
eventually
issued the writ. Specifically, the writ ordered that the City provide Bothwell with:
a. A copy of each report filed every time a police
officer discharges his or her weapon, from 1990 to
date, and from 1980 to 1985.
b. If different, any other report on the use of deadly
force for the same time periods.
c. If different, any other report filed by an officer
who discharged his or her weapon concerning said
discharge for the same time periods.
d. All reports summarizing or detailing discharges of
weapons or other use of deadly force for the
periods 1980 to 1985 and 1990 to present which
contain all or parts of the following information:
(1) The number of times police officers
discharged their weapons.
(2) The number of times these discharges
resulted in a person being struck by
gunfire.
(3) The number of times those discharges were
fatal.
(4) The number of times those discharges
resulted in an animal being struck.
(5) The number of times those discharges were
determined to be accidental.
(6) The date, time and location of each such
occurrence.
(7) The name, age, address, race and sex of
each person who was injured as a result
thereof.
(8) The name, age, address, race, sex and
length of service of the officer of the
Department whose weapon was discharged.
(9) A brief description of the circumstances
under which each such weapon discharge
occurred.
e. To the extent the records reflect the identity of a
person outside the Milwaukee Police Department
who provided information to the Milwaukee Police
Department on the subjects requested and who
requested, at the time of providing such
information, that his or her identity be kept
confidential, the information pertaining to such
person may be expunged prior to production.
The City now appeals.
II. DISCUSSION
The City claims the records requested involve documents generated and
maintained solely for the purposes of personnel evaluation and discipline. As a result,
the City maintains that public policy concerns outweigh the general right of the public
to have access to these records. In response, Journal/Sentinel, Inc. and Bothwell claim
that the records are not personnel records and that the public's right to access this
information outweighs any public policy concerns. The trial court ruled:
Okay, well, there is no more awesome power
exercised by government than that of the police. The
police have literally the power of life and death over
citizens they are to protect, but the power of the police in
our republic is limited. Ours is a representative form of
government, and in recognition of that fact, the Wisconsin
legislature has said at Section [19.31] of the ... Wisconsin
statutes that ... "In recognition of the fact that a
representative government is dependent upon an informed
electorate, it's declared to be the public policy of this State
that all persons are entitled to the greatest possible
information regarding the affairs of government and the
official acts of those officers and employees who represent
them." ... "To that end, Sections [19.32 to 19.37] shall be
construed in every instance with a presumption of
complete public access consistent with the conduct of
governmental business. The denial of public access
generally is contrary to public interest and only in an
exceptional case may access be denied."...
Now, this public policy statement must apply, I
think, with utmost vigor to the situation at hand where the
information sought concerns the police exercise of its most
extreme power, the use of deadly force.... [Y]ou can't
take a matter like police discharging its weapons and call
it personnel records and hide it from the public. I just
don't think that's right. The police chief, then, has to
either make those records available to a reasonable extent
or he has to create some other records that the public has
access to so the public knows whose firing the weapons,
who is firing them, when they are being fired, and the
general circumstances around them....
... Generally, you should deny access to the
personnel files, but here there is no other way, it seems,
for the public to know what's happening with the firing of
weapons in this city, and I think the public in this city has
an overriding concern in having that information available
to it, and it overrides, unfortunately, the chief's interest in
keeping his personnel files private....
... I have to agree with the plaintiff in this case,
and I will issue the writ of mandamus and make that writ
absolute on the points that you have requested, that is, the
P-10 information where it is available, any statistical data
that the department has concerning these things and before
the P-10 information was extant, the old PI -- old PI-4
form.[(1)] That is the order of the Court.
The review in this case involves interpretation of statutes as applied to
undisputed facts. Accordingly, we will apply the de novo standard of
review. Bitters v.
Milcut, Inc., 117 Wis.2d 48, 49, 343 N.W.2d 418, 419 (Ct. App.
1983).
