Patterson v. TNA Entm't, LLC, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78629 (E.D. Wis. 2006).

The plaintiff, Albert Patterson, sued TNA Entertainment for trademark infringement.  Patterson had registered trademarks that he used in connection with professional wrestling.  Patterson alleged that TNA Entertainment violated the Lanham Act and Wisconsin state law by using his registered marks to promote and sell professional wrestling products.  In May 2005, TNA filed a motion for summary judgment claiming it had not used any of Patterson’s protected marks.  Patterson admitted that TNA had not used any of his exact marks, but he contended that it had used marks that were confusingly similar and, therefore, were still infringing.  The court granted TNA's motion for summary judgment in part.  The court held that Patterson could not pursue monetary damages from TNA under the Lanham Act because he had not proven actual confusion; however, the court left open the question of whether TNA had used confusingly similar marks.

After failed attempts to settle the dispute, TNA filed another motion for summary judgment, seeking to dismiss the claims.  Patterson also filed a motion for summary judgment to enjoin TNA from using certain marks he claimed were confusingly similar.  The court granted TNA's motion and dismissed the claims.  In ruling for TNA, the court held that Patterson failed to present enough evidence for a reasonable jury to find a Lanham Act violation.   The court also found that Patterson lacked the evidence to show that the TNA's marks created a likelihood of confusion among consumers.  Additionally, the court held that it did not need to consider Patterson's state law trademark infringement claim because the factors of a Wisconsin state law trademark infringement claim are identical to those of a Lanham Act claim.  

Columbia Pictures Industries Inc. v. May, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26344 (E.D. Wis. 2006).

Columbia Pictures Industries, Paramount Pictures, and Warner Brothers Entertainment sued Chris May for copyright infringement.  The plaintiffs allege that May infringed upon copyrighted material by offering motion pictures and television shows for download on his website without the plaintiffs' permission.

May did not answer the plaintiffs' complaint; therefore, the plaintiffs filed a motion for default judgment against May.  The plaintiffs also requested that the court grant statutory damages in the amount of $35,000 and that it permanently enjoin May from operating his website and distributing copyrighted material.  May also did not respond to the plaintiffs' motion for default judgment.  The court granted the motion and entered default judgment on behalf of the plaintiffs.  The court also awarded the plaintiffs the $35,000 in requested damages and issued a permanent injunction against May.  The court determined that these remedies were appropriate because May's infringement was willful and the plaintiffs suffered irreparable harm.

Shain v. Racine Raiders Football Club, Inc., 2006 WI App 256; 726 N.W.2d 346.

The plaintiff, Scott Shain, was injured while coaching a youth football scrimmage.  The scrimmage was one of three scrimmages occurring simultaneously as part of the halftime entertainment at a Racine Raiders minor league football game.  The field was divided into three separate smaller fields so that the youth football scrimmages could occur at the same time.  Due to a lack of field space, the middle scrimmage shared out-of-bounds lines with the scrimmages on the side fields.  Shain was coaching his team from one of the shared out-of-bounds lines.

Shain was injured when players from the neighboring scrimmage crashed into him from behind while one player was tackling another.  Shain suffered a knee injury from the collision.  He sued the Racine Raiders Football Club, Inc., Racine Youth Sports, Inc., and their insurers for negligence under the safe-place statute.  Shain claimed the defendants negligently organized and conducted the halftime activities.  The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants.

The court of appeals affirmed the circuit court's decision.  The court held that Shain's role as a coach was a combination of participant and spectator.  The court found it unnecessary to classify him as either a participant or a spectator.  The court determined that Shain, regardless of his exact role, knew and understood the risks of coaching from the sideline with a scrimmage occurring on the neighboring field.  In finding for the defendants, the court held that Shain's contributory negligence outweighed any negligence on the part of the defendants. 

Fata v. Sch. Dist. of Horicon, 2007 WI App 19; 727 N.W.2d 374.

Sara Fata participated in track and field at Horicon High School.  On her first day of practice, she injured her knee in the landing pads of the high jump.  After aborting a high jump attempt, she landed in the foam mats.  Her foot got stuck between two of the landing pads, which twisted her knee causing her injury.  She claimed that her coaches and the School District were negligent in setting up the landing pads by not binding the several mats together and by not putting a cover over the mats to eliminate gaps.  The circuit court granted summary judgment to the School District, and this is Fata’s appeal. 

