BEFORE THE ARBITRATOR
In the Matter of the Arbitration of a Dispute Between
MILWAUKEE COUNTY DEPUTY SHERIFF'S
MILWAUKEE COUNTY (SHERIFF'S
(William Terry Discipline Grievance)
Gimbel, Reilly, Guerin & Brown, by Attorney Aaron
M. Hurvitz, 330
East Kilbourn Avenue, Suite 1170, Milwaukee, WI 53202, appearing on
behalf of the Union.
Mr. Timothy R. Schoewe, Deputy Corporation Counsel,
County Courthouse, Room 303, 901 North Ninth Street, Milwaukee, WI
53233, appearing on behalf of Milwaukee County.
The Milwaukee County Sheriff's Association (hereinafter
referred to as either the Association or the Union) requested that
the Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission designate a member of
its staff to serve as arbitrator of a dispute between the
Association and the Milwaukee County Sheriff's Department
(hereinafter referred to as either the County or the Department)
over the discipline imposed on Deputy William Terry. The
undersigned was so designated. A hearing was held on October 18,
2000, at the Milwaukee County Courthouse in Milwaukee, Wisconsin,
at which time the parties were afforded full opportunity to present
such testimony, exhibits, other evidence and arguments as were
relevant to the dispute. The Union made a closing argument and the
City submitted a responsive brief. The Union then submitted a
reply brief and the County a sur-reply. The last of these was
received on December 2, 2000, whereupon the record was closed. The
record was reopened on December 15, 2000, to consider the Union's
objection to the County's sur-reply.
Now, having considered the evidence, the arguments of the
parties, and the record as a whole, the undersigned makes the
To maximize the ability of the parties we serve to utilize the
Internet and computer software to research decisions and
arbitration awards issued by the Commission and its staff, footnote
text is found in the body of this decision.
The parties were unable to stipulate to the issues before the
Arbitrator. The Union believes the issues to be:
1. Whether the County's Sick Leave policy violates
bargaining agreement and the Municipal Employment Relations
2. Whether the suspension was
3. Whether the Sheriff failed to
comply with the Family and
Medical Leave Act?
4. If the answer to any of the
foregoing is "yes," what is the
The County believes the issues to be:
1. Whether the statutory claims made the
2. Whether the challenge to the
reasonableness of the Sick Leave
policy is precluded by an earlier arbitration award on the
3. Whether the challenge to the
suspension and the challenge to
the work rule are timely?
4. Whether the preponderance
of the evidence supports the
On review of the record, the issues may be fairly stated as
1. Are the challenges to the attendance policy under
FMLA arbitrable? If so,
2. Is the Department's
attendance policy valid?
3. Was the suspension of
Deputy Terry for just cause?
The contract contains a Management Rights Clause, reserving to
the Department the right to make and enforce reasonable rules and
regulations, and to impose discipline upon employees. There is
also a provision for arbitral review of suspensions of ten days or
PERTINENT DEPARTMENT RULES AND
POLICY AND PROCEDURE
DIRECTIVE NO. 24-97
November 21, 1997
NOTE: Directive No. 24-97 replaces
Directive No. 9-97 due to a
change in the call-in procedure.
. . .
Effective immediately for sworn and civilian
Absenteeism and tardiness by a relatively
few employees can
cause staffing problems. Absenteeism causes employees to be "held
over" to work forced overtime after working their assigned shifts.
Some employees may not understand the
basic reasons for a paid
absence plan and the cost of absenteeism in general. A paid
absence plan is meant to insure that employees' pay will continue
when they are ill. The plan is not intended to be an additional
off duty fringe benefit.
All employees who are absent will be
interviewed by their
immediate supervisor. This will allow the administration to:
Maintain written records of
all absences and the reason given
for the absences.
Identify the chronic absentee
or potential abuser.
3. Identify the
immediate causes of the absence and any
possible underlying causes.
4. Assist the absentee to
correct the basic and immediate
The following actions will be taken with
any employee who is
absent within a one year time frame (year is defined as a twelve
1st through 3rd Absence:
4th Absence: Noted
on Employee Activity Documentation Record;
5th and Subsequent Absence: Refer
documentation to Office of
Professional Standards for appropriate disposition. Based on
the disposition appropriate disciplinary action, if necessary,
will be decided by the Sheriff and may require a doctor's
excuse and increment denial.
