BEFORE THE ARBITRATOR
In the Matter of the Arbitration of a Dispute Between
WISCONSIN FEDERATION OF TEACHERS,
LOCAL 395, AFT, AFL-CIO
WISCONSIN INDIANHEAD TECHNICAL
(Arlen Burke Insurance Grievance)
Mr. William Kalin, Staff Representative, Wisconsin Federation
of Teachers, appeared on behalf of the Union.
Mr. Stephen L. Weld, Weld, Riley, Prenn & Ricci, S.C.,
Attorneys at Law, appeared on behalf of the College.
The above-captioned parties, hereinafter the Union and College or Employer,
were parties to a collective bargaining agreement which provided for final and binding
grievances. Pursuant to a request for arbitration, the Wisconsin Employment Relations
appointed the undersigned to decide a grievance. A hearing, which was not transcribed, was
December 9, 1998, in Shell Lake, Wisconsin. Afterwards, the parties filed briefs whereupon
record was closed on January 26, 1999. Based on the entire record, the undersigned issues
The parties were unable to stipulate to the issue to be decided in this case. The
the issue as follows:
Is the Employer in violation of the collective bargaining
agreement by requiring the grievant to
co-pay the health and dental insurance premiums for the 1998-99 school year? If so, what is
The College framed the issue as follows:
Did the Employer violate the collective bargaining agreement
when it prorated the grievant's
health and dental insurance premiums for the 1998-99 school year, pursuant to the Conditions
Employment agreed upon on February 25, 1998? If so, what is the appropriate remedy?
Having reviewed the record and the arguments in this case, the undersigned finds the
College's proposed issue appropriate for purposes of deciding this dispute. Consequently,
College's proposed issue will be decided herein.
The parties' 1996-98 collective bargaining agreement contained the following
ARTICLE I RECOGNITION OF THE
Section A. Recognition
1. The Board recognizes the Union as
the bargaining representative for all teachers teaching at
least 50% of a full teaching schedule in their area. . .
a. To clarify the bargaining unit
definition set forth above, the parties agree that teachers
teaching ten consecutive weeks or less, or carrying less than 50% of a full-time teaching
schedule are not included in said definition. The parties recognize that what constitutes a
teaching schedule" will vary depending upon the requirements of the projects/programs
involved. Such teachers are not covered by the terms and provisions of this contract.
. . .
SALARY AND FRINGE BENEFITS
Section A. Salary
1. The regular schedules attached as
Appendix "B" shall be adhered to for all teachers. Teachers
shall remain in their present classification until a higher classification is earned.
. . .
Section E. Health
1. For employees represented by this
agreement, the Board will provide medical care benefits
as described in the WCTC master Plan Document as of July 1, 1987, and amended as of
1990, and pay the monthly premiums of $381.64/family and $148.66/single. If the
premiums for these
benefits increase during the term of this agreement, the Board will pay the increased amount.
. . .
Section K. Dental
1. The Board agrees to pay the
monthly premium of $45.38 for family and $13.52 for single for
dental coverage on all bargaining unit personnel and their dependents. If these premiums
during the term of this agreement, the Board agrees to increase its premium payment
WITC operates a technical college which has four campuses New Richmond,
Ashland and Superior. The Union represents a bargaining unit of all teachers at WITC's
teaching at least 50% of a full teaching schedule. The school year for most full-time
teachers is 38
The parties' labor agreement compensates all bargaining unit members at full salary.
Historically, those teachers whose teaching load constitutes less than a full load (as defined in
labor agreement) have been assigned additional duties or responsibilities by the College in
create a workload equivalent to that of a full time teacher. Thus, prior to the instance
no bargaining unit member has been paid less than a full-time salary (i.e. 100%). Also,
the labor agreement, all bargaining unit members receive fully paid health, dental, life,
disability insurance. Thus, prior to the instance involved here, no bargaining unit member
had to pay a portion of their insurance premiums.
Grievant Arlen Burke is an instructor in the Farm Business and Production
Program at the New Richmond campus. He has been a teacher with WITC since December,
His teaching responsibilities primarily include providing individualized instruction to students
farms and small group instruction at designated locations. He spends most of his time in the
not at the New Richmond campus. As part of his job, he also seeks out and registers
students for the
Farm Business Program. He works an extended year contract 48 weeks per year.