Fata’s affidavits and deposition testimony stated there were gaps in the mat the day she was injured because they were not bound together nor covered, which violated School District Rule 7 Section 3, “[w]hen the landing pad is made up of two or more sections, they shall be attached or include a common cover or pad extending over all sections.”  The head and assistant track and field coaches disputed these facts testifying that the pads were bound together on the day of Fata’s injury but conceded the mats were not covered.  The appeals court reversed the circuit court decision granting summary judgment to the School District finding there was a material issue of fact.  The court remanded for additional findings on whether the landing mat was properly setup the day of Fata’s injury.

Bukowski v. Wisconsin Interscholastic Athletic Ass’n, 2007 WI App 1; 726 N.W.2d 356.

Plaintiff, Keith Bukowski, a student at Stevens Points Area Senior High School (SPASH), wanted to compete on the girl’s gymnastics team, but the Wisconsin Interscholastic Athletic Association’s (WIAA) rules prohibit mixed gender athletic competition.  The circuit court denied Bukowski’s motion for a temporary injunction to enjoin the WIAA.  The circuit court then dismissed the case, ruling that the denied motion for a temporary injunction would be a final judgment.  Bukowski appealed.

First, Bukowski argued that the WIAA was a state actor and that its rule violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by discriminating based on sex.  To prove an entity is a state actor, a plaintiff must provide evidence that the defendant “engaged in an action traditionally reserved to the state” and that there is a “close nexus between the State and the challenged action.”  Subsequently, the court found that Bukowski did not bring forth evidence demonstrating that the WIAA was a state actor and, therefore, the Fourteenth Amendment does not apply.  In addition, Bukowski argued the wrong legal standard for his equal protection claim.  Instead of providing gender discrimination cases in his brief where the court applied intermediate scrutiny, he used race discrimination cases where the court applied strict scrutiny.  Because Bukowski argued the wrong legal standard, the court found his argument was without merit.

Second, Bukowski argued WIAA’s rule violated Title IX, but again the court denied this claim, stating that Bukowski provided no legal authority to support his Title IX claim and provided no explanation as to why Title IX even applies to his circumstances.  Furthermore, Bukowski did not establish that the WIAA received federal funding, the threshold requirement of a Title IX claim.  The appeals court affirmed the circuit court's decision, dismissing Bukowski’s claim for a temporary injunction.

Elbing v. Blair, 2007 WI App 162; 735 N.W.2d 192.

The plaintiff, Elbing, and the defendant, Blair, were hockey players for opposing teams in a game played on June 30, 2002.  Elbing alleged that after he pushed Blair into the boards, Blair threw off his gear and punched Elbing six times, including one time in the face.  Blair was found guilty to a class B misdemeanor for disorderly conduct.

Elbing then filed suit against Blair and his insurance provider American Family Insurance, claiming Blair was negligent and committed a battery.  Elbing demanded both compensatory and punitive damages.  American Family argued its policy did not cover actions that were intentional or conduct that resulted in a criminal conviction.  The court granted American Family’s motion for summary judgment.  On appeal, the appellate court found that Blair’s actions did conform with actions that were barred from recovery in American Family’s policy since Blair intentionally hit Elbing in the face and was found guilty of a criminal charge. 

Blair argued that he punched Elbing in defense and that this was a “natural reaction coming from playing hockey” because Elbing was playing dirty.  The court found no evidence that Blair was being threatened by any bodily harm when he punched Elbing; therefore, the punch was intentional.  Blair further argued that he should be held to a standard of negligence not intentional harm since he was playing an organized team activity, but the court disagreed.  The court ruled that intentional torts occur when the defendant “meant some harm to follow from a particular act or where some harm is substantially certain to follow from an act.”  The court affirmed the summary judgment granted to American Family because the only logical explanation the court could conclude from the evidence was that Blair’s acts were intentional and, therefore, not covered under American Family’s insurance policy.

*Contributors:  Former Marquette University Law School student, Jay Smith (L'07) of Neuberger, Wakeman, Lorenz, Griggs, Sweet & Fischer and current Marquette University Law School student and Sports & Entertainment Law Section Student Liaison, Tiffany Jones (L'09).
Top