Only the Sheriff or his/her designee is
empowered to deviate
from the above procedures because of unusual circumstances.
Time approved under the Family
and Medical Leave Law or any
excused absence will not be considered for disciplinary purposes
nor will time off be taken into account for job evaluation purposes
or salary increment decisions.
If you have a problem that is causing you to
be absent, please
contact the Employee Assistance Program (327-5197). The program is
designed to assist employees in solving problems. All interviews
108.03 DEFINITION OF
TERMS USED IN THE MANUAL
Sick Leave. Sick
leave shall include paid absence from duty
because of illness; bodily injury not covered by worker's
compensation; exposure to contagious disease; and serious illness
in the immediate family of the employee and other causes as defined
in Chapter 17.18 of the General Ordinances of Milwaukee County.
Incident. Time off,
not covered by the Family and Medical
Leave Law, or excused absence which involves the use of sick or
absent hours whether in increments of 0.1 hour or more or one
continuous period of time.
Continual interruption of attendance.
. . .
1. Employees calling in
sick must notify the department at
least One Hour before the start of their shift in accordance
with the Bureau's call-in procedure.
2. Employees who do
not report to work and fail to notify the
department they are sick will be marked absent without pay
until such time as notification is made.
3. The following actions will be taken with
fail to comply with the above sick call-in requirements
within a one year time frame (a year is defined as a twelve
Noted on employee activity documentation
2nd and subsequent
occurrences: Referral to the Office of
Professional Standards for appropriate disposition as
determined by the Sheriff.
4. Health Services Unit employees who sign
up for additional
shifts must provide notice of cancellation of the shift(s)
two weeks prior to the start of the shift.
Only the Sheriff or his/her designee is
empowered to deviate
from the above procedures because of unusual circumstances.
. . .
SHERIFF' S DEPARTMENT
FAMILY AND MEDICAL LEAVE
The State of Wisconsin and Congress have both passed
legislation authorizing leaves of absences for employees. The
purpose of the legislation was to provide employees with unpaid
time off from work because of a serious health condition of their
immediate family member and their own serious health condition.
All Family and Medical Leaves
are subject to the approval of
the Sheriff Administration - Human Resources - Rm 107-SB.
Appropriate documentation must be received by Sheriff
Administration-H.R. before the leave can be approved.
Summary of Family and Medical
State of WI Family and Medical
In a calendar year:
1. Duration up to:
a.) Two weeks paid or unpaid leave for
employee's own serious
b.) Two weeks paid or
unpaid leave for serious health
condition of spouse, child, foster child, parent.
c.) Six weeks for birth
or adoption of child.
2. Employee selects what type
of paid leave to be used. Sick
allowance, vacation, accrued overtime, personal days accrued
holiday or unpaid time.
Federal Family and Medical Leave Act
In a calendar year:
1. Up to twelve weeks in a
calendar year for any of or
combination of the following situations:
a.) Because of an employee's own serious
which makes the employee unable to perform the essential
functions of the position.
b.) To care for a child,
parent or spouse with a serious
c.) Birth or adoption of
a child or foster child placement.
2. Sheriff Administration will
determine what type of paid or
unpaid leave the employee can take in cases not involving an
employee's own serious health condition.
Under State and Federal Leave
the following will apply:
4Requests for FMLA leave must be
submitted as far in advance as
possible but no later than ten working days prior to the start
of the leave except in emergencies. In case of emergency, you
must submit documentation within ten working days after the
4Any time taken under the State Leave will count toward
twelve week limit.
4A serious health
condition is defined as a disabling physical or
mental illness, injury, impairment, or a physical or mental
condition that involves one of the following.
1. Hospital Care
Inpatient care (overnight stay) in a
hospital, hospice, or
residential medical care facility, including subsequent
treatment in connection with such inpatient care.
Outpatient care that requires continuing
supervision by a health care provider.
A period of incapacity of more than
three consecutive calendar
days (including any subsequent treatment or period of
incapacity relating to the same condition), that also involves
a. Treatment two or more
times by a health care provider; OR
b. Treatment by a health care
provider on at least one occasion
which resulted in a regimen of continuing treatment under the
supervision of the health care provider.
Any period of incapacity due to pregnancy
or for prenatal
Conditions Requiring Treatment
Chronic conditions requiring periodic
for treatments or
long term conditions which are incurable or so serious that if
not treated it would result in incapacity of more than three
4Any other relatives, such as
grandparents, brothers, sisters,
aunts, uncles, etc., are not covered by the FMLA.
