BEFORE THE ARBITRATOR
In the Matter of the Arbitration of a Dispute Between
FOREST COUNTY DEPUTY SHERIFF
(Denial of Kelly Time for Clerk-Matrons)
Ms. Carol J. Nelson, Director, Northern Tier Uniserv-East, Box
Crandon, Wisconsin, for the labor organization.
Ruder, Ware & Michler, S.C., by Attorney Dean R.
Third Street, Wausau, Wisconsin, for the municipal employer.
The Forest County Deputy Sheriff Association and Forest County
are parties to a collective bargaining agreement which provides for
final and binding arbitration of disputes arising thereunder. The
Association made a request, in which the County concurred, for the
Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission to appoint a member of
its staff to hear and decide a grievance over the interpretation
and application of the terms of the agreement relating to "Kelly
Time" in lieu of overtime. The Commission designated Stuart D.
Levitan to serve as the impartial arbitrator. Hearing in the
matter was held in Crandon, Wisconsin, on December 13, 2000. The
County and Association filed written statements on February 19 and
February 22, and replies on March 19 and March 12, respectively.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE
The Association states the issue as follows:
Did Forest County violate the collective
when it denied deputized Clerk/Matrons the use of Kelly Time in
lieu of overtime? If so, what is the remedy?
The County states the issues as follows:
1. Whether the grievance has been timely processed
in order to be
an arbitrable dispute;
2. Whether the County violated the Labor
Agreement when it did
not modify the work schedule of the Clerk/Matrons to allow
these employees to earn Kelly Time. If so, what is the
I frame the issue as follows:
Did the Association's failure to meet the timelines of
4.02, Step 3 bar it from advancing this grievance to
If not, did the County violate the collective bargaining
when it denied deputized Clerk/Matrons the use of Kelly Time
in lieu of overtime? If so, what is the remedy?
Should differences arise between the Employer and the
Association concerning the interpretation or application of the
written provisions of this Agreement, every reasonable effort shall
be made to settle such differences. If the matter is not resolved
informally, a grievance shall be processed under the provisions of
1/ The only position
cited in the text of this article is that
of deputy. Obviously, its provisions apply equally to all other
positions within the bargaining unit as well.
Section 4.01: Only one
incident shall be covered in any one
grievance. A written grievance shall contain the name and position
of the grievant, the date and the cause for the grievance took
place, the particular section of the Agreement alleged to have been
violated, the issue involved and the relief sought.
Step 1: Any Deputy covered
by this Agreement who has a
grievance shall, within fifteen (15) working days after the Deputy
is aware of the cause for the grievance, report the grievance
individually or with an Association representative to the Sheriff
in writing, with a copy to the Personnel Administrator. The
Sheriff shall meet with the grievant and Association
representative, if requested, within five (5) working days of the
receipt of the grievance and shall prepare a written response to
the grievance within three (3) working days of the meeting.
Step 2: In the event no
satisfactory agreement has been
reached in Step 1 between the Sheriff and the grievant, the
grievance may be submitted in writing to the Personnel Committee
within ten (10) working days from the day that the Sheriff
responded to the grievance in Step 1, or within ten (10) working
days from the date that the response in Step 1 was due. In the
event of a grievance, the grievant shall continue to perform
his/her assigned duties.
If the grievance is submitted in writing to
Committee, a meeting shall be scheduled to take place within
fifteen (15) working days of receipt of the written grievance
unless by mutual agreement, a later date is set. However, in the
event the nature of the grievance results from discharge of an
employee, the Personnel Committee shall meet within ten (10)
working days from receipt of the grievance.
Following the meeting, the committee
give its answer in
writing to the grievant within fifteen (15) working days of the
date of the meeting. The Association shall have the right to have
the aggrieved Deputy attend the meeting and to have him represented
by another Association member or representative for the purpose of
resolving the grievance. No Deputy shall lose any pay or benefits
for attending any steps in this grievance procedure.
Step 3: Any grievance that
cannot be settled through the
above steps may be submitted to the Wisconsin Employment Relations
Commission (WERC) for resolution. The WERC shall appoint an
arbitrator from a member of its staff to resolve the dispute. The
Association shall notify the Personnel Committee in writing within
ten (10) working days after receipt of the Personnel Committee
response that they intend to take the grievance to arbitration and
shall submit a Petition for Arbitration with the WERC within ten
(10) working days of the date of the notice to the Personnel
Committee. The procedure for arbitration is as follows:
A: Arbitration Hearing:
The Arbitrator so appointed, shall
meet with the parties at a mutually agreeable date, to review the
evidence and hear testimony relating to the grievance. Upon
completion of this review and hearing, the Arbitrator shall render
a written decision to both the County and the Association, which
shall be final and binding upon both parties.