According to the open records law, § 19.31, Stats., "shall be construed
in every instance with a presumption of complete public access, consistent with the
conduct of governmental business." See also
§§ 19.32-.37, Stats. Case law
construing this statute provides, "'The general presumption ... is that public records
shall be open to the public unless there is a clear statutory exception, unless there exists
a limitation under the common law, or unless there is an overriding public interest in
keeping the public record confidential.'" Mayfair Chrysler-Plymouth,
Inc. v.
Baldarotta, 162 Wis.2d 142, 156, 469 N.W.2d 638, 643 (1991). The
instant case
primarily presents an issue with respect to the third factor.
Although both parties spend a significant amount of time attempting to
label the requested records as "personnel records" or as records that are not considered
personnel records, this categorization is not dispositive. Even if these records are
construed to be personnel records, they are not automatically exempt from disclosure.
The issue of whether records which are labelled "personnel" should be disclosed has
been addressed repeatedly in the case law. In Village of Butler v.
Cohen, 163 Wis.2d
819, 472 N.W.2d 579 (Ct. App. 1991), this court held that public policy favoring
nondisclosure of personnel records outweighed the presumption of disclosure.
Similarly, in Pangman & Associates v. Stigler,
161 Wis.2d 828, 839, 468 N.W.2d
784, 788 (Ct. App. 1991), and in Pangman & Associates, S.C. v.
Zellmer, 163 Wis.2d
1070, 1083, 473 N.W.2d 538, 543 (Ct. App. 1991), requests for personnel records of
police officers made pursuant to the open records law were denied and the records were
not released.
None of these cases, however, stands for the proposition that records
categorized as "personnel" records are entitled to a blanket exemption from disclosure.
This issue--whether all disciplinary or personnel records of public employees are
exempted from the open records law--was specifically addressed and decided by our
supreme court in Wisconsin Newspress, Inc. v. Sheboygan Falls School
District, 199
Wis.2d 769, 546 N.W.2d 143 (1996). In Wisconsin
Newspress, our supreme court
rejected the notion that all disciplinary or personnel records of public employees are
entitled to a blanket exemption from the open records law.
Id., 199 Wis.2d at 775, 546
N.W.2d at 145. The court held that whether personnel records are subject to disclosure
must be examined on a case-by-case basis. Id. at 781,
546 N.W.2d at 147. Here, the
City conceded that personnel records are not automatically exempt from disclosure
during oral argument, but nonetheless suggests that the City's interests in not disclosing
this information outweighs the public's interest in accessing the requested information.
In reviewing the instant case, we apply a balancing test to determine
whether the City is correct.(2)
Id. We must determine whether the public policies
favoring disclosure, including the presumption of openness as described in
§ 19.31,
Stats., are outweighed by the public policies favoring nondisclosure,
id. at 782,
546 N.W.2d at 148, such as those raised by the City: (1) disclosure would
adversely
affect the police department's ability to conduct effective investigations; (2) disclosure
would impinge on officers' reputational and privacy interests; (3) disclosure would
give
the requester greater access to the records than the employee has; (4) disclosure would
impinge on the department's ability to attract and retain competent personnel;
(5) disclosure would discourage victims and witnesses from providing information. In
applying the balancing test, we weigh each of these countervailing interests
seriatim.(3)
We emphasize that the information that is subject to disclosure must be
reviewed on a case-by-case basis, and will not be identical in every case. Accordingly,
our analysis in the instant case is limited to the case at bar. As challenges to the open
records law are presented, the trial court should determine what information is subject
to disclosure after an in camera inspection. We emphasize the importance of
this
procedure and the need to have each case individually examined rather than setting forth
any absolutes applicable to all instances of apparent conflict.(4)
We turn now to an examination of the countervailing interests raised by
the City. The City suggests that disclosing the reports would hamper the police
department's ability to conduct effective investigations. We are not persuaded that this
concern justifies blanket withholding of all the information requested. First, this
concern is countered by the fact that Journal/Sentinel, Inc. (as argued both in its brief
and at oral argument) is looking for solely factual information. Factual material
gathered in connection with an investigation of police conduct is generally subject to
public inspection. See State ex rel. Youmans v.
