Vol. 76, No. 6, June
2003
Lawyer Discipline
The
Office of Lawyer
Regulation (formerly known as the Board of Attorneys Professional
Responsibility), an agency of the Wisconsin Supreme Court and component
of the lawyer regulation system, assists the court in carrying out its
constitutional responsibility to supervise the practice of law and
protect the public from misconduct by persons practicing law in
Wisconsin. The Office of Lawyer Regulation has offices located at Suite
315, 110 E. Main St., Madison, WI 53703, and Suite 300, 342 N. Water
St., Milwaukee, WI 53202. Toll-free telephone: (877) 315-6941.
Public reprimand of
Donald A. Hahnfeld
The Office of Lawyer Regulation (OLR) and Donald A. Hahnfeld, 49,
West Allis, entered into an agreement for imposition of a public
reprimand, pursuant to SCR 22.09(1). A referee appointed by the
Wisconsin Supreme Court thereafter approved the agreement and issued the
public reprimand on April 22, 2003, in accordance with SCR 22.09(3).
Hahnfeld represented the wife in a divorce matter. An attorney
initially represented the husband while the attorney was an associate at
another firm. While the divorce matter was pending, the associate left
the firm to work at a firm in another city, and a partner at the first
firm replaced the associate as the husband's attorney.
Twelve days before the scheduled trial date, the partner
inadvertently discovered that the associate who had formerly represented
the husband was working out of Hahnfeld's office. The next day, the
partner filed a motion and supporting affidavit to have Hahnfeld removed
as the wife's attorney of record based upon a violation of SCR
20:1.10(b). Hahnfeld did not file an affidavit or any other response in
opposition to this motion.
At a hearing on this motion, the court found that it was clear that
the associate was associated with Hahnfeld's office based upon the
following, all of which occurred in the month before the scheduled trial
date: the associate sent out letters to her clients on Hahnfeld's
letterhead; the associate was listed as "of counsel" on Hahnfeld's
letterhead; the associate was listed as an employee in Hahnfeld's office
in State Bar of Wisconsin records; and the associate accepted service of
the notice of the partner's motion for Hahnfeld's removal at Hahnfeld's
office.
Despite Hahnfeld's position that he made efforts to minimize his
relationship with the associate, the court found that Hahnfeld had a
conflict of interest; that the husband did not consent to waive the
conflict; and that there was a clear violation of SCR 20:1.10(b). As a
result, the court removed Hahnfeld as the attorney of record for the
wife. Hahnfeld did not challenge the court's decision to remove him from
the case by filing either a motion for reconsideration or an appeal of
this decision.
Two months later, Hahnfeld filed a defamation lawsuit against the
partner alleging that statements the partner made in her affidavit in
support of the motion for removal of Hahnfeld from the divorce action
were defamatory and that the partner published these defamatory
statements. Pursuant to Hahnfeld's request, the court sealed the court
record in the defamation action. Hahnfeld did not serve the partner with
the summons and complaint until more than seven weeks after filing the
lawsuit. At the same time, Hahnfeld served the partner with extensive
discovery requests. As a result of Hahnfeld's delay in serving the
partner with the summons and complaint, her answer to the complaint as
well as her responses to the discovery requests were due during the
winter holiday season. In addition, the trial in the divorce action that
had to be rescheduled due to Hahnfeld's removal was scheduled to begin
during this period. These discovery requests for documents and
information were extensive, overbroad, and mostly irrelevant to the
defamation action.
In a letter to Hahnfeld, the partner, through counsel, asserted that
she was absolutely privileged to publish defamatory statements
concerning Hahnfeld in communications preliminary to, during the course
of, and as part of a judicial proceeding in which she participates as
counsel if they have some relation to the proceeding, and cited case law
supporting this assertion. The partner's counsel requested that Hahnfeld
sign a stipulation dismissing the defamation action. Promptly
thereafter, Hahnfeld signed the stipulation dismissing the defamation
action with prejudice.