B. Costs: Both parties
shall share equally the costs and
expenses of the arbitration proceedings, including transcript fees
when requested by the Arbitrator. Each party, however, shall bear
its own expenses for attorneys and witness fees.
C. Authority of
Arbitrator: The decision of the Arbitrator
shall be limited to the subject matter of the grievance and shall
be restricted solely to the interpretation of the terms of this
D. If the question of arbitrability is
arbitrator shall hear arguments of the parties on the question of
arbitrability and the arguments on the merits of the grievance.
The arbitrator shall first decide the question of arbitrability,
with the decision of the arbitrator being final and binding on both
parties. If it is determined that the issue is arbitrable, then
the arbitrator shall proceed to issue a decision on the grievance.
Section 4.03: If the
has been processed beyond Step
2, and the grievant wishes to add new facts or information into the
file, he/she shall immediately transmit a written notice to the
Sheriff and the Personnel Committee indicating in said notice the
nature and details of the new facts. When such notice has been
transmitted by the grievant, the grievance cannot progress through
the arbitration procedures until the Sheriff has had an opportunity
Within five (5) days of receipt of such
special notice, the
Sheriff shall exercise one of the following options:
A. He/she may reopen
the proceeding for purpose of
reconsidering his/her Step 1 decision.
B. He/she may acknowledge receipt of the
facts and the
grievance shall proceed.
Section 4.04: Any
adjustments resulting from the grievance
conferences under this provision shall not be inconsistent with the
terms of this Agreement.
Section 4.05: Any and all
reference to "days" or "working
days" in this section shall mean Monday through Friday excluding
Saturday, Sunday and holidays. All time limits in this procedure
may be changed by mutual agreement of the parties.
Section 4.06: Past grievances
may not be filed under the
provisions of this procedure and all grievances which bear a filing
date which precedes or is the same as expiration date of the
Agreement, must be processed to conclusion under the terms of this
. . .
HOURS PER WEEK
Section 16.01: The normal work day for all
Jailer/Dispatchers shall be 12 consecutive hours per day. The
normal work day for the deputized Clerk-Matron shall be eight (8)
consecutive hours per day.
Section 16.02: The normal
work shifts for employees covered
by this agreement shall be as follows:
A. Patrol Deputies and
Jailer/Dispatchers shall work on a
day or night shift. The normal work schedule shall be
four (4) days on duty, followed by four (4) days off
B. The normal work
shift at the Mole Lake post shall be 12
hours per work day from 4:00 p.m. to 4:00 a.m. and with
a work schedule of four (4) days on duty followed by four
(4) days off duty.
C. One "fill-shift"
position shall be utilized by the
department. The fill-shift position shall work 12 hours
per work day, and may be assigned to either a day shift,
night shift, or Mole Lake post. The fill-shift position
shall not be scheduled with more than six (6) consecutive
duty days followed by a minimum of four (4) days off.
The fill-shift position shall not be scheduled with less
than 12 hours rest period between assigned shifts. The
fill-shift position shall not work in excess of 14 days
in any 28 day cycle. No more than two shift changes will
be scheduled in any eight (8) day period.
D. The Deputized
Clerk-Matron shall work Monday through
Friday with flexible hours between 7:00 a.m. and 5:00
E. As an offset for the
number of hours worked, each Deputy
and Jailer/Dispatcher shall receive kelly days equivalent
to one-hundred and ten (110) hours of off time, yielding
a work year of 2,080 hours and an average work week of 40
hours. If the Sheriff elects to replace the deputies on
kelly days, he/she may assign part-time deputies.
Kelly day off scheduling
shall be initiated by
employee request and in all cases shall be subject to
approval or disapproval by the Sheriff in his discretion.
(NOTE: Parties agree that this
language means County can
fill all or part of a shift absence at the Sheriff's
discretion; if it's a kelly off absence, then Sheriff may
use full or part-timers; if it's some other kind of
absence, Sheriff must offer to full-timers per
Article XXIII, Section 2.)
Section 16.03: The Sheriff
will establish regular work
schedules which will permit the deputies to obtain as nearly as
possible the hours per day and hours per week as necessary for
efficient operation of the Department.