Owens, 32 Wis.2d 11, 144 N.W.2d
793 (1966). Further, any impact on investigations if solely factual information is
disclosed would be remote. These incidents are occurring in public. Limiting the
disclosure to only the facts should not impact on an officer's ability to conduct an
investigation.
This concern, however, may justify withholding certain portions of the
documents at issue. The portions of the reports that are not purely factual information
may legitimately be withheld in order to maintain the effectiveness of ongoing
investigations. That is, any supervisory opinions containing recommendations or
concerns made for future action or criticisms of past actions may legitimately be
withheld. These portions of the forms, which required supervising officers to render
an opinion regarding the investigation should be withheld because supervisors might
be less than candid if they know that the documents are subject to public disclosure.
Moreover, the need to conduct thorough investigations and maintain the integrity of the
investigations relative to supervisory opinions outweighs the presumption that all public
records should be disclosed. See
Zellmer, 163 Wis.2d at 1082, 473 N.W.2d at 543.
Accordingly, with respect to these described portions of the reports, we conclude that
the City's concern does outweigh the public's right to access this information. The
remaining portions of the requested forms, however, are not impacted by this concern
and, therefore, must be made available.
The City's main argument for blanket withholding is that the officers'
reputational and privacy interests need to be protected and that disclosing the requested
reports would harm those interests. The City suggests that recent case law demonstrates
that our supreme court has placed a high priority on protecting reputational and privacy
interests. See Woznicki v. Erickson,
202 Wis.2d 178, 549 N.W.2d 699 (1996).
We do not disagree that Woznicki, which held
that the open records law
does not provide a blanket exemption for public employee personnel records,
emphasized the importance of protecting an individual's privacy and reputational
interests. Id. at 180-81, 549 N.W.2d at 700.
Nevertheless, Woznicki is very different
from the instant case and we are therefore not wholly persuaded by the City's
arguments of its application in this regard.
The instant case, unlike Woznicki, involves
police officers who are
discharging weapons in public places. When individuals accept positions as police
officers, they necessarily relinquish certain privacy rights and must be subject to public
scrutiny. See Wisconsin State Journal v. University
of Wisconsin-Platteville, 160
Wis.2d 31, 41, 465 N.W.2d 266, 270 (Ct. App. 1990). As a result of their public
employment, police officers have a lower expectation of privacy.
Wisconsin
Newspress, 199 Wis.2d at 788, 546 N.W.2d at 150. Moreover, in
Woznicki, the
reports at issue were a teacher's personnel file and personal phone records, which had
been subpoenaed by the district attorney. Id. at 181,
549 N.W.2d at 701. The reports
at issue here are factual reports documenting police officers' use of deadly force. The
public has a compelling interest in monitoring the use of deadly force by police officers
and such interest outweighs the police officers' expectation of privacy with regard to
discharging their weapons while working as police officers.
As aptly stated by the trial court:
[T]here is no more awesome power exercised by
government than that of the police. The police have
literally the power of life and death over citizens they are
to protect, but the power of the police in our republic is
limited.... "In recognition of the fact that a representative
government is dependent upon an informed electorate, it's
declared to be the public policy of this State that all
persons are entitled to the greatest possible information
regarding the affairs of government and the official acts of
those officers and employees who represent them." ... "To
that end, Sections [19.32 to 19.37] shall be construed in
every instance with a presumption of complete public
access consistent with the conduct of governmental
business. The denial of public access generally is contrary
to public interest and only in an exceptional case may
access be denied."...
[T]his public policy statement must apply ... with
utmost vigor to the situation at hand where the information
sought concerns the police exercise of its most extreme
power, the use of deadly force....