By continuing to represent the wife in the divorce action after the
associate had associated with his firm, Hahnfeld knowingly represented
the wife in the same matter in which the associate had previously
represented the husband, whose interests were materially adverse to the
wife and about whom the associate had acquired information protected by
Rules 1.6 and 1.9(b) that was material to the matter, in violation of
SCR 20:1.10(b). By filing a lawsuit against the partner alleging that
the partner made defamatory statements in her affidavit in support of
her motion to remove Hahnfeld from the divorce action when she had an
absolute privilege to do so, Hahnfeld filed a suit when he knew or when
it was obvious that such an action would serve merely to harass or
maliciously injure the partner, in violation of SCR 20:3.1(a)(3).
In 1993, Hahnfeld received a public reprimand for violations of SCR
20:1.3, 20:1.4(a), and 20:1.16(d).
Disciplinary proceedings against
Bruce L. Nash
The Wisconsin Supreme Court suspended the law license of Bruce L.
Nash, Chicago, for one year, effective April 22, 2003, as discipline
reciprocal to that imposed upon Nash by the Illinois Supreme Court in
2001.
The one-year suspension of Nash's Illinois law license resulted from
his misconduct in two separate client matters, consisting generally of
conversion; failing to hold property of clients or third persons
separate from the lawyer's own property; failing to promptly pay or
deliver to his client or a third person funds that his client or the
third person is entitled to receive; engaging in conduct involving
dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation; engaging in conduct
that is prejudicial to the administration of justice; and engaging in
conduct that tends to defeat the administration of justice or bring the
courts or the legal profession into disrepute.
The OLR's filing of a disciplinary complaint seeking reciprocal
discipline resulted in the Wisconsin Supreme Court's order that Nash
show cause why identical discipline should not be imposed. Nash's
failure to respond resulted in Wisconsin's suspension order.
In addition to the disciplinary suspension, Nash's Wisconsin law
license remains suspended for his failure to pay dues and for
noncompliance with CLE requirements.
Disciplinary proceeding against
Judith A. Pinchar
On April 10, 2003, the Wisconsin Supreme Court revoked the law
license of Judith A. Pinchar, 48, Milwaukee, effective the date of the
order. Pinchar had failed to answer the disciplinary complaint and also
failed to respond to the referee's calls to her office and home, which
ultimately led to a default judgment.
Pinchar was privately reprimanded in 1999 for lack of diligence in
pursuing a client's claim, failing to respond to the client's attempts
to contact her, failing to notify the client that the statute of
limitation had passed, and failing to cooperate with the Board of
Attorneys Professional Responsibility (BAPR). In November 2000, the
court suspended Pinchar's law license for 60 days based upon her failure
to keep a client informed about the status of a matter, making
misrepresentations to that client, practicing law in a jurisdiction in
which she was not licensed, and failing to cooperate with three
investigations. (See February 2001 Wisconsin Lawyer).
Her license was reinstated on April 26, 2001; however, it was
temporarily suspended on Aug. 27, 2001, and remained so since then,
based upon her willful failure to cooperate with OLR.
The revocation stems from Pinchar's conversion of $3,698 and other
trust account violations, which were discovered as a result of
overdrafts on her trust account (SCR 20:1.15(a) and SCR 20:8.4(c)). In
August 2000, a man retained Pinchar to represent him regarding a
post-divorce matter. He gave her a $6,326.22 check for arrearages owed
to his ex-wife, which Pinchar deposited in her trust account. Pinchar
then represented to the ex-wife that the $6,326.22 that she was holding
in her trust account was to pay all arrearages owed by Pinchar's client.
The ex-wife would not accept the amount as payment in full, because her
counsel calculated the arrearage to be nearly $12,000.
In November 2000, Pinchar disbursed $1,708.53 to herself from that
client's funds, identifying it as attorney fees. However, two weeks
later, she replaced the funds by reducing the amount that she withdrew
for fees in an unrelated matter. Between November 2000 and July 2001,
Pinchar converted an additional $3,698 from that client's funds.
