PUBLISHED
OPINION
COURT OF
APPEALS
DECISION
DATED AND FILED
April 26,
2000
Cornelia G. Clark
Clerk, Court of Appeals
of
Wisconsin
NOTICE
This opinion is subject to further editing. If published, the official version will
appear in the bound volume of the Official Reports.
A party may file with
the Supreme Court a petition to review an adverse decision by the Court of Appeals.
See
Wis. Stat. §808.10
and Rule 809.62.
No. 99-2261-CR
STATE OF
WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS
DISTRICT
II
State of Wisconsin,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
Michael A. Smaxwell,
Defendant-Respondent.
APPEAL from an order of the circuit court for Winnebago County: ROBERT A.
HAASE, Judge. Reversed.
Before Brown, P.J., Nettesheim and Anderson, JJ.
¶1. BROWN, P.J. This case concerns the manner in which a third offense
operating while intoxicated complaint was drafted by the district attorney's office. The facts
giving probable cause that Michael A. Smaxwell committed this crime were not specifically
contained in writing within the four corners of the complaint. Rather, an investigator for the
district attorney's office, who was not the arresting officer, swore under oath to the
truthfulness and reliability of an unsworn police incident report prepared by the arresting
officer. This unsworn incident report was attached to the criminal complaint. The trial court
dismissed the complaint because it did not use the legal term of art "incorporated by
reference" to meld the incident report into the complaint. We disagree with the trial
court's holding because it puts form over substance.
¶2. Smaxwell seeks to affirm the dismissal of the complaint on other grounds.
He argues that an investigating officer who has no eyewitness knowledge of an incident
cannot swear to the truthfulness and reliability of an unsworn incident report prepared by the
arresting officer. However, we hold that an investigator who is not an eyewitness can swear
to the reliability and truthfulness of the arresting officer's incident report where the incident
report is reliable.
¶3. The facts of this case are as follows. On May 22, 1999, Smaxwell was
issued a citation by Town of Menasha Police Officer Gary M. Cutler for a third offense of
operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of an intoxicant and with a prohibited
alcohol concentration contrary to Wis. Stat. §346.63(1)(a) and (b)
(1997-98).1 On June 29, 1999, the
Winnebago county district attorney filed a criminal complaint charging Smaxwell with the
above violations.
¶4. However, this was not a customary criminal complaint because the body of
the complaint contained no description of the events leading to Smaxwell's arrest. Instead,
the criminal complaint first set forth the crimes charged, their elements and penalties, and a
notice that all Smaxwell's vehicles were subject to seizure, equipment with an ignition
interlock device or immobilization. Then, rather than detailing the facts forming the basis of
the charges, a paragraph entitled "AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF CRIMINAL
COMPLAINT" stated that an incident report was attached to the complaint. The
paragraph read as follows:
R. Neebel, your complainant
states that he is an Investigator with the Winnebago County District Attorney's Office and
has had an opportunity to review the attached police reports and documents supporting this
complaint which are kept in the normal and ordinary course of business which your affiant
believes to be truthful and reliable and have proven so on numerous occasions in the past and
believes them to be accurate and reliable.
Investigator Richard P. Neebel, who was
not present at Smaxwell's arrest, signed under oath the criminal complaint. Stapled to the
criminal complaint was an incident report, a photocopy of the front and back of the citation
and a blood/urine analysis report. A measured reading of the attached incident report reveals
that Cutler, the arresting officer, prepared the incident report. The trial court dismissed the
complaint because it did not use the legal term of art "incorporated by reference"
to incorporate the incident report into the complaint.
¶5. The sufficiency of a complaint is a question of law that is reviewed de
novo. See State v. Manthey, 169 Wis. 2d 673, 685, 487
N.W.2d 44 (Ct. App. 1992). A criminal complaint is "a written statement of the
essential facts constituting the offense charged." See Wis. Stat. §
968.01(2). In order to establish probable cause, sufficient facts must be stated in the
criminal complaint. See Wis. Stat. § 968.03(1).2 The test for determining the sufficiency of a
complaint is common sense. "The complaint must be considered in its entirety, and be
given a common sense reading." State v. Knudson, 51 Wis. 2d
270, 275, 187 N.W.2d 321 (1971). The test of a complaint is of "minimal adequacy,
not in a hypertechnical but in a common sense evaluation, in setting forth the essential facts
establishing probable cause." State ex rel. Evanow v. Seraphim,
40 Wis. 2d 223, 226, 161 N.W.2d 369 (1968).
¶6. Thus, we must look to common sense to decide if use of the term
"attached" is sufficient to incorporate the incident report into the criminal
complaint. We hold that using the term "attached" does in fact incorporate the
document because "attached" and "incorporated by reference" mean
basically the same thing. The only real difference is that one term is used in everyday
language while the other term is most often employed by those who have a legal background.