The grievant has a long history of inadequate record keeping. In 1993, Albert
Dean of Instructional Operations and the grievant's supervisor, began documenting problems
that aspect of the grievant's job performance. Between November, 1993 and September,
Schultz wrote Burke nine different memos relating to Burke's poor record keeping, late
failure to get students registered for the Farm Business Program in a timely fashion. Several
memos established timetables for Burke to submit his weekly itineraries and activity logs to
so that Schultz could track Burke's activity and substantiate his workload. Several of these
also indicated that if he did not take corrective action to improve his recordkeeping
discipline would follow.
On September 23, 1997, Schultz, Vice-President for Human Resources Wayne
Vice-President of Operations Vasant Kumar met with Burke to discuss his job performance.
meeting, Burke told the management representatives that he had a long history of chiropractic
treatment for pain and musculoskeletal ailments, and that he had a medical condition known
fibromyalgia. Burke also told them that his health was adversely affecting his ability to do
In this meeting, Burke reported that 41 students had been registered for the program.
meeting, Schultz directed Burke to get the 41 students officially registered by October 10,
On October 13, 1997, the management representatives identified above met again
to discuss his job performance problems. In that meeting it was determined that Burke did
41 students officially registered. He was suspended for five days for failing to comply with
directives issued at the September 23 meeting and for giving false information concerning the
of students registered in the program.
Following his suspension, Burke advised the College that he could not continue
time for medical reasons, and asked to have his teaching load reduced. In response to this
Sabatke sent Burke the following letter on December 9, 1997:
RE: Employment Status
Dear Mr. Burke
The purpose of this letter is to summarize
your employment status. WITC has serious concerns
about your recent performance. You allege that your performance has been adversely
health problems. WITC has responded by allowing you to work as a part-time employee. In
interim, participation in your program has declined to an unacceptable level.
WITC is hopeful that your performance will
improve and the program restored. However, in
case it does not, WITC wishes to enter into a Last Chance Agreement with you. This Last
Agreement will address the terms and conditions of your future employment. We will
agreement at the Tuesday, December 13 meeting, 3:30 PM at the New Richmond Campus.
Arlen, WITC has gone the extra mile for
you, I hope you will take advantage of this opportunity.
Very truly yours,
Wayne Sabatke /s/
Vice President, Human Resources
This letter was copied to Union Representative Bill Kalin and
Union President Tracy Mahrer. The
Last Chance Agreement attached to this letter was a three-page document. That document is
reproduced here. One of its terms was the following:
a. Teacher shall be employed on a 67% FTE contract for
1997-98. His wages and benefits shall
be prorated accordingly.
On December 16, 1997, the grievant and Kalin met with Sabatke, Schultz and Kumar
discussed the Last Chance Agreement at length. In doing so, they agreed that his workload
be reduced to 67% FTE for the remainder of the 1997-98 school year. Since 270 credits/90
equaled a 100% teaching load, a reduction to 67% FTE required 180 credits/60 students.
matter was being discussed, neither Kalin nor the grievant objected to the second sentence of
"a" of the Last Chance Agreement which provided that the grievant's "wages and benefits
Aside from that, what else was said and/or agreed upon at this meeting about the
sentence of section "a" is disputed.
The grievant and Kalin testified that Kalin asked Sabatke whether the grievant's
would be paid in full, and that Sabatke responded that as long as employee was over 51%
carrying at least a 51% workload), benefits would be fully paid by WITC.
All three WITC representatives in attendance (Sabatke, Kumar and Schultz) testified
not recall Kalin asking that question. The three also could not recall any discussion that
insurance would be treated differently than salary (meaning that insurance would be prorated
salary). Sabatke denied agreeing during the meeting to fully pay the grievant's insurance
He testified that the Employer's position was that both the grievant's wages and benefits
prorated, and that if he had made any exception for Burke's insurance premiums, he would
a note of that, which he did not. Kumar testified that he did not recall any discussion to the
wages were to be prorated but benefits were not. It was his understanding that wages and
were to be prorated. Schultz testified he could not recall any discussion related to how
insurance would be treated, or any discussion regarding benefits.
Kalin's copy of the Last Chance Agreement document from that meeting contains
notations. One of the notations is that he underlined the word "benefits" in section "a" and
"over 50%" underneath it.
On February 20, 1998, WITC President David Hildebrand sent Burke a letter
that the College was submitting a partial teaching contract to him for the 1998-99 school
letter provided in pertinent part:
This contract is a partial reduction in your weekly work load.
Your work load is set at 67% per
week for 48 weeks. Compensation and benefits will be prorated accordingly.