In August 2001, Pinchar deposited a $3,700 check payable to herself
from a relative to cover the $3,698 that she had converted, thereby
commingling a personal loan with client funds (SCR 20:1.15(a)). That
same day, she disbursed $5,539.12 to the client's ex-wife. Following
that disbursement and a prior $787.50 disbursement to the ex-wife's
lawyer, that client's funds had been completely disbursed.
In October 2001, Pinchar deposited $450 in cash into her trust
account and disbursed it to pay her law office rent (SCR 20:1.15(a)). In
November 2001, three months after the temporary suspension took effect,
Pinchar disbursed $1,618.95 from her trust account to the attorney for
her client's ex-wife, despite the fact that there were no funds in the
account in that matter. The check to the ex-wife's attorney resulted in
an overdraft. That same month, Pinchar disbursed a $300 check from her
trust account to pay costs that had been assessed in connection with a
motion to compel discovery, despite the fact that there were no funds in
the account relating to that client (SCR 20:8.4(c)). This led to a
second overdraft.
Pinchar subsequently deposited a $50 check from the client with the
arrearage matter, along with $158 from two other former clients for
earned fees, thereby commingling personal funds in her trust account
(SCR 20:1.15(a)). In December 2001, Pinchar deposited an $890 retainer
fee into the trust account but failed to disclose to the client that her
license was suspended (SCR 20:8.4(c)). Finally, Pinchar failed to
cooperate with OLR's investigation regarding the two overdrafts (SCR
22.03(6)).
Hearing to reinstate Joseph J.
Klein
On July 31, 2003, at 9:30 a.m., a public hearing will occur before
referee Cheryl Weston at the offices of Cullen, Weston, Pines, &
Bach LLP, 122 W. Washington Ave., Suite 900, Madison, on the petition of
Joseph J. Klein, Madison, to reinstate his Wisconsin law license. Klein
formerly practiced law in Madison. Any interested person may appear at
the hearing and be heard in support of, or in opposition to, the
petition for reinstatement.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court revoked Klein's law license, effective
March 16, 1987, for professional misconduct consisting of making
unauthorized withdrawals of funds in a receivership account in a matter
in which he was the court-appointed receiver; providing a receivership
accounting inaccurately reflecting the transactions that occurred in
that account and misrepresenting the status of the account; making
misrepresentations in the accounting during the misconduct
investigation; failing to promptly obtain court permission to pay out
funds from a receivership account to the parties entitled to them;
commingling funds from a receivership account with client funds on
deposit in his attorney trust account and using those commingled funds
for personal purposes; failing during the misconduct investigation to
fully and fairly disclose all facts and circumstances pertaining to his
alleged misconduct, and failing to answer questions and present relevant
evidence; and failing to maintain and preserve adequate trust account
records. A more detailed account of Klein's misconduct is recited in
Disciplinary Proceedings Against Klein, 135 Wis. 2d 342, 400
N.W.2d 459 (1987).
As to reinstatement, Klein is required to demonstrate by clear,
satisfactory, and convincing evidence that, among other things, he has
not practiced law or engaged in certain law-work activity during the
suspension; his conduct since the suspension has been exemplary and
above reproach; he has a proper understanding of and attitude towards
the standards that are imposed upon members of the bar and will act in
conformity with the standards; he can safely be recommended to the legal
profession, the courts, and the public as a person fit to be consulted
by others, and to represent them and otherwise act in matters of trust
and confidence; he has fully described all of his business activities;
he has the moral character to practice law in Wisconsin; and he has
fully complied with the terms of the order of suspension and court
rules.
Further information can be obtained from OLR investigator Nancy
Warner, 110 E. Main St., Suite 315, Madison, WI 53703, (877) 315-6941
(toll free); or from OLR retained counsel Robert G. Krohn, 24 N. Henry
St., P.O. Box 151, Edgerton, WI 53534, (608) 884-3391.
Wisconsin Lawyer