Section 16.04: The
assignment of shifts and vacations shall
be made by the Sheriff to the Deputies on a seniority basis.
Section 23.01: Overtime will be compensated
the rate of
time and one-half. Overtime is defined as any hour worked in excess
of the normally required hours provided those hours are actually
worked. Any overtime pursuant to this Article shall be compensated
by either being paid time and one-half, or granted compensatory
time of time and one-half, at the discretion of the deputy who
works that overtime.
. . .
This grievance concerns the policy of Forest County to decline
to offer so-called "Kelly Time" in lieu of overtime to its
deputized clerk/matrons. The county had accreted the position of
deputized clerk/matron into a unit consisting of deputy sheriffs
and jailer/dispatchers in 1997, when the county opened its new
The clerk/matrons work an eight-hour shift
Friday, with flexible hours between 7:00 a.m. and 5:00 p.m. They
have been deputized for the purpose of serving legal papers. They
have limited powers of arrest, with their jurisdiction restricted
to the courthouse, law enforcement center, and such other sites as
the Sheriff authorizes. They are not considered protective status
employees. They do not wear a uniform. They have no special
education, training or certification relevant to their employment.
They are not authorized to carry concealed weapons.
In order that the county may maintain an around-the-clock,
daily law enforcement presence, the collective bargaining agreement
provides that all deputies and jailer/dispatchers work a 12-hour
shift, with a work schedule of four days on duty, followed by four
days off duty, for a total of 2190 hours per year. The county
neither needs nor ordinarily maintains the services of its
deputized clerk/matrons outside the 40-hour, standard work-week
In order to reduce the hours of the deputy sheriffs and
jailer/dispatchers to the standardized 2,080 hours, these employees
receive 110 hours time off at straight pay under the so-called
"Kelly time" provision. For hours worked in excess of 2,190 in a
year, these employees also receive overtime or compensatory time
off at time-and-one-half. The
clerk/matrons do not receive Kelly time, but do receive pay or
compensatory time-off at the rate of time-and-one-half for all
hours worked in excess of eight in a day or 40 in a week. 2/
2/ As noted
above, the only position referenced in the text of
section 23.01 is "the deputy." Apparently, the parties have not
yet addressed in a comprehensive manner the 1997 accretion of the
clerk/matron position. Based on the employer's representation at
hearing, I hold that all provisions of the first paragraph of
section 23.01 apply to all positions in the bargaining unit, not
just deputy sheriffs.
The county also offers Kelly Time to the Jail Administrator,
who works a 42-hour work week, Monday-Friday, and to the School
Liaison Officer, who works a 42.5-hour work week, Monday-Friday. At
the time of hearing, the position of Liaison Officer was within the
bargaining unit, the position of Jail Administrator was not.
Bethyn Baldauf was hired as the county's second deputized
clerk/matron on August 9, 1999. Shortly after completing her six-month probationary period,
she requested Kelly Time off for
herself and veteran colleague Kathleen White. That request was
On March 21, 2000, the Association submitted to Sheriff Roger
Wilson at Notice of Grievance and Request for Remedy, in which it
asserted that the County had "violated the collective bargaining
agreement and past practice when they denied Ms. Wadzinski and
Ms. White kelly-time in lieu of overtime." The Association claimed
that the County's actions violated sections 16.01 and 16.02 of the
agreement, as well as past practice. Sheriff Wilson denied the
On March 31, 2000, the Association advanced the grievance to
Step 2, the Personnel Committee. In her cover letter to the
Personnel Committee Chair in care of the County Clerk, Association
Executive Director Carol J. Nelson wrote she was "requesting that
a meeting be scheduled with the Personnel Committee within the
timelines outlined in the Collective Bargaining Agreement to try to
resolve this grievance."
The record does not indicate the date on which the Personnel
Committee met to consider this grievance. On June 16, 2000, County
labor counsel Dean Dietrich wrote to Nelson as follows:
I am writing on behalf of the Forest County Personnel Committee
to advise you that the Committee has voted to deny the grievance
filed by the Forest County Deputy Sheriff Association regarding
Kelly days for the position of Clerk-Matron. The Committee voted
to deny this grievance for the following reasons:
* The provisions of
Section 16.01 of Article XVI Hours
Per Week, clearly provide that the workday for the Clerk-Matron position shall be eight
consecutive hours per day
and the language of Article XVI Hours Per Week does not
provide for the Clerk-Matron position to receive Kelly
* The suggestion by
the Association that the Clerk-Matron
position work eight and one-half hours per day for five
days per week for several months and four days per week
for the remaining months would constitute a violation of
the Fair Labor Standards Act which requires the County to
pay time and one-half for hours worked in excess of 40
hours per week for the Clerk-Matron position.