Two documents were attached to this letter. The first was a form letter of intent which
the College was offering him (Burke) a 67% workload for the 1998-99 school year and
written response from Burke on that form letter concerning his intent to return (as a teacher)
1998-99 school year. The first paragraph of this form letter provided as follows:
Employee Name ARLEN BURKE
I hereby (accept) or (reject) the continuing employment of 67%
workload per week for 48 weeks
for the 1998-99 fiscal year with the Wisconsin Indianhead Technical College, subject to
working conditions, and staff reduction provisions as established by the Wisconsin
Technical College Board and contractual agreements.
This form letter of intent did not say anything about prorating the grievant's salary or
benefits during the 1998-99 school year. The second document enclosed with Sabatke's
entitled Conditions of Employment. This document was a rewritten version of the Last
Agreement which had been discussed and modified at the December 16, 1997 meeting. In
meeting, the parties had retitled the document Conditions of Employment rather than Last
On February 25, 1998, the parties met again to discuss the document now entitled
of Employment. With the exception of Kumar who was not at this meeting, the same people
present: the grievant, Kalin, Sabatke and Schultz. At this meeting, two changes were made
first sentence of section "a" in that document (i.e. the sentence providing "teacher shall be
on a 67% FTE contract for 1997-98"). The first change was that the grievant's 67%
made retroactive to October 31, 1997. The second change was that the grievant's 67%
extended for the duration of the 1998-99 school year. After these two changes were made,
sentence read as follows:
Teacher shall be employed on a 67% FTE contract for 1997-98
starting October 31, 1997 and
for the school year 1998-99.
The second sentence of section "a" of that document (i.e. the
sentence providing "his wages and
benefits shall be prorated accordingly") was not changed.
Aside from that, what else was said and/or agreed upon at this meeting about the
sentence of section "a" is disputed.
Kalin testified he told Sabatke: "Arlen will be over 50%, so we're OK with the
to which Sabatke responded in the affirmative. The grievant testified Sabatke said he
get full benefits because he was over a 51% teaching load.
Sabatke testified that he did not recall Kalin asking about insurance proration. He
did not recall Kalin saying "Since he's over 50%, there's no problem with the insurance."
testified that if he had agreed to anything other than what was in the draft agreement, he
noted the change. Schultz testified that he had no recollection of either Kalin or the grievant
how health insurance would be treated, nor did he recall
Sabatke or Kalin suggesting that since the grievant was over 50%, he would be OK on
Schultz also testified that he did not recall Sabatke saying that the grievant would receive full
At the end of the meeting, all the participants initialed and dated the hand written
made on the Conditions of Employment document to indicate they agreed with them. There
is a set
of initials and dates on the left side of section "a" next to the words "starting October 31,
"for the school year". In section "a", the phrase "his wages" is underlined. During that
Burke also signed the letter of intent document wherein he indicated he accepted continued
employment at WITC at 67% workload. After Burke signed the document, he handed it to
the Employer's representatives.
On March 10, 1998, Sabatke sent Burke and Kalin a retyped
copy of the Conditions of
Employment document which incorporated all the changes which had been made to that
at the February 25, 1998 meeting. This draft specifically included the phrases "starting
1997" and "for the school year" in section "a". Neither Kalin nor Burke objected to this
draft of this
document or indicated it was incorrect in any way. The document does not contain signature
at the end for any of the parties. As a result, neither Kalin nor Burke signed this document.
Sometime thereafter, the College began paying Burke 67% of a full-time employe's
Prior to this, Burke was paid a full salary (i.e. 100%). Thus, the College began prorating
salary. It did not prorate his insurances though. Instead, the College continued to pay the
health and dental insurances in full for the remainder of the 1997-98 school year.
Sabtake testified that following the February 25, 1998 meeting previously referenced,
unilaterally decided to continue paying all of Burke's health and dental insurance premiums
remainder of the 1997-98 school year, and to not implement proration of same until the
the 1998-99 school year. Sabatke testified he did so for the following reasons: 1) it was late
school year; 2) the fact that Burke worked an extended work year made retroactive proration
difficult; and 3) he (Sabatke) had concerns about what proration formula to use.
On July 20, 1998, the College notified the grievant that his monthly health and dental
insurance premiums would be prorated based on a 67% contract for 1998-99 and that he
therefore be required to pay 33% of the premiums.