We conclude, therefore, that under the facts of this case, the public policy
favoring the right of inspection of public records and documents is not outweighed by
any privacy/reputational concerns. We do accept the City's argument, however, that
police officers have a right to keep their home addresses private. Accordingly, any
forms containing an officer's home address should have the address redacted before
disclosure.
We also reject the City's claim that the records should not be disclosed
because disclosure would give the requestor greater access to the records than is
available to the employee. This argument is circular. If the records are available to a
requestor under the open records law, then the employee is also entitled to inspect the
records. Once the records are made public, it makes no difference who the requestor
is.
The City next claims that disclosing this information would make it more
difficult to attract and retain competent police officers. We reject this argument as well.
As noted by Journal/Sentinel, Inc., the City fails to support this argument with any facts
nor does it demonstrate how this eventually would occur. Regardless, we conclude that
the likelihood of such a result is remote--too remote to overcome the policy favoring
disclosure of public records. Police officers must necessarily expect close public
scrutiny, especially with respect to incidents involving discharge of weapons or use of
deadly force.(5) Accordingly, it is difficult to
ascertain a situation where qualified
individuals would choose not to work as police officers merely because the public has
the right to inspect the factual information related to deadly force incidents. This
concern is insufficient to override the strong public interest in disclosure of the factual
reports at issue.
The City next claims that disclosing the requested reports will discourage
victims and witnesses from providing information. Again, we disagree. There is no
evidence to support this assertion. Moreover, in those situations where
victims/witnesses request that their statements be kept in strict confidence,
confidentiality can be maintained. The trial court's writ already contains such a
provision for redacting statements made in confidence and Journal/Sentinel, Inc.
accedes that the public is not entitled to this information. Therefore, we conclude that
this concern is insufficient to outweigh the public's compelling interest in accessing the
records. Any confidentiality issues can be carefully determined, as needed, by a
document-by-document in camera inspection.
In reviewing each of the City's proposed countervailing interests, we are
not persuaded that they justify a blanket withholding of the records at issue. The
records sought in this case involve records of the police exercise of its most extreme
power, the use of deadly force. The public has a particularly strong interest in
monitoring a police department's overall use of deadly force.
Having applied the balancing test by addressing all of the City's concerns
regarding withholding the records, we conclude that the public's particularly strong
interest in accessing the majority of this information is not outweighed by any of the
concerns set forth by the City. We do, however, conclude that certain portions of the
records may be withheld because the countervailing interests raised by the City do
outweigh the public's right to access a certain portion of the documents.
As noted, the public is entitled to inspection of all the factual information
regarding the use of deadly force. We interpret this information to include: (1) who
discharged a weapon; (2) when it was discharged; (3) the general circumstances
surrounding the incident; and (4) the name and identifying information of any victims
or witnesses, provided the individuals have not requested confidentiality.
We conclude, however, that the public is not entitled to inspect those
portions of the reports containing supervisory statements regarding conclusions,
recommendations or other comments regarding potential or actual disciplinary actions.
We also conclude that officers' home addresses should not be subject to disclosure.
These items must be redacted because the privacy concerns attached to such outweigh
the public's right to access this limited information.
III. CONCLUSION
In sum, we hold that the trial court's order is affirmed,
subject to the
following modifications: police officers' home addresses should be redacted from the
forms and any supervisory conclusions, recommendations or other comments regarding
disciplinary action should also be redacted from the forms prior to disclosure.
By the Court.--Order affirmed in part and modified in part.
1. These forms are also known as "In
the Matter of" forms and "Use of Force" forms. The
"matter of" forms, used prior to the middle of 1993, are simply a narrative description of the
event at issue, a recounting of the investigating officers' findings, and a conclusion by the
supervisor as to what actions should be taken with respect to the officer who discharged the
weapon. The "use of force" reports, which replaced the earlier documents, include both a
pre-printed form with space for a description of the incident, the location, the officers
involved,
the suspect and the witnesses. These forms also provide a narrative detailed description of
the
incident with a specific place for the commanding officer's recommendation.
2. Our review included an in
camera inspection of the sampling of the requested records.