Mother/father-in-law are only covered by the State Law.
4Leaves for spouses both working
for Milwaukee County is limited to
a total of twelve weeks per calendar year under the Federal
cannot simply be for care of an ill child or parent.
The condition of the child, parent or spouse must qualify as
a serious health condition and the employee's presence is
necessary or beneficial for the care of the family member.
4Both the Federal and State Laws
require an employee to be employed
for at least twelve months prior and receive a minimum number
of paid hours for the employee to be eligible for a leave.
(State - 1,000 hours during preceding 52 weeks; Federal -
1,250 hours during preceding 52 weeks)
When requesting a FMLA
the following procedure should be
1. Complete and submit a Request
for Family and Medical Leave
Form as soon as possible when the leave is foreseeable but no
later than ten working days prior to the start of the leave
except in emergencies. In case of emergency, documentation
must be submitted within ten working days after the emergency.
Submit the form to your supervisor who will forward the form
to Sheriff Administration.
FOR A . . . .
Employee's own serious health
Submit a Certification of Physician or
Practitioner Form to
Sheriff Administration-H.R. -RN 107,SB. A physician's release
stating you are able to return to your job duties must be submitted
upon your return to work.
Serious health condition of
spouse, child, or parent
Submit a Certification of Physician or
Practitioner Form to
Sheriff Administration-H.R.-RM 107, SB.
Birth, adoption or foster child
Birth - documentation from your physician
expected date of birth, the beginning and ending dates of time
medically excused off work prior to birth and a 'matter of' stating
the beginning and ending dates of the time requested to be off.
Intermittent leave for birth,
adoption, or foster child
Intermittent Leave is not a right under the
Federal Law and an
employer has the option of granting or denying an intermittent
2. Sick allowance or absent
time which is not approved as Family
or Medical Leave under the FMLA process will be considered in
3. For copies of Family and
Medical Leave Forms, contact Sheriff
Administration - Room 107-SB.
Under the Milwaukee County Civil Service Rules,
and/or labor contract agreements, with appropriate approvals, the
length of an employee's leave may be longer than the time allocated
under the state and federal laws.
The County provides general governmental services, including
law enforcement, to the people of Milwaukee County, in southeastern
Wisconsin. Lev Baldwin was, at all relevant times, the Sheriff.
The Grievant, William Terry, is a court officer. Between February
of 1999 and November of 1999, he had five occasions of absence as
defined by the Department's Directive 24-97 on absenteeism. He was
gone from February 16 to 18 and June 21 to 23 for bronchitis. He
made no request for FMLA leave for these absences, nor did the
Department ask whether he wanted to use FMLA. The lost time was
covered by accumulated sick leave. On August 24, he said he had
the flu. From October 4 to 6, he cited bronchitis as the reason.
In response to the October absence, the Human Resources
Manager twice sent him forms and instructions on applying for FMLA
leave, but he did not return them. On November 18, he called in
with food poisoning. He called in the absences properly, but since
he had a previous verbal warning for absenteeism, he was assessed
a one-day suspension. This is the penalty called for in the
Directive, which includes no-fault attendance policy.
The suspension was assessed on February 17, 2000, and this
grievance was filed on the same date. A Step 2 hearing was held on
the grievance by the Human Resources Manager on March 6, 2000, and
she denied the grievance in writing on March 20. The grievance
cited the sick leave provisions of the contract and the general
ordinances governing sick leave. In the course of the grievance
procedure, the Association added an allegation that the Management
Rights clause had been violated. The grievance asked that the
suspension be removed from his record, and that the attendance
policy be abolished. No reference was made to the Family and
Medical Leave Act during the grievance procedure.
The Grievant testified in his own behalf, and stated that he
has suffered from bronchitis since the winter of 1992-93, and that
is sometimes incapacitated him. He said had told the dispatcher he
was calling in because he had bronchitis in both February and June.
In neither instance did the County send him FMLA forms, and no one
ever told him to see a doctor or made any inquiries about his
condition. He acknowledged that he had told Captain Moore of the
Department that his doctor had said he could do anything, that he
had self-treated with herbs, and that his doctor had refused his
request to certify the bronchitis as a serious medical condition
for FMLA purposes. He also acknowledged that he had not responded
to the FMLA forms sent by the Department in November, and had never
filed a complaint over denial of FMLA or over the validity of
Additional facts, as necessary, will be set forth below.