On August 10, 1998, the Union grieved the College's decision to prorate the
and dental insurance premiums for the 1998-99 school year. The grievance contended that
V, Section E of the collective bargaining agreement requires payment of full
premiums for all bargaining unit personnel and that the agreement to have the grievant
work at a 67%
workload did not include proration of health and dental insurance premiums. The grievance
subsequently appealed to arbitration.
POSITIONS OF THE PARTIES
The Union contends that the Employer violated the collective bargaining agreement
paying all of the grievant's health and dental insurance premiums for the 1998-99 school
makes the following arguments to support this contention.
It notes at the outset that it is undisputed that bargaining unit members are
entitled to full salary and benefits. It further notes that the grievant is a bargaining unit
Building on these premises, the Union reasons that the grievant is contractually entitled, like
bargaining unit employe, to have the Employer pay his full health and dental insurance
Since the Employer is not doing that, but is instead having the grievant pay 33% of those
the Union believes that the Employer is in violation of Article V, Sections E and K.
Next, the Union makes several arguments which essentially challenge the
enforceability of the
side agreement which the Employer relies on. First, it submits that no union representative
signed a document waiving the collective bargaining agreement with respect to the grievant's
and dental insurance. Second, the Union calls attention to the fact that the grievant never
side agreement. According to the Union, it expected that the Employer would redraft the
of Employment document in an agreement form for the parties' signatures. It notes that was
Next, the Union avers that when the parties negotiated the side agreement, they
although the grievant's pay would be prorated, his insurance premiums would not; instead,
Employer would continue to pay all of the grievant's insurance premiums. To support this
it cites several forms of bargaining history. First, the Union relies on the testimony of the
and Kalin who were present at both of the meetings when the matter was discussed.
their testimony, health and dental insurance was discussed at both meetings and the Employer
that since the grievant has more than a 50% workload, his health and dental insurance would
paid by the Employer. To support this premise, it cites Kalin's testimony that he told
will be over 50% so we're OK with the insurance", to which Sabatke responded in the
Second, the Union relies on some notations which exist on the documents which were
the meetings held on December 16, 1997 and February 25, 1998. The Union notes that on
copy of the Last Chance Agreement document from the first meeting, the word "benefits" in
"a" is underlined with the phrase "over 50%" written underneath it. The Union also
notes that on the
Conditions of Employment document from the second meeting, the words "his wages" in
are underlined. The Union believes these notations establish that the parties mutually
treat wages differently from benefits, namely that wages would be prorated but benefits
Third, the Union cites the Individual Employment Contract document which the grievant
which provides, in pertinent part, that his "continuing employment of 67% workload per
"subject to" the "contractual agreement". As previously noted, the contractual agreement
that employes are entitled to full wages and benefits (including health and dental insurance).
Union implies that since this document did not say anything about prorating the grievant's
benefits, the Employer relinquished the right to prorate the grievant's wages and benefits.
As the Union sees it, the bargaining history referenced above establishes that the
intended that the grievant's health and dental insurance would be fully paid by the Employer
prorated. The Union asks the arbitrator to give effect to that mutual intent and direct the
to pay all of the grievant's health and dental insurance premiums.
The Employer contends that the grievant's health and dental insurance must be
pursuant to the agreed-upon Conditions of Employment document. It makes the following
to support this contention.
First, for background purposes, the Employer acknowledges that bargaining unit
are contractually entitled to full salary and benefits. It further acknowledges that the grievant
bargaining unit member.
The Employer avers that notwithstanding this contractual right to full salary and
parties voluntarily made a side agreement for the grievant which altered that contractual
other words, the parties made a side agreement which modified the labor agreement's salary
benefit provisions as it relates to the grievant. According to the Employer, this happened
grievant decided he could no longer work full-time because of his health, and he requested a
workload reduction. The Employer notes that the parties subsequently agreed on a reduced
for the grievant, specifically a 67% workload. As the Employer sees it, by making this side
for a 67% workload, the grievant and the Union waived his contractual right to full salary
benefits. To support this premise, the Employer cites the language contained in section "a"
Conditions of Employment document (i.e. the side agreement). According to the Employer,
language clearly and unambiguously provides that the grievant will have a 67% FTE
that "his wages and benefits shall be prorated accordingly." The Employer contends this
exactly what it says (namely that his wages and benefits will be prorated) and provides
That being so, the Employer argues there are none and the grievant's health and dental
must be prorated pursuant to the written side agreement.