The general procedure set forth for reviewing open records cases involves a two-step
procedure:
First, we must decide if the trial court correctly
assessed whether the custodian's denial of access was made
with the requisite specificity. Second, we determine whether
the stated reasons are sufficient to permit withholding, itself a
two-step analysis. Here, our inquiry is: (1) did the trial court
make a factual determination supported by the record of
whether the documents implicate the public interests in secrecy
asserted by the custodians and, if so, (2) do the countervailing
interests outweigh the public interest in release.
Milwaukee Journal v. Call, 153 Wis.2d 313,
317, 450 N.W.2d 515, 516 (Ct. App. 1989)
(citations omitted). The first step of this test was not challenged--that is, neither party
disputes
that there is adequate factual support for the trial court's determination that the police record
custodian's denial of access was made with the requisite specificity. We concur with this
determination. Accordingly, we need to address only the second step of the procedure--the
balancing test.
3. Those countervailing interests raised
by the City not specifically addressed in the text of
this opinion are summarily rejected for the reasons explained below.
The City's claim that
disclosing these records would affect how a police officer handles a
situation involving a firearm is raised for the first time on appeal and, therefore, we need not
address it. Pangman & Assocs., S.C. v.
Zellmer, 163 Wis.2d 1070, 1085, 473 N.W.2d 538,
544 (Ct. App. 1991) ("It is not for ... appellate courts to hypothesize or consider reasons for
not permitting inspection which were not presented by the custodian.").
In its initial denial, the City
raised two additional concerns: (1) that disclosure would
run counter to the municipalities' interests in maintaining the confidentiality of its personnel
records which are closed under § 230.13(5), Stats.; and (2) that disclosure
would violate §
103.13(2), Stats. We conclude that neither justifies withholding the records. First, §
230.13(5), Stats., was repealed and is no longer current law. See 1989 Act
31, §§ 2522-24.
Second, the City argues that § 103.13(2), Stats., indicates that this information
should only
be turned over upon the request of the employee or pursuant to a waiver by the employee.
Although this statute does provide employees with the right to inspect their own personnel
records, it does not prohibit the disclosure granted in the instant case.
We also reject the City's
argument that federal law supports withholding of the requested
information. The City's argument in this regard rests solely on the
Ballard v. Terrak, 56
F.R.D. 45 (E.D. Wis. 1972) case. We have previously rejected the applicability of
Ballard,
see Pangman & Assocs., S.C.,
163 Wis.2d at 1083-84, 473 N.W.2d at 544, and see no reason
for Ballard to persuade us
here.
The City's reliance on
Village of Butler v. Cohen, 163 Wis.2d 819, 472
N.W.2d 579
(Ct. App. 1991), is also misplaced. Cohen involved a
much different factual scenario than
presented in the instant case. The subject records in
Cohen involved a request for a complete
personnel file, not for records solely with respect to deadly force issues. Accordingly,
Cohen
is not controlling in the instant case.
4. To avoid an opinion that is heavily
overwritten, we address only dispositive issues which
were specifically raised under the facts presented. We decline to address any and all
additional
issues that although not raised in the instant case, may surface in future cases.
State v.
Blalock, 150 Wis.2d 688, 703, 442 N.W.2d 514, 520 (Ct. App. 1989)
(cases should be
decided on the narrowest possible grounds); see generally, 1 John H.
Wigmore, Evidence in
Trials at Common Law § 8a at 617 (3d ed. 1983) (discussing avoidance of
"overconsideration of every point of law raised in the briefs").
5. We note that other situations have
received similar treatment: personal injury lawsuits,
1983 civil rights claims, and coroner's inquests. See
Tyner v. City of Jackson, 105 F.R.D.
564 (S.D. Miss. 1985); Diamond v. City of Mobile,
86 F.R.D. 324 (S.D. Ala. 1978); Wood v.
Breier, 54 F.R.D. 7 (E.D. Wis. 1972).
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