* The Association's
argument that the hours of work worked
by the Jail Administrator constitutes a past practice for
the assignment of Kelly days for the Clerk-Matron
position is completely unfounded since the Jail
Administrator position is a law enforcement position and
also is not included in the bargaining unit represented
by the Deputy Sheriff Association.
For these reasons, the Personnel
Committee has denied the
Grievance filed by the Forest County Deputy Sheriff Association.
On August 23, 2000, the Association informed the
it was filing with the Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission a
request to initiate grievance arbitration in the matter. On August
24, 2000, Dietrich wrote Nelson as follows:
I have received a copy of your request to initiate grievance
arbitration filed on behalf of the Forest County Deputy Sheriff's
Association in the above noted matter. I note that this request is
dated August 23 and the denial of the grievance submitted by the
Personnel Committee was dated June 16, 2000.
The current Labor Agreement between
Forest County and the
Forest County Deputy Sheriff's Association provides, in Article IV
Grievances, Section 4.02 that "the Association shall notify the
Personnel Committee in writing within ten (10) working days after
receipt of the Personnel Committee response that they intend to
take the grievance to arbitration and shall submit a petition for
arbitration to the WERC within ten (10) working days of the date of
the notice to the Personnel Committee." It is our opinion that the
Deputy Sheriff's Association has not
complied with either of
these requirements under Step 3 of the Grievance Procedure. As a
result, the County will object to the processing of this grievance
to arbitration and will raise a defense before the Grievance
Arbitrator that the grievance is untimely and should not be
considered by the Arbitrator. We do agree to raise this issue as
part of the grievance arbitration process in lieu of refusing to
schedule a grievance arbitration hearing.
If you should have any questions regarding this, please feel
free to contact us.
POSITIONS OF THE PARTIES
In support of its position that the grievance should be
sustained, the Association asserts and avers that the clerk/matrons
are members of the Association, with the same rights as other
members including, but not limited to, Kelly time; that
clerk/matrons are deputized, and their schedules described as
flexible, and that the Sheriff has been flexible with other members
of the Association who work Monday-Friday days and receive Kelly
time. The Association also states that because the parties have a
collective bargaining agreement which includes all members of the
Association, the County cannot arbitrarily and capriciously select
which members receive which benefits, and that the collective
bargaining agreement clearly indicates that all members of the
Association have the right to request and receive Kelly time.
In support of its position that the grievance
denied, the County asserts and avers that the grievance was
advanced in an untimely manner, making it procedurally not
arbitrable. The County further posits that the clear and
unambiguous language of the collective bargaining agreement
establishes that the Clerk/Matrons are not entitled to Kelly time,
and that the Association's claim of past practice is unsupported by
relevant law and contrary to the evidence.
In its reply brief, the Association addresses the issue of
timeliness by positing that the employer had repeatedly cancelled
scheduled meetings and bargaining sessions at which the parties
could have discussed the grievance in a timely manner, and that the
grievance is a continuing matter which would allow for a new
grievance to be filed at any time. As to the merits, the
Association further posits that other positions have scheduling
flexibility and receive Kelly time, and that the collective
bargaining agreement is clear that as deputized deputy sheriffs the
clerk/matrons receive all benefits that other deputized members
receive, including the right to request Kelly time.
In its reply brief, the county further posits that the
association has ignored the unambiguous language of Article XVI
which plainly states that only deputies and jailer/dispatchers
receive Kelly time; that the Sheriff has no need to adjust the
clerk/matron schedule to create additional overtime; that because
the clerk/matrons do not qualify as law enforcement personnel, the
county is required to pay overtime for all hours worked over 40 in
one week, meaning they could not receive the Kelly time as
The employer has made a very strenuous argument that I should
deny and dismiss the grievance because the Association was untimely
in advancing the grievance from Personnel Committee denial to
arbitration. For the reasons explained below, I have declined to
The collective bargaining agreement establishes timelines for
each step in the grievance process. The grievant "shall" file a
written grievance within 15 days after becoming aware of the cause
of the grievance; the Sheriff "shall meet" with the grievant within
five days and "shall prepare" a written response" within three days
afterwards. If this Step 1 result is deemed unsatisfactory, the
grievance "may be submitted" to the Personnel Committee within ten
days of the Sheriff's response; if it is, "a meeting shall be
scheduled to take place within fifteen days," unless by mutual
agreement a later date is set. Following that meeting, the
Personnel Committee "shall give its answer in writing within
fifteen days of the date of the meeting." If that answer is deemed
unsatisfactory, the Association "shall notify the Personnel
Committee in writing within ten days" after receipt of the
committee response that it intends to take the grievance to
arbitration, and "shall submit a Petition for Arbitration with the
WERC within ten working days" of the date of notice to the
Just as it is important to note what the collective bargaining
agreement says, it is also important to not what it does not say
specifically, what it does not say regarding the sanction for the
association's failure to provide timely notice of its intent to
advance the grievance.