But just because lay people use one term while lawyers customarily use another does not
mean that the lay term is legally suspect. In fact, unless a statute or case law calls for the
use of specific terminology, everyday language should be the preferred method of
communicating. See Walters v. Reno, 145 F.3d 1032, 1041 (9th Cir.
1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1003 (1999) (holding that aliens' due process right
to meaningful notice was violated where waiver forms were "so bureaucratic and
cumbersome and in some respects so uninformative and in others so misleading that even
those ... with a reasonable command of the English language would not receive adequate
notice from them"); see generally Joseph Kimble, Answering the
Critics of Plain Language, 5 Scribes J. Legal Writing 51 (1994-95). Here, a
commonsense reading of the affidavit stating that Neebel had an opportunity to read the
"attached" incident report and swore to its truthfulness and reliability indicates
that the incident report was intended to be included in the criminal complaint. We hold that
the trial court's ruling to the contrary is unnecessarily formalistic.
¶7. We acknowledge that State v. Williams, 47 Wis. 2d
242, 252, 177 N.W.2d 611 (1970), holds that "[o]nly if affidavits or transcripts of
testimony are specifically incorporated by reference in the complaint and made a part of it
can they be used to show probable cause for issuance of a warrant." However, the
court in Williams did not state that the legal term of art must be used to
incorporate a document into a criminal complaint. See id. We read
Williams to say that to incorporate a document into a complaint some
statement in the body of the complaint must indicate that another document, outside the four
corners of the complaint itself, is intended to be included in the complaint.
¶8. Smaxwell urges us to affirm on other grounds. He sees the issue as being
whether Neebel, the complainant, who was not an eyewitness to the arrest, can swear to the
truthfulness and reliability of the unsworn incident report prepared by Cutler, the arresting
officer. Smaxwell urges that because the criminal complaint must be made under oath and
the incident report was not sworn to by the arresting officer, but only was sworn to by
Neebel, who had no personal knowledge of the underlying facts, the criminal complaint fails
to establish probable cause. For this proposition, he cites Giordenello v. United
States, 357 U.S. 480, 485-86 (1958) (holding that a warrant did not establish
probable cause because complainant officer had no personal knowledge of the alleged facts
supporting the warrant).
¶9. We reject this argument. Our supreme court has held that a
non-eyewitness complainant can swear to the truthfulness and reliability of an eyewitness's
unsworn statement, provided the complainant can establish the personal and observational
reliability of the eyewitness. See Knudson, 51 Wis. 2d at 277.
¶10. In this case, a number of factors indicate that Cutler, the arresting officer
whose incident report was relied upon, had personal and observational reliability. First,
Cutler observed and participated in the facts set forth in the police report, which are
incorporated into the complaint. Information based on the personal observations of police
officers made while acting in their official capacity is considered trustworthy.
See P.A.K. v. State, 119 Wis. 2d 871, 888, 350 N.W.2d 677
(1984). Second, Cutler has personal and observational reliability because even though he did
not swear to the truthfulness of the incident report under oath, falsifying the incident report
would subject him to felony prosecution for misconduct in public office contrary to Wis.
Stat. § 946.12. Finally, Cutler was reliable because Neebel swore that he had an
opportunity to review the attached incident report and that such documents were kept in the
normal and ordinary course of police business. Furthermore, Neebel swore that he believed
the document to be truthful and reliable and that incident reports prepared by Cutler had
proven on numerous occasions in the past to be accurate and reliable. In short, Neebel was
able to swear to the reliability of Cutler's incident report because Cutler is a reliable
eyewitness.
By the Court.-Order reversed.
Recommended for publication in the official reports.
1 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 1997-98 version.
2 Smaxwell does not claim that the underlying facts were insufficient to establish probable
cause.