ARGUMENTS OF THE PARTIES
The Position of the Association
At the outset, the Association argues that all of its
arguments are properly before the Arbitrator. The Association has
pointed out the invalidity of the Sheriff's absenteeism rules
under MERA, and the illegality of his FMLA policy under federal
law. The County complains that these arguments were never raised
before arbitration, and thus are barred by the contract provision
that says that issues not raised in the lower steps of the
grievance procedure cannot be presented in arbitration. That view
is unrealistic. The parties at the lower steps generally argue
about the facts of the case, and the legal arguments are developed
at arbitration, once counsel is secured. A finding that the legal
theories cannot be fleshed out at the arbitration step would simply
insure that the parties would bring their attorneys in at an
earlier point, a result which is inconsistent with the step by step
procedure negotiated between the parties. The Association also
observes that there is no proof that these arguments were not
raised at the lower steps.
Turning to the merits, the Association argues that the
Sheriff's attendance rules are unilateral and illegal. Attendance
rules are a mandatory subject of bargaining, and these were never
negotiated with the Association. Moreover, the collective
bargaining agreement makes sick leave available for employee
illnesses, and the unilateral policy cannot override the negotiated
terms of the bilateral agreement. While Arbitrator McGilligan may
have found the policy valid in 1997, this arbitrator must proceed
under the 1998-2000 contract, and the old award cannot supercede
The Association notes that the County suspended Deputy Terry
for having five occurrences of absence, and that two of these in
February and June were the result of bronchitis. Deputy Terry
testified that he told the dispatcher this when he called. The
County took no action in response to this information. As a matter
of law under the FMLA, the onus is on the employer to offer FMLA
information whenever it becomes aware of a serious medical
condition. Bronchitis has been found by the federal courts to be
a serious medical condition. Yet the Department's FMLA policy
purports to place the onus of the employee. The Sheriff cannot
simply rewrite the FMLA. The failure to investigate Deputy Terry's
report of a serious illness is, on its face, a violation of the
FMLA and whether he would have qualified for leave or not is beside
the point. He was never given the chance. Since this condition
does qualify for FMLA leave, and since the County's failure to
investigate denied Terry the chance to take FMLA leave, and since
it is illegal to count FMLA absences against an employee even under
a no fault attendance plan, the February and June absences cannot
be counted against the Grievant. Thus, even if the absenteeism
policy is valid, he is at most guilty of three occurrences of
absence, not five as the Department claims.
The Position of the County
The County takes the position that the grievance is
procedurally defective and substantively without merit. First, the
County notes that the contract specifically forbids raising issues
in the upper steps of the grievance procedure that were not
presented by the original grievance. The grievance does not
mention MERA nor does it mention the FMLA, yet the Association
seeks to have the Arbitrator consider both of these external
arguments are clearly foreclosed. Additionally, the Union seeks to
challenge the validity of the sick leave policy but such a
challenge is several years too late. The policy was adopted, in
its amended form, in 1997. In January of 1999, Arbitrator
McGilligan determined that the policy was already past the point at
which it could be challenged, yet the Union invites this arbitrator
to revisit the issue. There is no basis for this, and if the
Arbitrator did so, it would authorize either party to simply
abandon all past awards and practices every time a new contract was
signed. That is completely contrary to the final and binding
nature of arbitration, and runs counter to sound labor relations
The Union's FMLA argument is also unsound. The Union asks
the Arbitrator to find that the County failed to honor the
Grievant's FMLA rights when his own doctor told him his bronchitis
was not a serious medical condition, and when he was never absent
for more than three days. Both are prerequisites to FMLA benefits.
Moreover, Deputy Terry never even responded when the County did
send him FMLA forms. The FMLA rule, like the attendance policy, is
an attachment to the contract, and the Union has agreed to the
substance of each. It cannot now be heard to challenge the
validity and reasonableness of policies it has, in effect, signed
Deputy Terry admitted that he knew of the attendance rules,
and had been disciplined under them previously without challenge.
He admitted he violated the rules. The discipline imposed upon him
is progressive and reasonable. The instant grievance is wholly
without foundation and must be dismissed.