Next, the Employer responds to the Union's assertion that the parties' bargaining
that side agreement) supports the Union's view that the grievant's health and dental insurance
be paid in full rather than prorated. Specifically, it denies that assertion. In doing so, it
testimony of the Employer representatives who were present at those meetings and who
unequivocally testified that health insurance was not even discussed. According to the
Employer representatives present at those meetings never made any oral agreement or
to continue to pay the grievant's full insurance premiums, but rather took the position that all
including health and dental insurance, would be prorated in accordance with the grievant's
contract. Given the foregoing, the Employer avers that the Union's assertion to the contrary
credibility. The Employer submits that the Union had the opportunity at the December 16,
February 25, 1998 meetings to propose language that would have excluded health insurance
benefits to be prorated, but it did not do so.
Finally, the Employer acknowledges that it continued to pay all the grievant's health
dental insurance for the balance of the 1997-98 school year. In its view, the fact that it was
and did not implement the proration of the insurance premiums until the start of the 1998-99
year does not somehow preclude it from implementing the proration at that time. It asserts
that it has
the right, pursuant to the side agreement, to prorate the grievant's benefits (specifically his
dental insurance) for the 1998-99 school year. The District therefore asks that the grievance
My discussion begins with an overview of the applicable contract language. The
that the contract provisions applicable here are Article V, Sections A, E and K. Those
establish that all teachers working 50% or more receive full salary and have their health and
premiums fully paid by the Employer. In other words, those teachers receive full salary and
health and dental insurance premiums. The record indicates that the Employer tries to assign
as close to a 100% workload as possible in order to avoid paying full compensation and
less than full time work. If a unit member's teaching schedule does not include a full time
load, the teacher is given additional tasks such as curriculum, recruiting or program
order to achieve a full workload.
It is against this contractual context that the instant matter unfolded. What happened
the grievant, a full-time employe, decided he could no longer work full time because of his
He therefore requested a reduction in his workload. The parties subsequently negotiated over
and ultimately agreed on a reduced workload for the grievant. Specifically, they agreed that
go from a 100% workload to a 67% workload for the 1997-98 school year effective October
1997 and for all of the 1998-99 school year. Other details of their agreement will be
It is apparent from the foregoing that the parties made a side agreement which
of the terms of the labor agreement as it relates to the grievant. The parties to a labor
(namely the Union and the Employer) may amend or add to it by subsequent agreement if
While the labor agreement is the chief instrument that guide the parties in their relationship,
occasion it becomes necessary to clarify, add to, or make exceptions to the labor agreement
manner. This is what a side agreement does. Such side agreements are very common in
relations. In this case, the parties made a side agreement which reduced the grievant's
100% to 67% for most of the 1997-98 school year and the entire 1998-99 school year. That
their call to make.
The Union makes several arguments which essentially challenge the enforceability of
agreement. First, it submits that no union representative ever signed a document waiving the
collective bargaining agreement with respect to the grievant's health and dental insurance.
true; no such waiver document exists. Be that as it may, there is no question that when
Kalin and the
grievant left the February 25, 1998 meeting, they had agreed with the Employer on a side
which established certain conditions of employment for the grievant. As will be noted later,
agreement modified the contractual wage and benefit provisions. Second, the Union calls
to the fact that the grievant never signed the side agreement. That is also true. However,
norm for side agreements is that they are ultimately signed by the parties, there is no formal
requirement that signatures must be affixed to a side agreement in order for it to be binding
enforceable. In this case, the document contains the initials of the parties involved. I find
sufficient. Since neither of these challenges to the enforceability of the side agreement have
found persuasive, it is held that the parties' February 25, 1998 side agreement is binding.
Before the language of the side agreement is reviewed, the undersigned has decided
what is and is not disputed about same. The latter is addressed first. The parties agree that
agreement reduced the grievant from a full salary to a 67% salary (i.e. 67% of a full-time
salary). Thus, the grievant's wages are not in dispute. The record indicates that the grievant
paid at that level (i.e. 67% of a full-time employe's salary) and the Union does not challenge
proration. What is disputed is the grievant's health and dental insurance under the side
The Employer is currently prorating the grievant's
health and dental insurance premiums at 67%. The Union avers this is incorrect. It
grievant's health and dental insurance premiums should not be prorated, but rather should
to be fully paid by the Employer.
The focus now turns to the side agreement itself. Just one small section of that
pertinent herein. It is section "a" which provides as follows:
a. Teacher shall be employed on a 67% FTE contract for
1997-98 starting October 31, 1997 and
for the school year 1998-99. His wages and benefits shall be prorated accordingly.