The county inadvertently makes this very point by several of
the cases it cites in support of its argument that this grievance
should be dismissed. For example, the county has cited Marquette
County, No. 37294 (Schiavoni, 5/87), in which the arbitrator
dismissed a grievance because the union did not appeal a step one
denial in a timely manner. But the critical factor in Arbitrator
Schiavoni's decision was a provision not present in the Forest
County collective bargaining agreement explicitly and
unambiguously stating that "a grievance not presented within the
time limitations or procedural requirements of this Article shall
be considered dropped." (emphasis added). As Arbitrator Schiavoni
corrected noted, this
language "makes it clear that the parties intended that untimely
grievances or those which failed to comport with the procedural
requirements are to be considered dropped."
The county here has cited yet another case with similar,
explicit language far different from that before me. In Kaukauna
School District, No. 37988 (Houlihan, 8/87), the collective
bargaining agreement explicitly provided that "grievances not
processed to the next step within the prescribed time limits shall
be considered resolved against the grievant." Accordingly, while
acknowledging the "policy preference favoring decisions on the
merits," the arbitrator dismissed a grievance as not arbitral
because it was processed outside the rigid timelines.
As the county knows, it is the language of the particular
collective bargaining agreement that is of the greatest importance;
an arbitration award interpreting a collective bargaining agreement
with language far different from that under review is simply not a
persuasive precedent. If the collective bargaining agreement
before me contained language similar to that in the cases before
Arbitrators Houlihan and Schiavoni, I would reach the same
conclusion as did they. But it doesn't, and I don't.
There is yet another reason for declining the county the
preemptory relief it seeks its own handling of this grievance.The
record shows that the grievance was filed with Sheriff Roger Wilson
on March 21, 2000, and that Chief Deputy Aaron Huettl denied the
grievance, in writing, on March 28. On March 31, well within her
ten-day window, NTU-East Executive Director Carol Nelson advanced
the grievance to Step 2, noting in her cover letter that she was
"requesting that a meeting be scheduled with the Personnel
Committee within the timelines outlined in the Collective
Bargaining Agreement to try to resolve this grievance." Allowing
two days for mail delivery, Nelson's letter put the county on
notice that it was required to schedule a Personnel Committee by no
later than April 16, or seek Nelson's agreement for the meeting to
be held at a later date. On April 12, county special legal counsel
Dean Dietrich wrote to Nelson to inform her he would be meeting
with the Personnel Committee on April 17 to discuss the grievance,
and would "contact you shortly after the April 17 meeting to
discuss the processing of this grievance." Thus, the first
violation of the grievance timelines was not committed by the
association, but by the county.
The record does not indicate the date the Personnel Committee
finally met. The next record evidence is Atty. Dietrich's June 16
letter to Nelson, in which he advises her of the committee's
The collective bargaining agreement requires the Personnel
Committee to meet within fifteen days of the Step 2 notice and
respond in writing within 15 days of that meeting, unless by mutual
agreement an alternate schedule is set. It does not appear the
Association agreed to
later dates, thus requiring the county to have submitted its
written response from the Personnel Committee with 30 days of the
Step 2 notice. Instead, that notice was not provided until
June 16, or 77 days after Nelson's Step 2 notice and request for a
meeting more than two and a half times the allowable duration.
Having failed to comply with the contractual timelines, the
county now seeks to have the grievance dismissed because the
association failed to submit a timely notice to the Personnel
Committee that it was advancing the grievance to arbitration.
There is no question that the association's notice to the
committee was 58 days late, just as there is no question that the
county's response to the association was 47 days late. I will not
honor the county's request for rigid application of the timelines
when the county itself has failed to abide by them.