A. The Scope of the Grievance
The County objects to many of the Association's arguments, on
the grounds that they were never raised prior to arbitration.
Section 5.01 of the contract states, in part:
(11) At each successive step of the
grievance procedure, the
subject matter treated and the grievance disposition shall be
limited to those issues arising out of the original grievance as
The question here is whether the issues of the validity of the
absenteeism policy in general under MERA, and the application of
the policy under FMLA, are presented by the original grievance.
The grievance generally alleges that the suspension of Deputy Terry
was without just cause and that the attendance policy is invalid.
Grievance processing is as much an exercise in bargaining as
litigation, and the interactions during the processing of the
grievance cannot be treated as legal pleadings. Parties are
generally accorded considerable latitude to deviate from their
prior theories once they have reached arbitration, abandoned
settlement efforts, and have the benefit of counsel. 1/ The
Association's arguments rely on the same
basic facts raised by the initial grievance filing, and it seeks
the same basic remedies. I cannot find that the basic grievance
before me whether there was just cause to suspend Deputy Terry
is a different grievance than that raised below. In recognition of
the new theories, however, I have afforded the parties more
latitude in supplementing their arguments than would normally be
latitude" is not carte blanche, and there are
limits to how much the parties may deviate from the case they
actually presented in the grievance procedure. Obviously, they may
not reinvent the facts or raise a completely new grievance.
Moreover, where an argument in support of or opposition to a
grievance differs so radically from the theories advanced at
earlier stages that it effectively transforms the entire case, it
may be the matter should be remanded to the lower steps for
reconsideration. In any event, the precise limits of the parties'
right to deviate from their prior positions need not be defined in
B.The Validity of the Attendance Rules
The Association argues that the Sheriff's attendance rules are
invalid and should be considered null and void. The County points
out that the rules were found valid by Arbitrator McGilligan in a
1997 Award. The Association seeks to distinguish the 1997 Award
because it was rendered under a different contract. The assertion
that the McGilligan Award upholding the validity of the attendance
policy does not apply to this case because it was issued under an
earlier version of the collective bargaining agreement is simply
without merit. The contract provides for final and binding
arbitration. The issue of the validity of the attendance rules has
been submitted to that process and an answer has been received.
The relevant language has not changed since the Award was rendered.
If arbitration is a final and binding process, it cannot be the
case that all arbitration results are cancelled each time the labor
contract expires and a new contract is negotiated, any more than
the bargaining history and past practices surrounding a provision
are cancelled by the continuation of the language unchanged in a
new contract. Indeed, it is generally held that the precedential
effect of a prior arbitration award is cemented by the negotiation
of a successor agreement which does not change the underlying
language, since the parties are presumed to have knowledge of the
result when they bargain, and a failure to change the language
indicates acceptance of the interpretation. For that reason, I
decline the Association's invitation to reconsider Arbitrator
McGilligan's result and conclude that the attendance rules are
Under the FMLA, employees are entitled to leave for serious
medical conditions and such leave may not be held against employees
under no-fault attendance plans. Moreover, employers are required
to advise employees with serious medical conditions of their right
seek FMLA leave. The Association argues that two of Deputy Terry's
absences were due to bronchitis, and that he told the dispatcher
this when he called in sick. Bronchitis may be considered a
serious medical condition, and has been so found by at least one
Federal District Court. Thus, the Association argues, the County
had the obligation to tell Terry that his condition might qualify
under the FMLA, and having failed to do so, it cannot hold two of
the absences against him for purposes of the attendance policy.
Bronchitis varies in severity, and it may qualify as a serious
medical condition, as in the case of Oleson v. Kmart Corporation,
1996 WL 772604 (D. Kan.), cited by the Association. 2/ Or it may
not, as in MPI Wisconsin Machining Division v. DILHR, 159 Wis. 2d
358, 464 N.W.2d 79 (Ct. App. 1990). The Code of Federal
Regulations itself uses bronchitis turning into bronchial pneumonia
as an example of an ordinary sick leave condition that becomes a
serious medical condition. (See 29 C.F.R. 825.208(d)). Deputy
Terry's own doctor refused to certify his bronchitis as a serious
medical condition, and the two instances of absence where he
allegedly told the dispatcher he had bronchitis were each three
days in duration. In broad terms, in order to qualify as a serious
medical condition requiring FMLA, the absence caused by the illness
must exceed three calendar days and require medical care, or if
chronic be for the purpose of receiving a course of treatment.