In my view, the meaning of both sentences is clear and unambiguous. The first
sentence provides in
plain terms that the grievant is to be employed at a 67% contract for a major portion of the
school year and the entire 1998-99 school year. Although this language does not say so, the
indicates that the grievant's previous contract had been 100%. Since he previously had a
contract, this sentence reduced the grievant from a 100% contract to a 67% contract. The
sentence provides that during that time period, "his wages and benefits shall be prorated
When something is prorated, it is divided; it is less than full or 100%. Since the first
explicitly sets the grievant's workload at 67%, the second sentence implicitly sets his "wages
benefits" at that same level (i.e. 67%). As previously noted, it is undisputed that this
reduced the grievant's salary from 100% to 67%. Since the words "and benefits" follow the
"wages", the grievant's "benefits" are to be reduced from 100% to 67% as well. When the
sentence references "benefits", it does not list any exceptions or exclude any benefits from
proration. If the parties had meant that some benefits would not be prorated, they would
so. They did not. In point of fact, the language does not contain an exception for health and
insurance. Since no exceptions were listed to prorated benefits, none will be inferred. The
sentence therefore clearly envisions that all benefits will be prorated. In labor relations,
dental insurance are considered "benefits". That being so, there is no basis whatsoever in
language itself for excluding health and dental insurance from the proration.
The Union contends that notwithstanding this written language, the parties orally
during their bargaining that the Employer would continue to pay the grievant's full insurance
premiums. Thus, according to the Union, the parties agreed that the grievant's insurances
be prorated even though his salary was to be prorated. The Employer expressly denies that
to be the
case. In its view, it made no oral agreement or commitment to continue to pay the
In my view, what the Union wants me to do in this case can be fairly stated thus: 1) I
review the disputed testimony about what was or was not said at the parties' meetings on
16, 1997 and February 25, 1998 about section "a" and find that the union witnesses'
regarding same is more credible than that of the Employer witnesses; 2) I should find that
the fact that
Kalin underlined the word "benefits" on his copy of the Last Chance Agreement and that the
"his wages" were underlined on the Conditions of Employment document which was initialed
establish that the parties mutually intended that wages were to be prorated and benefits were
3) I should then give effect to that intent (i.e. that the grievant's health and dental insurance
prorated but remain fully paid by the Employer) even though that result was not expressed in
written language itself. Based on the following rationale, I decline to do so.
A basic principle which arbitrators traditionally follow in contract interpretation cases
a written agreement may not be changed or modified by any oral statements made by the
connection with the negotiation of the agreement. Under this principle, known as the parol
rule, a written agreement consummating previous oral and written negotiations is deemed to
the entire agreement. Thus, parol (i.e. oral) statements are not allowed to vary the clear
a written agreement. One exception to this principle is when the written agreement is
When the language is ambiguous, arbitrators sometimes use parol evidence and bargaining
to help them interpret the ambiguous language. The key word in the previous sentence is
"ambiguous". The reason that word is key is because that is not the case here. Specifically,
language in section "a" is not ambiguous. That language has previously been reviewed and
meaning has been found to be plain, clear and unambiguous. That being so, there is no need
undersigned to resort to using any parol evidence and/or bargaining history to determine the
intent concerning the meaning of section "a" of the side agreement. That language speaks
and presumably incorporates the parties' mutual intent that all benefits, including health and
insurance, are to be prorated. Given this finding, the undersigned will not comment on 1)
disputed testimony about what was or was not said at the parties' two meetings about section
2) the significance of the fact that Kalin underlined the word "benefits" on his copy of the
Chance Agreement and that the words "his wages" were underlined on the Conditions of
document which the parties initialed; and 3) the form letter of intent (also known as the
employment contract) which the grievant signed on February 25, 1998.
Since the side agreement provides that the grievant's benefits will be prorated, the
actions herein in prorating the grievant's health and dental insurance for the 1998-99 school
comport with the side agreement. The fact that the grievant's health and dental insurance
prorated for the latter portion of the 1997-98 school year does not change this result.
no contract violation has been found.
In light of the above, I issue the following
That the Employer did not violate the collective bargaining agreement when it
grievant's health and dental insurance premiums for the 1998-99 school year, pursuant to the
Conditions of Employment agreed upon on February 25, 1998. Therefore, the grievance is
Dated at Madison, Wisconsin this 31st day of March, 1999.
Raleigh Jones, Arbitrator