Finally, I decline to dismiss the grievance on procedural
grounds because such an action would be counter to the efficient
administration of industrial justice. The recurring nature of the
underlying event the denial of Kelly time makes this a
continuing grievance that would allow the association to start the
process anew at any time. That being the case, there is little to
gain, and much in the way of time and attention to lose, by putting
the parties through a completely new grievance.
Accordingly, for these three reasons that the collective
bargaining agreement does not specify a sanction for untimely
notice of an intent to arbitrate, that the county was the first to
violate the procedural timelines, and that this constitutes a
continuing grievance which the association could refile at any time
I find the grievance arbitrable.
I now turn to consider the grievance on its merits. Here, the
county is on firmer footing.
The crux of the associations' argument is that "all members of
the Forest County Deputy Sheriff's Association have the same rights
under the Collective Bargaining Agreement," that "all members of
the Association receive the option of Kelly time in lieu of
overtime," and that as members of the association, the deputized
Clerk/Matrons are entitled to the same rights and benefits as all
The association contends that among the benefits all deputized
members receive is the right to request Kelly time, and that as
deputized deputy sheriffs, the clerk/matrons are entitled to this
benefit as well.
There are several problems with the association's theory of
the case. The first is the clear language of the collective
bargaining agreement. Section 16.02E does not provide, as the
association asserts, that all deputized personnel receive Kelly
time; instead, it specifically refers to "each Deputy and
The clerk/matrons have been deputized for the specific and
limited purpose of serving legal papers. As their identification
badges plainly state, they have only limited powers of arrest and
are not authorized to carry concealed weapons. They are neither
trained nor credentialed as law enforcement personnel. In the
context of collective bargaining and contract administration, a
"deputized clerk/matron" is not a deputy sheriff.
Moreover, to demand Kelly time for non-law enforcement
personnel shows a fundamental misunderstanding of the purpose of
Kelly time, which is to address the unique circumstances of
employees who provide round-the-clock protective services on
schedules quite different from the standard 40-hour work week.
The collective bargaining agreement makes absolutely clear
that the Kelly time provision is only for the deputies and
jailer/dispatchers indeed, it not only says that, it even
explains why that is so. Section 16.02(E) leaves no ambiguity:
As an offset for the number of hours worked, each Deputy and
Jailer/Dispatcher shall receive Kelly days equivalent to one-hundred and ten (110) hours of
off time, yielding a work year of
2,080 hours and an average work week of 40 hours.
It is hard to see how this could be any clearer. Based on
their 12-hour shifts, four days on, four days off, the deputies and
jailer/dispatchers work 2,190 hours; 110 hours in Kelly time brings
them down to 2,080 hours just as is provided for in 16.02(E). In
contrast, the clerk/matrons work 8-hour shifts, Monday-Friday,
already putting them at the standard 2,080 hours.
The association has focused on the phrase "flexible hours" in
section 16.02(D), and claimed that other personnel with flexible
hours get Kelly time. But in this paragraph, the reference to
"flexible hours" is to indicate that the work window (7:00 a.m. to
5:00 p.m.) is ten hours wide, with the employees only working eight
of those hours.
I do not find the treatment of the jail administrator or
school liaison officer particularly meaningful. At all times
relevant to this proceeding, the position of jail administrator was
outside the bargaining unit, and thus has absolutely no application
here. And the liaison officer is a law enforcement position (which
the clerk/matrons are not) regularly working a schedule exceeding
2,080 hours (which the clerk/matrons do not).
The Association has prepared a detailed analysis showing why
it would be efficient and economic for the County to allow the
deputized clerk/matrons to request Kelly time off. That may well be
the case. Or it may not. I have not made a finding in that regard
because whether or not allowing the clerk/matrons to request Kelly
time is a good idea is not the issue before me. The issue before
me is whether the collective bargaining agreement requires the
county to allow such a request. It does not.
Accordingly, on the basis of the collective bargaining
agreement, the record evidence and the argument of the parties, it
1. That the Association's failure to meet the timelines of
Section 4.02, Step 3 did not bar it from advancing this grievance
2. That the County did not violate the collective bargaining
agreement by denying deputized Clerk/Matrons the ability to request
Kelly Time in lieu of overtime.
3. That the grievance is denied and dismissed.
Dated at Madison, Wisconsin this 21st day of May, 2001.
Stuart Levitan, Arbitrator