Terry did not claim that he received medical care during his
absences. Indeed, he admits that he treated himself at home with
herbs. Thus, the absences themselves would not have qualified for
2/ Oleson was a motion
to dismiss under Federal Rule 12(b)6,
and the decision there was that the claimant, assuming all of his
allegations to be true, could make out a prima facie case. It was
not a factual determination by the court after an evidentiary
The Association argues that the lack of notice or independent
investigation, in and of itself, should exempt the days from
counting under the no-fault plan because the law requires it. As
to the legal requirement that notice be given or the protections of
the Act fully apply, the Association cites 29 C.F.R. 825.208(c).
That provision speaks to an employer that that has the requisite
knowledge that a leave qualifies for FMLA, and fails to designate
the leave as FMLA leave. In that case, the employer is prohibited
from retroactively designating the time off as FMLA leave and
deducting it from the annual allowance. The provision includes the
statement that "In such circumstances, the employee is subject to
the full protections of the Act. . ." This statement is taken
somewhat out of context in the Association's argument. The
employer does have an obligation to independently investigate
whether a leave qualifies for FMLA if the employee states a
qualifying reason or if the employer already has knowledge of the
qualifying reason. (See 29 C.F.R. 825.303(b)) This obligation
involves obtaining required information through informal means.
Bronchitis may or may not be a qualifying reason. The Association
points out that Deputy Terry's bronchitis has been a recurring
condition since 1993, and has caused him to seek medical treatment
and periodically incapacitated him. If the
Sheriff's Department knew all of that, there might have been a
reason to further inquire. There is no evidence that they did.
There is evidence only that he mentioned the word "bronchitis" to
the dispatcher when he called in sick. The FMLA does not require
the employer to inquire of every employee who calls in sick whether
they will seek to qualify for FMLA leave. Here Deputy Terry called
in sick with a condition that is not per se a serious medical
condition, then returned to duty after three days. He used the
ordinary sick leave benefit, in the ordinary manner. He did not
request FMLA coverage, and nothing about his request would
reasonably give the Department reason to believe that FMLA was
applicable. There was no occasion for the inquiry suggested by the
The Association also suggests that Deputy Terry was prejudiced
by the failure of the Department to offer FMLA information because,
had he known of his FMLA rights, he might have been able to make
use of the leave. This does not follow. Terry took off work for
the period of time he was too sick to work. The Association's
position seems to be that Terry could have somehow manipulated the
length of his absence or the course of his medical treatment to
make the absences qualify under FMLA, if he had been told of the
requirements to qualify. FMLA exists in part to regulate the
treatment of absences caused by illness. The absences do not exist
to take advantage of the FMLA. Assuming Deputy Terry to be an
honest man, as I do, he presumably would not rearrange his health
care to make it qualify for the Act.
To the extent that the Department's FMLA policy does not
provide for an inquiry into the nature of an illness or condition
where circumstances suggest that FMLA may be applicable, it would
run afoul of the FMLA. However, the question before the Arbitrator
is not whether there might be cases where the attendance policy or
the FMLA policy might be applied so as to violate the law. The
question before the Arbitrator is whether, in this case, the policy
as applied to Deputy Terry violated the statute and thus rendered
the February and June absences uncountable for attendance purposes.
I conclude that the policies as applied to Terry did not violate
FMLA, and that the February and June absences were properly counted
under the attendance policy. Since the policy calls for
disciplinary review on the fifth occurrence, and since Deputy Terry
had five occurrences, I conclude that the County had just cause to
discipline him. As to the measure of discipline, there is no
evidence that a one-day suspension is inconsistent with the
penalties assessed in similar cases, and it is not on its face
On the basis of the foregoing, and the record as a whole, the
undersigned make the following
1. The challenges to the attendance policy under MERA and
FMLA are arbitrable.
2. The attendance policy is valid under MERA and the
collective bargaining agreement, by virtue of the 1997
3. The attendance policy as applied in this case is valid
under FMLA, as the Grievant did not suffer from a serious
medical condition, and as the County had no basis for
believing that inquiry into FMLA coverage was necessary
when he called in the February and June absences.
4. The suspension of Deputy Terry was for just cause.
5. The grievance is denied.
Dated at Racine, Wisconsin, this 12th day of March, 2001.
Daniel Nielsen, Arbitrator